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Summary 
 
This study examines intra-party power in the Liberal Democrats, looking at the formal role and 
remit of the various sectors that make up the party bureaucracy, and evaluating the exercise of 
power with regard to policy, campaigning and the use of resources.  It is interested in two 
overarching questions: has the party professionalised, and has power moved toward the top? If so 
could this have had an impact on its electoral success?   
 
The theoretical context for this study is a well-established tradition of scholarship on party 
organisation going back to Moise Ostrogorski (1902) and Robert Michels (1911). The hierarchical 
nature of party organisations has been a constant refrain in this literature, especially in respect of 
major parties that are serious contenders for governmental office (McKenzie 1963; Kirchheimer 
1966; Panebianco 1988; Katz & Mair 1995). This thesis offers a test of these theories by applying 
them to a smaller party that gradually evolved from a party of opposition to a party of government. 
While the incentives for intra-party centralisation are clear in office-seeking parties (the leadership 
requires maximum autonomy in order to devise and adapt a competitive strategy), this research 
explores whether it is a necessary precursor to electoral success.   It will test whether the party 
has become more professional, or top-down, by looking at the policy making process, at the way 
the party campaigns, and at its distribution of resources.  Finally the thesis examines the role of 
intra-party politics in achieving and maintaining the coalition with the Conservatives negotiated in 
May 2010.  
 
The research spans the lifetime of the party from 1988 to present day, and relies on an extensive 
series of semi-structured interviews with 70 individuals connected to the party including prominent 
politicians, senior staff and ordinary members. It argues that the party has become significantly 
more professional during this time, and that this was a contributory factor in delivering office.  
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
i) Introduction 
 
In May 2010 the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats took just five days to agree an historic 
coalition that appeared to many to be counter-intuitive.  This study examines intra-party power in 
the Liberal Democrats and argues that entry into coalition should have come as no surprise.   It 
challenges assumptions about the party‟s grassroots orientation and suggests instead that the 
party leadership was able to pull off coalition at least partly as a result of long-term organisational 
change that has seen it become more professionalised, more centralised and with regard to these 
two key elements, as much an electoral-professional party as Labour and the Conservatives. 
 
Since 1988 the party has changed.  Its bureaucracy has expanded in tandem with an overall 
growth in support, and professionalism has followed.  It shifted to the left under Kennedy and to 
the right under Clegg.  At the same time a series of subtle changes have happened within the 
party‟s support base. Gone are the beards and sandals, replaced instead with a clean-shaven, 
suited and booted activist, many of whom cut their teeth in council chambers up and down the 
country.  It now relies not just on its givers of time – the army of focus-leaflet deliverers – but on its 
givers of money – hedge-fund managers and corporate supporters.   Organisationally it now 
resembles a smaller version of its two larger rivals. These developments are consistent with much 
of the party organisational literature which has long emphasised the point that electorally oriented 
parties tend to give greater autonomy to leaders who need it to play the game of party competition 
with maximum strategic flexibility (McKenzie 1955; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Katz and 
Mair 1994).  Indeed such flexibility plays a vital role for a party whose most realistic hopes of office 
lie in negotiating with its rivals. The hierarchical nature of parties has been a constant refrain in this 
literature, particularly in respect of those which are serious contenders for governmental office, a 
position only very recently realised by the Liberal Democrats.  This is, of course, an over-
simplification. The party remains bound by a constitution that can restrict the leader on matters of 
policy and binds him or her to a set of powerful democratically elected internal committees. It is, 
therefore, a party in transition.  
 
This research fills a gap in the literature both about the Lib Dems and about party organisational 
change.  It helps us gain an overall understanding of the character of an under-studied third party, 
that has now become a „party of office‟, making this research all the more salient (Katz and Mair 
2002).  It also allows for a detailed empirical study of party organisation adding to a number of 
other case-studies (Bille 1997; Webb, Farrell et al. 2002), important because they are based on 
the premise that party organisational tendencies contribute to our understanding of the wider 
political system. As well as exploring the party‟s grassroots orientation this study also challenges 
the assumption that the Liberal Democrats are naturally inclined to the left. What emerges is a 
picture of a party less driven by ideology than used to be assumed, difficult to place in the right/left 
spectrum but held together by broad ideological aspirations and political pragmatism.   Although 
this thesis focuses on party organisation rather than party ideology, an understanding of the 
different beliefs of those within it, and which are dominant, can provide some useful indications of 
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where power lies.    Unlike the Labour party it is „under-factionalised‟ (Grayson 2010) making 
protagonists and cliques hard to identify (Grayson 2010).  Unlike the Conservatives in recent years 
it did not publicly, self-consciously and openly embrace change (Bale 2010).  What has happened 
instead has been a gradual, quiet and subtle evolution in which vote-seeking, seat-maximising and 
ultimately office-holding, have become the all important goals, at the leadership level at least.  
 
The party known as the Liberal Democrats has at its origins in the merging of two parties, one of 
which was born out of a fundamental disagreement over party organisation.  Whether the Gang of 
Four chose the issue, or “the issue chose them” (Crewe and King 1995), the Limehouse 
Declaration explicitly criticizes the Labour Party for moving away from its “commitment to 
parliamentary government” and so set out its centre-left, top-down, electorally expedient agenda.1  
That this new party sought to merge with the Liberals, and bring together two very different 
organisational tendencies, is important to this study.  It re-emerges throughout the research, 
raising questions about the relationship between its origins and questions about the party‟s 
ideological identity and organisational coherence.   As such the party “bears the mark of its 
formation” (Panebianco 1988) and for this reason the thesis compares the party as it is now with 
the party it once was, and looks at a series of events over time, beginning with its formation in 
1988.   The thesis looks at all aspects of the party‟s organisation, borrowing from other work that 
looks at the individuals, interests, ideas and institutions that make up the political party (Helco 
1994; Russell 2005; Bale 2010).  Without any one of these four features the study would be 
incomplete and it is the ways in which these features interact with one another that gives us the 
most comprehensive understanding of intra-party power. 
 
ii)  Research Questions  
 
The first research question asks if the Party has become more centralised during its first 22 years. 
The party has a federal structure, and is often therefore described as „de-centralised‟.  In this 
thesis the term „centralisation‟ means the process of drawing power toward the centre, in this case 
more specifically, toward the Leader and parliamentary party.  It should not be confused with 
devolution, to which the Liberal Democrats and predecessor parties have historically been 
committed and which divides the party in to state parties which are governed separately, with their 
own constitutions, leaders, and now in Wales and Scotland, their own Parliament and Assembly
2
.   
We are concerned with the federal party and power within the organisation as it relates to the UK 
government.  This study focuses on whether there has been a gradual subversion of power away 
from the party‟s grassroots and toward the party elite. It looks for evidence of changes in the 
relationship between the parliamentary party and the extra parliamentary party.  Or are the 
divisions ideological, harking back to the division between former members of the SDP and Liberal 
parties, or those more recently organised under the „social liberal‟ versus „economic liberal‟ 
                                                                    
1.  The Limehouse Declaration, issued by Shirley Williams, David Owen, Bill Rodgers and Roy Jenkins to the Press 
Association on 25th January 1981. http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=73&item=history  
accessed 5.10.10. 
2
  The impact of devolution on intra-party relations is discussed in more detail in Hough, D. and C. Jeffery, Eds. 
(2006). Devolution and Electoral Politics. Manchester, Manchester University Press.   The “co-existence” of 
genuinely autonomous state parties and centralising tendencies at the federal level in the third party, is explained 
here as contributing, largely through the experience of coalition, to the party‟s overall strategy of electoral gain 
(p238). 
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banners? (see Hickson 2010).  We examine the extent to which the interview data, much of it 
reflecting the perception among the party elite, demonstrates that centralisation and 
professionalisation are necessary preconditions in order for the party to a) adopt successful 
electoral strategies and b) grant sufficient flexibility to the leadership in order to negotiate cross-
party coalitions. There is no doubt that prior to May 2010 the Liberal Democrats failed to make the 
independent breakthrough in electoral terms at Westminster, that many had hoped for, and so the 
first hypothesis, H1, states that the Lib Dems, as a party interested in maximising seats in order to 
gain executive power, underwent a process of centralisation.  This tests the „iron law‟ put forward 
by Michels and posits that the internal changes described, particularly under Campbell and Clegg, 
were a factor in the Liberal Democrats gaining power (Michels 1911).   
 
The second hypothesis allows for a more detailed examination of one of the key elements of party 
change, professionalisation.  In addition to H1, this second hypothesis (H2) states that the Lib 
Dems, as a party interested in maximising seats in order to gain executive power, underwent a 
process of professionalisation. The difference between these two, which are closely related but 
often confused and treated as if interchangeable, is explained by Robert Harmel: 
professionalisation is to do with organisational complexity, while centralisation affects 
organisational power (Harmel 2002).  Although centralisation and professionalisation are quite 
different, the relationship between these two elements of organisational change is also considered. 
These questions bring the thesis up to the point at which the party entered into coalition with the 
Conservatives in May 2010.  Room is also made for an assessment of what we might expect to 
happen in the future in the Liberal Democrats generally and therefore  further our understanding of 
the internal workings of political parties in Britain.    
 
iii)  Context  
 
In keeping with a diachronic design the thesis charts the party‟s evolution from being in single 
figures in the polls and close to bankruptcy in 1988, to attracting multi-million pound donations and 
being in government in 2010.  Significant moments in the party‟s history emerge throughout the 
study as evidence of party organisational change. In particular the party doubled its numbers in 
Westminster following the 1997 general election, and benefited from the accompanying „Short 
money‟ (introduced by Harold Wilson‟s government in 1974 to assist opposition parties with their 
parliamentary duties), which allowed it to fulfil some of its aims toward professionalisation.  
Outside the party this phase was also significant in that it signalled the failure of Paddy Ashdown‟s 
ambitions to work with the Labour Party, his so-called „project‟ withering as Blair‟s popularity grew.   
After Ashdown‟s resignation in 1999 the tenure of Charles Kennedy saw the party shift both 
organisationally and politically. A very different leader in both style and political inclination, 
Kennedy was more laid-back and during his eight years as party leader presided loosely over an 
organisation that became somewhat more fragmented, resulting in a diffuse distribution of power 
across a number of different bases.  His opposition to the Iraq War put the party distinctively on 
the political map, and while not intentionally positioning the party to the left of Labour, drew its 
increase in electoral support from precisely that group of voters (Russell 2005). The series of 
16 
 
 
personal disasters that befell not just Kennedy but other senior parliamentarians in the party is 
also significant in that it generated a solidarity and leadership-loyalty behind Nick Clegg in 2008, 
that contributed to the ease with which he was able to negotiate the coalition (Grayson 2010).  
 
Although less visible to political scientists until now, there has also been a quiet and significant 
shift of emphasis within the party. In particular two relatively minor events signify this.  Firstly, 
according to insiders, one of the party‟s main benefactors, Paul Marshall, disappointed with the 
party‟s incremental growth at general elections, and frustrated by its arguably nostalgic 
commitment to ‟pavement politics‟,3 not only rekindled ideological debate by co-authoring The 
Orange Book, seen by many as a turning point back toward economic liberalism, but shortly 
afterwards gave a £1m donation to fund a new think-tank, Centre Forum, which carried these 
ideas to a wide audience.
4
  Secondly, Ming Campbell‟s short period in office is not without 
importance for this study. Aware of the frustrations of being a Liberal Democrat Leader, and 
regularly warned of the dangers of being seen as the „caretaker‟, Campbell began to highlight the 
inadequacies of „weak party structure‟ and set about reforming it (Campbell 2006).  Soon after his 
departure his successor Nick Clegg set up „The Party Reform Commission‟ (known as The Bones 
Commission), the most wide-ranging and significant internal review in the party‟s history, published 
in September 2008.  It brings together the many strands of opinion about its organisational origins, 
strategic development and internal operation. The impact of it‟s recommendations are still the 
subject of some debate, and are an ongoing indication of the tensions inherent in the organisation.  
There is little doubt, however, that Nick Clegg‟s leadership ambitions and the Liberal-Democrat 
Conservative coalition itself, were in part facilitated by these factors, which we examine in detail.   
 
iv)  Chapter outlines 
 
In order to set out the areas of particular interest in this study, the thesis is divided in to four main 
sections;  
 
I  Research Foundations 
II The Liberal Democrats 1988-2010  
III Power and decision-making  
IV Conclusions.     
 
The opening section, Research Foundations, comprises two chapters that cover the background to 
the production of this thesis: Chapter 1 (Introduction) and Chapter 2 (Literature Review).  The 
introductory chapter looks at the research questions that are posed, how these might be 
operationalised in practice, the overall hypotheses and a detailed explanation of the methodology 
and research methods.  The second chapter provides a detailed literature review that spans the 
classic works of political science (Ostrogorski 1902; Michels 1911; McKenzie 1955; Kirchheimer 
1969), as well as more recent literature on party models and party organisational change 
(Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1994; Katz and Mair 1994; Katz and Mair 2002).  In 
                                                                    
3
  Interview 27, 2010. 
4
  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article538115.ece (accessed 23.03.2011). 
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particular it asks if the party now conforms to the electoral-professional model and how this 
research makes use of some of the themes in the literature on party classification.  Since the 
creation of the Liberal Democrats in 1988, there have been a number of historical accounts 
(MacIver 1996, Douglas 2005), one detailed study that focuses on grass roots campaigning 
(Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006) and recently an enlivened debate about ideology (Hickson 2010). 
However none has covered party organisational change in any depth.    
 
The second section of the thesis aims to provide a historical framework for the study.    It is divided 
into two chapters: Chapter 3 (Background) and Chapter 4 (Constitution and formal party 
structure).  Given the lack of literature specifically on the Liberal Democrats, Chapter 3    provides 
a background, with analysis that explains key moments in the party‟s development. These include 
the formation of the SDP, the Liberal-SDP Alliance, merger and creation of the Liberal Democrats.  
It asks what motivated the merger, and focuses on key phases in party development and how 
these correspond to different periods of  leadership.  This chapter also looks at the party‟s 
electoral fortunes and how the party has performed at general elections, by-elections and local 
elections as well as how it has fared since devolution. It charts the party‟s move from a distinctly 
third and somewhat irrelevant entity, into a mainstream opposition party in 2005 (Webb 2005) and 
party of government in 2010.  It also attempts to provide a sense of what else was going on of 
relevance outside the party, to situate it in the political landscape (although without attempting to 
offer a comparative study).  It looks at which individuals are associated with change and closes 
with an examination of the events building up to the 2010 general election.  This chapter 
demonstrates that the party launched in 1988 was a new entity and a new organisation and for this 
reason the period of time being examined begins with the birth of the Liberal Democrats. 
 
Chapter 4 describes how the party formally organises its various functions.  The Lib Dems are a 
complex and changing organisation and this section aims to explain the formal constitution and 
federal nature of the party in full, assessing where significant changes and adaptations have been 
made.  It explains the party constitution, setting out its federal structure, the role of membership 
and local parties, the Federal Executive and other key committees, the parliamentary party, 
president and leader. It explains how the party elects various key individuals and committees, 
candidate selection and the role of various associated bodies, particularly the Association of 
Liberal Democrat Councillors (ALDC) and the party‟s youth and students organisation (Liberal 
Youth). It also looks at how the party bureaucracy has grown informally, looking at associated 
party magazines and newspapers, think-tanks and various other significant developments such as 
communicating with the party through the internet and the first web-based party conferencing 
system „CIX‟.  It explains the party‟s formal rules and how it is intended to function as an institution 
and concludes that while the constitution remains robust there is a great deal going on outside its 
confines. 
 
The third section of the thesis looks at the most extensive body of empirical data collected for this 
research project. It is largely based on semi-structured interviews, and looks at three areas in 
which power can be exercised in the party: Chapter 5 on the formulation of policy, Chapter 6 on 
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campaigning and Chapter 7 on the distribution of resources.  These three areas are the focus 
because as well as being implicit in the literature (Webb, Farrell et al. 2002) they are those aspects 
of political life that have traditionally set the Liberal Democrats apart from its two larger rivals. The 
Lib Dems, in the widest sense, view their party largely as one that believes in grassroots 
involvement in policy, campaigning and the distribution of resources.  This thesis examines each 
of these assumptions and finds a move toward both centralisation and professionalisation, at 
varying paces, while continuing to demonstrate a democratic policy-making process.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on policy, in particular at the party‟s Federal Policy Committee (FPC) and 
conference, and the increasingly significant role played by the parliamentary party and leader. 
Evaluating the detail of this process both in theory and in practice allows for a test of the growth in 
the centralisation of party bureaucracy. According to their constitution, the Liberal Democrat 
Conference is its sovereign body and responsibility for making policy rests with it. The party has 
been caricatured as one that enjoys the opportunity to „give the leader a bloody nose‟ by rejecting 
his policy proposals at conference.  More recently, however, it has become a twice-yearly 
showcase event to endorse the elite, to rubber stamp party business, and raise funds.  The 
parliamentary party has increased in size and significance, producing themed policy papers and 
making increased use of media opportunities at conference, while differences of opinion are now 
more likely to be hammered out behind closed doors in party committees. The party leader has to 
contend with a potentially rebellious parliamentary party, but at the same time enjoys significant 
autonomy over the production of the manifesto.  Finally this section asks if the purpose and status 
of party policy has changed, particularly in facilitating the flexibility necessary to negotiate coalition. 
Has the character of the party changed or has it just become more efficient, better managed and 
more professional? The chapter concludes with two detailed case-studies of Liberal Democrat 
policy on a) the decision to speak at the „Stop the War‟ rally, which highlights a brief phase of 
grassroots militancy, and b) the policy on the abolition of university tuition fees, which 
demonstrates the enduring power of the Federal Policy Committee. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the party‟s campaigning tradition. It looks at the development of the party‟s 
successful targeting strategy and how it approaches what it calls the „ground-war‟.  Here the 
relationship between the party bureaucracy and its grassroots is important and has undergone a 
period of change in which the party has centralised and standardised much of its campaigning 
activity.   The way the party finds, selects, nominates and trains its candidates is explained as well 
as examining how much autonomy local parties are able to exercise over these decisions.  Here 
we use the term „grassroots‟ to describe party members and activists. It may also describe activists 
that hold office in local councils or those that are elected on to federal party committees, but would 
exclude those elected to national office (MPs) or employed by the federal party.  A brief series of 
case-studies demonstrate how this process can be controlled from the centre.   Party 
communications are examined here together with the impact of the growth in the new media and 
the use of the intra-net as a standardising tool. The prominent role played by Chris Rennard, who 
became very powerful, both devising the party‟s strategy, and seeing through its implementation 
as Director of Campaigns, then Chief Executive, over a 20 year period, is assessed here.  
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Conclusions are drawn from looking at the party‟s success in by-elections and local elections in all 
areas of the UK, not just its traditional rural heartlands, and incremental growth at Westminster, as 
well as at and some of its mistakes, including the gradual waning of the impact of targeting and the 
unsuccessful „decapitation‟ strategy aimed at winning Tory seats in 2005. Although the party 
clearly failed to break through in the terms necessary to signal a permanent end to the two-party 
hegemony, it appears to have been successful in the re-orientation of its goals from vote-
maximising to office-maximising and negotiating a role as the junior partner in coalition 
government.         
 
Finally the last of these three substantive chapters, Chapter 7 examines how the party makes use 
of its human and financial resources. Without the reliable backing of business, union or interest 
group donations, the Liberal Democrats have always convincingly argued that their development, 
strategy and degrees of professionalism are dictated by a lack of resources. Here it is argued that, 
although this lack of resources may impact on the extent to which it is able to put its aims into 
practice, it presents no barrier to the party‟s aspiration toward professionalisation.  The party has 
undergone two major reviews of its internal bureaucracy, in 1997 with The Medium Term Review, 
and 2008 with The Bones Commission.  Both of these recommended the party rearrange its 
organisation to streamline, to reflect the reality of electoral competition and to enable the 
leadership. These internal documents, along with Electoral Commission data and interview 
evidence, allows us to build a coherent picture of party priorities, through an assessment of 
funding, spending and staffing patterns.  Finally this chapter looks at what the party has in its gift, 
particularly the giving of peerages.  What is of interest here is the leadership‟s refusal to take note 
of the grassroots „interim peers list‟, a democratic process agreed at conference, but to which he is 
not bound. It demonstrates a gulf between the elite and the grassroots in this important aspect of 
party activity, where Peers outnumber, and could potentially outflank, MPs.   
 
Chapter 8 (Findings and Conclusions) reiterates the findings outlined in previous chapters and 
asks what conclusions can be drawn from them.  It makes the case that the gradual strengthening 
of the leader‟s hand was important in enabling Nick Clegg to gain power, in support of H1 and H2 
(see p14).  It does this by explaining that a combination of factors have led to this, in particular a 
series of events that lend itself to a path-dependent explanation of outcomes (Pierson 2000) There 
has been a twin-track process at work, in which the party‟s parliamentary activity has become 
much more professional and the campaigning activity at Cowley Street has become more 
centralised. At the same time and while the party continues to elect important committees and 
make policy at twice-yearly democratic conferences, the leader has been able to exercise an 
increasingly free-hand.  In a party so long without power, without a reliable income and frustrated 
by the two-party squeeze, the grassroots have practiced political pragmatism and leadership-
loyalty above all else, in the shared goal of office-maximising.  The thesis closes with Chapter 9 
(Epilogue) where the events of May 2010 and the party entering in to an historic coalition with the 
Conservatives is examined in light of these hypotheses.  
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v) Strategy, methods and logic 
 
The framework for this study is one that enables the examination of both the institution of the party 
and individuals within it. It owes much to the traditional historical institutional perspective that 
suggests a cyclical pattern to party organisation in which either actors change structures or vice-
versa, as a consequence of environment or events.   In particular the two phases of internal reform 
are pinpointed as moments of organisational reform - the 1997 Medium Term Review and the 
2008 Bones Commission.  They act as useful focal points since documentation and the process 
leading to it gives set of clear reflections and recommendations for change. It is, however, too 
simplistic to see these in isolation and divorced from other aspects of party life that will have 
played a part in their coming about.  The events and shifting complex relationships between both 
groups and individuals within the organisation, as well as external factors such as electoral 
competition and events outside the political centre may also be important factors.  
 
Just as politics in general can be seen as a process of consensus and conflict among 
interdependent individuals, intra-party politics is also marked by the consensual and 
conflicting relationship among interdependent party sub-groups. (Hellman 2011) 
 
This study was designed in order to give different weight to each of the different sectors of the 
party, the „sub-groups‟, in order to understand who or what may have been powerful at a given 
time, and influence change or the reinforcement of the status quo.   It is based on the premise that 
a complete understanding of the motives and methods employed by a political party are 
impossible to understand in their entirety.  As the research demonstrates, there are many shades 
of opinion, including different versions of the same event and it is impossible to say with absolute 
certainty what is accurate.  A greater understanding is, however, possible using a combination of 
methods and triangulation.  This research has been designed in order to offer a thorough 
understanding of both the institution of the party, with an examination of the constitution and formal 
rules, as well as the day to day conduct of official party business, while at the same time 
describing the informal workings of the party and looking at the roles played by key individuals.  It 
aims to capture the character of the party, using a combination of data drawn from an extensive 
schedule of semi-structured interviews, biography and autobiography, blogs, newspapers, web 
articles and case-studies.  The systems the party has devised in order to solve organisational 
problems and to maximise its goals provides a number of competing explanations, and the 
primacy of leadership is a theme that runs throughout.   It stops short and deliberately so, of 
making claims about structure and agency, in part because they polarise two views that this study 
intends to blend, and because the key components of that debate can be confounded by insider 
research.  To make claims about the institution of the party while having been an individual 
engaged in its activity over a long period of time, and having developed close personal and 
professional relationships with many of the individuals involved, is problematic.   Equally to base 
this research entirely on that personal experience and to overlook the importance of its formal 
rules and structures, would be to simplify and narrow the scope of its focus.  The work contained in 
this project, then, strives to achieve neutrality, makes good and relevant use of access, and 
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therefore examines the party through a combined approach to the questions of what constitutes 
facts, and knowledge, and what can be claimed with a degree of certainty.  
 
One approach that was considered and that adds explanatory power to political science, was a 
comparison of the Liberal Democrats with their rivals – the Conservatives and Labour party.  
Having been fortunate enough to find the Lib Dems fully co-operative with this research, and 
providing privileged access to senior interviewees, the comparative angle was outweighed.   It was 
also apparent that the gap in the literature meant that this study would involve a significant amount 
of empirical research and descriptive content. For this reason the study is comparative across 
time, and seeks to compare the Liberal Democrats as they are in 2011, with the party since its 
creation in 1988.  
 
The research was conducted using a series of semi-structured interviews, (see Appendix A) and 
these were carried out in three broad stages.  In the early stages of this research a number of 
informal discussions with former colleagues were carried out, to gauge over-all co-operation, 
questions of access and what resistance, if any, the research might encounter.     This was off the 
record and aimed largely at being able to proceed with the second and third stages of research in 
the most efficient manner.  The second phase of research comprised the main body of semi-
structured interviews, including a formal request in writing, usually by email, and a standard form 
for giving consent to conduct the interview, tape it and use the transcripts.   Interviews were initially 
conducted on the record, although after the first few it became clear that being able to attribute 
statements to certain individuals had to come second to getting more closely involved in the 
answers themselves. Interviews were subsequently conducted off the record, a well-understood 
tradition in political circles, and respondents were mostly open and unguarded. In total 70 people 
were interviewed, 6 of whom were interviewed on more than one occasion, typically lasting 45 
minutes each, fully taped and transcribed, during a period of 18 months. It was anticipated that the 
questions themselves might generate an informal discussion among MPs and Peers, particularly 
given my insider position. For this reason long gaps between the interviews would have been 
counterproductive and so colleagues were grouped together.  In preparation for the interviews as 
well as the theoretical framework already explained, the use of biographies and auto-biographies 
proved particularly useful (Ashdown 2000; Ashdown 2001; Campbell 2006; Hurst 2006).  It 
enabled questions that went beyond the descriptive and used the biographies as a starting point 
from which to ask more questions about motivations.   Autobiography as a research resource is 
sometimes dismissed as a resource in qualitative inquiry since it can only convey one view and 
should be seen in the context of ongoing political competition (Creswell 1988, p49) although in this 
research, and in the absence of much other material, it provides a helpful starting point for elite 
interview questions.  The data autobiography offers needs to be treated with caution and as 
secondary data provides an account of key events that, as Burnham & Gilland say, „are most 
effectively employed in combination with elite interviewing and/or with the analysis of primary 
documents‟ (Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004 p169). The third and final stage of the interview process 
was to save a number of key interviews to be conducted last and once the writing up process had 
started. This was in order to take into account gaps that would inevitably appear in the data and 
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analysis.    
 
As many of the texts on qualitative research methods predicted, the success of the interview 
process depended on re-examining the questions and approach, and adjusting accordingly along 
the way (Creswell 1998; Shostak 2006). In particular, just at the moment when the interview data 
appeared to be reaching a saturation point, when interviewees were repeating one another and 
the overall body of material had been gathered, the 2010 general election and subsequent 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition introduced an entirely new set of circumstances.5  This 
had the impact of sharpening the focus from what might happen, to what had happened, and 
generated a further tranche of interviews.  The majority of the research was prepared and 
conducted, however, with little regard to the possible outcome of the 2010 general election, and 
should be seen in this light. Suffice to say though, that a thesis must have a beginning and an end, 
and in order to make the work achievable it was decided to use coalition as the concluding 
moment, leaving the door open for further research.   The questions that subsequently arose are 
therefore collected in the Epilogue.  
 
vi)  Rationale and methodology - Insider status and mitigation 
 
This research methodology starts from the premise that, while academic research about party 
structures can provide a framework for greater understanding of party organisation, it is the actors 
that hold the key.   A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is used, with data 
supplied by official party records together with a series of semi-structured interviews. Prior to 
interviews, data was collected about the remit of each body based on formal party literature, past 
and present, the timing of significant changes to its organisation and the allocation of resources.  
 
There is no shortage of academic literature on the workings of political parties, but detailed 
accounts of the movements of power within the organisation are rare.  The classic literature 
provides explanations for this, and includes a number of warnings.  Daalder‟s verdict still holds that 
„internal party processes…to this day remain very much a blank spot in comparative analyses‟ 
(Daadler 1983: p3). Although some of Michels‟ assertions about the work of political parties and 
the superiority of the leading class is dated, he was particularly insightful about the reluctance by 
political parties to be scrutinised in any detail.  He noted that the parties themselves resent and 
resist such study, and „react with the utmost energy against any attempt to analyse their structure 
or their nature, as if it were a method of vivisection‟ (Daalder 1983).  Rohrschnider summed up the 
obstacles to gathering data from conference representative or party members, which seems to 
apply equally well to a study of party elites (Rohrschneider 2006). They will present a united front 
in the face of electoral competition, which in turn means that internal controversies are likely to be 
covered up, which may give a false impression to claims to Michels‟ „iron law‟. Furthermore, 
observing parties in this way is necessarily „past orientated‟, since the victor of any intra-party 
                                                                    
5  A survey of staff had been prepared along similar lines to that conducted by Paul Webb and Justin Fisher  
in 2003. This was abandoned since it was thought that the period immediately before the 2010 general  
election, and immediately after in which the party suffered significant redundancies, was atypical . See Webb, P. 
and J. Fisher (2003). "Professionalism and the Millbank Tendency: The Political Sociology of New Labour's 
Employees." Politics 23(1): 10-20. 
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battle will be the one most likely to be in a prominent position from which to write their version of 
history (Rohrschneider 2006). Others have commented on the problems of electoral competition in 
the study of political parties - that is to say the inevitability of a political party wishing to present 
itself to the electorate as a united organisation, will naturally mask internal divisions (Duverger 
1954). Similarly epistemological questions are inevitable when asking those in positions of power 
to tell the story about how they got there (see McKenzie 1955 , Kavanagh 1984, p10). It is to be 
expected that a party engaged in ongoing electoral competition will treat academic scrutiny as just 
another arena in which to present itself in the most positive light. Research should therefore be 
designed to take this in to account, and mitigate or at least explain the problems this may present.  
 
Firstly, why look at the Liberal Democrats at all?  The Liberal Democrats are broadly speaking an 
under-studied part of British politics, which is an omission that needs rectifying. Potentially they 
offer political science three benefits; 
 
1. Difference – the Lib Dems are unique in the UK Parliament in four potentially significant 
ways;  being created from the merger of two former parties, having a federal structure, 
being permanently in opposition and electing two figure-heads, the Party Leader and the 
President.  
 
2. Sameness – the Lib Dems provide a campaigning and communications experience 
legitimately comparable with the other two parties. 
 
3.  Challenge to classic theory – concentration by political scientists on the two major     
      parties has left theory only partially tested. 
 
Secondly, how does the position of the researcher potentially influence the work itself?  As a 
former member of party staff (1990-2005) it is important to explain and briefly explore the pros and 
cons of insider research.    To begin with it is worthwhile being explicit about the nature of that 
employment and so in this paper where this is relevant it is declared in the footnotes.  This should 
allow for an understanding of the a priori knowledge that naturally accompanies it. It is also worth 
noting that although an academic perspective may deem this insider research, that is not a view 
shared by the party, for whom the years that have elapsed between my employment and the 
completion of this paper, render that part of the past. It would be false to use the term „insider‟ 
other than in the present tense, although there is no doubt that the process of conducting this 
research was influenced by this former relationship. Familiarity with a number of senior figures, 
indeed with the majority of those contained in the interview list, meant that obtaining interviews, 
and sometimes returning to them for clarification, was made easy.  It also meant that I had the 
advantage of knowing a number of those that fell out of favour, lost their jobs or positions or chose 
to leave, whose perspective was often different from those that continue to work for the party.  
Such familiarity however, might have inclined this research to only seek the views of those I have 
easy access to, and is something I aimed to overcome by seeking to interview those individuals 
that held office but with whom I did not work closely.  
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In the early stages of research a mitigation exercise was completed with the assistance of 
colleagues at  the University of Sussex, and sought to take in to account the questions raised by 
insider status. In summary this exercise looked at questions about objectivity raised by the process 
of obtaining research data, and the assessment of the data itself.   Taking the three focuses of 
research certain elements are particularly worthy of note. Firstly I did not work for the party in any 
function specifically associated with the formulation of policy, that is in the policy unit, as a 
specialist (portfolio) researcher, in the Whips Office or in any way that associates me with certain 
policies or ideologies. My role was primarily as an administrative and research assistant providing 
back-up material to other party officials.  Secondly I have not worked for the party in a capacity 
formally associated with campaigns, in the campaigns department for instance, or been in any way 
closely associated with a particular campaign strategy.   Assessments of these areas of party 
activity have been undertaken without the real need for any mitigation.  Thirdly, where the thesis is 
concerned with the professionalisation of the party, and in particular its use of resources, both 
financial and human, is a question that has at times relied on questions prompted by personal 
experience.   The research period spans over two decades and although I have been engaged in 
party activity in a number of positions including as staff in both Houses of Parliament and at party 
HQ I have attempted to mitigate bias by conducting a substantial number of interviews with staff 
that were both senior to me and often worked over a longer term. Furthermore, a large number of 
interviews were conducted with people that began working for the party post-2006.  
 
In the process of designing and conducting this research two key points should be noted.  The 
Liberal Democrats have gone from being a small, amateurish and family-like organisation, to being 
significantly larger, and as this thesis demonstrates, more professional.   Access to individuals has 
undoubtedly been privileged although it is clear from the large number of interviews conducted that 
no consistent line in regard to the questions posed could have been orchestrated by the party. It is 
fair to assume that the data represents the views of the wide spectrum of those interviewed. This 
is supported by the variety of opinions collected.  Secondly, an open and professionally revised 
research design was prepared in order to avoid bias that might interfere with any conclusions.  
Early fears that the party might in some way consider the research a threat, a betrayal of 
professional loyalty or most reasonably a nuisance, have (contrary to the literature‟s warnings) 
proved generally unfounded. The research has been deliberately constructed to make best use of 
party documents and quantitative data that is already in the public domain, and to draw inferences 
by triangulating this with the interview data.  Interviews were conducted off the record and tape 
recorded, often by both parties and I have been explicit during that process about my questions 
and in explaining the purpose of the research at every stage.   It is important to note, particularly 
given the sensitive nature of the questions posed, that for the individuals interviewed and the 
suddenly somewhat higher stakes for a party recently engaged in coalition government, that they 
were expressly given under anonymity and this is strenuously protected.  
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vii) Conclusion 
 
The thesis has been designed to fill a gap in the literature on the Liberal Democrats and contribute 
to the literature on party organisational change. It includes descriptive chapters in order to provide 
a proper context for the substantive chapters that follow.  It takes in to account that it is conducted 
from the position of a former party insider, and makes every effort to mitigate against any bias this 
may generate.  It was prepared and designed at a time when it was hard to forsee the events of 
May 2010, even if, as this thesis suggests, the outcome should not have come as a surprise.  
Recent developments may make this research all the more salient, but in the interests of drawing 
the thesis to a conclusion, the period covered reaches a logical end with the May 2010 coalition.  
Questions that arise from the period following May 2010 are, however, important and worthy of 
note and are contained in an epilogue to this thesis. The vast majority of interviews were 
conducted before May 2010, and the opinions expressed at that time are those of people involved 
with a party inexperienced in the business of government.  Naturally that changed when the party 
entered government, making the timing potentially advantageous. Not only are the research 
questions posed  every bit as relevant, perhaps moreso, to the period prior to government (indeed 
before it was envisaged by many), but the people interviewed possibly less guarded and certainly 
under less time pressure.  From the creation of the new party in 1988 to its first experience of 
holding office provides a chronologically clear, but also rich and largely unexplored, period of 
transformation.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
 
i) Introduction 
 
It is organisation which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the 
mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says 
organisation says oligarchy. (Michels 1911) 
 
The extent to which the Liberal Democrats obey the iron law of oligarchy, and are becoming a 
more top-down party, has to be judged in light of the extensive and well-developed theoretical 
literature on party organisational change.   Here that literature is examined in detail, beginning with 
the rich and classic theoretical work on the classification of parties (Michels 1911; Duverger 1954; 
Ostrogorski 1964; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995). In addition to this 
there is a growing literature on the empirical testing of these theories (Michels 1911; Harmel and 
Janda 1994; Katz and Mair 1994; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Harmel 2002), and on individual 
parties or countries as comparative case-studies (Sartori 1971; Katz and Mair 1994; Bille 1997; 
Muller 1997; Webb, Farrell et al. 2002; Chhibber and Kollman 2005; Poguntke 2006).    With 
respect to UK parties in particular detailed studies on party organisational change concentrate on 
the Labour Party (Hughes and Wintour 1990; Quinn 2004; Russell 2005), with some more recent 
attention paid to the Conservatives (Kelly 2004; Bale 2010). Some useful historical accounts are 
published looking at the period covering the SDP and Liberal Alliance and subsequent merger 
(Bogdanor 1983; Ingle 1985; Sykes 1990; Koelble 1991; Crewe and King 1995; Douglas 2005) 
and at the Liberal Democrats (Ingle 1985; Stevenson 1993; MacIver 1996; Douglas 2005; Russell 
and Fieldhouse 2005; Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006).  As the Party grows in parliamentary 
significance, some recent studies have looked more closely at the Party‟s structure and internal 
democracy (Meadowcroft 2003; Holmes 2007; Cole 2009; Cowley 2009), and at ideology and 
policy positions (Hickson 2010). Accounts of the recent coalition are beginning to emerge (Laws 
2010; Beech and Lee 2011) and there will no doubt be a surge in publications about this typically 
under-studied political party.  
  
This chapter aims to put the research in the context of party organisational change, drawing 
closely on the work of Panebianco and considering the extent to which the Liberal Democrats are 
beginning to conform to his „electoral-professional‟ model (Panebianco 1988). It examines party 
classification and seeks to explain some of the various empirical tests and methods that have 
been applied by political scientists in order to explain party organisation, organisational change 
and centralisation. It asks if Katz & Mair‟s „ascendancy of the party in public office‟ makes sense in 
this case and finally it provides a broad overview of the academic literature on the Liberal 
Democrats. 
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ii) The Iron Law and its critics 
 
Michels‟ work has subtly dominated work on  parties for nearly a century.   Observing the rise of 
the mass party, and in particular the German Social Democratic Party, he noted that as the Party 
grew that growth was accompanied by the growth of an internal hierarchy, that the members were 
dependent on their leaders, and the result was oligarchy.  Michels argued that it was both the 
organisational features of big bureaucracy and the psychological characteristics of leadership 
types that made this inevitable.  In contrast to Weber, who argued that the domination by elites 
could be viewed positively, Michels believed that this „iron law‟ would be the undoing of the 
democratic principle in practice.   He argued that as parties become more sophisticated so the 
need for specialisation increased, separating the masses from the leader whose political skill and 
access to communication channels, together with the authority to appoint key personnel, secured 
and perpetuated the oligarchy.    It is not only  leadership‟s control over communication channels 
that made this possible – it is coupled with the “incompetence of the masses” (p17).  
 
Michels‟ observation is based on three key components. The first is that democracy without 
organisation is „inconceivable‟ (p61). He asserts that an organisation that aims to resolve complex 
questions requires an understanding of complex solutions and thereby becomes dependent on the 
expertise of key individuals.  „Leaders possess many resources…among their assets; superior 
knowledge; control over the formal means of communication with the membership; skill in the art 
of politics‟ (p16).  The second key tenet of Michels‟ theory is the consent of the membership in 
being led.  He asserts that the need for „direction and guidance ..is accompanied by a genuine cult 
for the leaders‟ (p88).  Finally he argues that such leadership ultimately runs counter to the need of 
the masses and instead becomes detrimental to internal party democracy.   „When faced with a 
threat to their authority or office from within the organisation the leaders will become extremely 
aggressive and will not hesitate to undermine many democratic rights‟ (p18).   
 
Based on the combination of the bureaucratic need for leadership, psychological dependency by 
the masses and the technical superiority of the political class, Michels asserts that, aided by the 
press and increasing cult of celebrity,  leaders become ultimately „self seeking‟ (p212).  Although 
criticisms of his theory (that it lacks “methodological rigour” or is a “hyper-generalisation” see 
Weldon, 2007), has some force, it remains relevant.  As this thesis demonstrates, in enduring for 
over a century, Michels has struck upon the essential problem faced by attempts to design 
democratic institutions.   As party systems and party models change, and even as parties appear 
to be in decline, the significance of his work is apparent.  Indeed, Lipset‟s introduction to the 1961 
volume  explains: 
 
…the malfunctioning of existing democracy, in particular the domination by the  leadership 
over the society and popular organisations was not primarily a phenomenon which 
resulted from a low level of social and economic development, inadequate education or 
capitalist control of the opinion-forming media and other power resources but rather was 
characteristic of any complex social system. (p15) 
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Michels‟ theory then, remains widely applicable, and as the literature on empirical testing expands, 
is, with one or two exceptions (Rohrschneider 2006; Weldon 2007), supported. Weldon‟s 2007 
study of the „psychological roots of power‟ concludes that leaders do not display an „insatiable 
appetite for power‟. He reaches this conclusion following a membership survey and a multivariate 
analysis that seeks to explain whether 13 parties in Denmark and the Netherlands were driven by 
their elite or participatory/grass-roots factions.   Weldon discovers that it is the leaders, rather than 
the masses, that place importance on the role of the grassroots. What Weldon does, however, is 
to reveal the real problem inherent in any attempt to test Michels‟ theory, namely the difficulty of 
falsifying the proposition that: 
 
..no matter what a party does organisationally, even fully democratising internal decision 
making procedures, the psychological tendencies of leaders and rank and file members, 
conspire to create oligarchy. (p31)   
 
The context of ‟Michels‟ work was the rise of the mass party, and his close observation of the 
German Social Democratic Party demonstrated the mutual dependence of the leadership and the 
masses.  In the century since it was published however, parties and electoral systems have 
changed, and the „iron law‟ is often tested, challenged and proves adaptable to the modern reality 
of political life.  Duverger, for instance, in his continuation of Michels‟ work forty years later, 
claimed; “The iron law is not iron, leaders can and have been removed and need to carry the 
membership with them to survive”  (Duverger 1954). He argues that Michels‟ theory while sound in 
terms of the technical and psychological need for leadership, overlooks the fundamentals of the 
British parliamentary system, in which the elected are accountable to their electorate, and not the 
mass organisation (i.e., party) that got them there. In essence he says then, that parties are simply 
vehicles for providing the electorate with a democratic choice.  
 
Lipset was himself a critic of Michels‟ work, someone who sought out exceptions to the rule and 
found them in his study of the hierarchy of the American based International Typographical Union 
(Seymour Martin Lipset, Trow et al. 1956). This organisation devised systems to promote 
autonomy and transparency, while encouraging regular elections and the input of powerful locally 
based factions, and did, for a short while, appear to bend the iron law (Goldfield 1998).   Other 
exceptions include the German Green Party, which set about observing rules that prioritised 
internal democracy and sought to avoid „distancing‟ between the grassroots and leadership. 
Policies including the “imperative mandate” which compelled party representatives to abide by 
conference decisions and the “diagonal rotation” of senior party officials, appeared however only to 
have limited success, but eventually succumbed to the iron law (Kitschelt 1989; Harmel and 
Frankland 2005; Poguntke 2006).  It is unlikely then, that a study of a political organisation such as 
the Liberal Democrats, will reach conclusions that swim against the strong tide in support of the 
„iron law‟ albeit in a qualified, modified form.  The literature that began with Michels provides a 
sound and broad framework within which to conduct a test of this theory with particular regard to a 
party that until recently had few realistic aspirations to national office. 
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iii) An explanation of party models 
 
From being a means to an end, parties, that is, the perceived interests of the party elite, 
become ends in themselves. (Ostrogorski 1902) p303. 
 
The evolution of party in western democracies gives rise to analysis based on models, a brief 
explanation of which follows. The cadre or elite party model was characterised by common goals, 
very loose organisation and a growing emphasis on providing candidates.  The early observations 
of this phase were published in 1902 when Moise Ostrogorski carried out the first detailed 
assessment of its kind focusing on parties in the UK and US.  Ostrogorski noted that parties first 
developed in Parliament around the Whips and began operating outside parliament, at the 
constituency level in direct response to the 1832 Reform Bill and the production of electoral lists 
(p72).  Organisation at that time centered on elections, and disappeared between election times, 
but with an increased electorate the value of a more permanent order soon became apparent and 
central organisations of the Conservative and Liberal Parties were born.  Membership was 
restricted and what emerged was a cross between a social club and a political registration 
campaign, the Conservatives belonging to the Carlton Club established in 1831 and Liberals 
gathering at the Reform Club established in 1836.   He noted “people still continued…to rely more 
on direct personal influence than principles and programmes” (pp76) and these „elite‟ party 
machines were a mirror to “the manners and customs of the nation”, which in other words, 
represented the same elite traditions where personal contact, class, education and land-owning 
were of primary importance.   
 
Ostrogorski went on to detail how these amateur clubs grew, through regional registration 
societies, in to mass membership organisations, and into movements that became important in 
their own right.   While the local organisations showed enthusiasm they remained “in need of 
guidance” (p94) and the marrying of these grass-roots local parties with their corresponding 
parliamentary leadership gave rise to the caucus, a forerunner of what we know as the local 
branch, and which forms the basic structure for a larger assembly,  which we now know as the 
conference.
6
 He describes the growth in the importance of the caucus, particularly during times of 
electoral defeat, and how the Parliamentary  leadership used this vehicle to draw supporters 
together to maximum effect.  This, he argued “democratise[d] party government” (p292) but he 
also noted that the dependence of the party organisation on “political professionals” meant that in 
reality it had “succeeded only in a superficial, purely apparent fashion” (p303). 
 
Following the universal suffrage reforms of 1918 and 1932 the so-called „cadre‟ then required a 
means by which to reach out to the wider electorate, and so the „mass party‟ was born. Maurice 
Duverger‟s classic text „Political Parties‟ published in 1954 identified the transition from elite to 
mass party, the elite model characterised as a parliamentary organisation initially created internally 
and drawn from the elite of male landowners who already had political power, to one of mass 
membership  (Duverger 1954) .  Duverger argues that the evolution of the mass-party was a 
                                                                    
6  The first meeting of a number of local and regional Liberal Associations was held in Birmingham on 31st  
May 1877 , chaired by Joseph Chamberlain.  
30 
 
 
response to two factors. Firstly socialist parties lacked big financial backers and a mass-based 
party had the potential to raise small funds from the many rather than large donations from the 
few. Secondly it was a good fit with socialist ideology which favoured political education for the 
masses, and more democratic methods for recruiting candidates. Duverger believed the mass 
party could, although hierarchical, reflect an overall socialist principle.   „The „inner circle‟ is very 
open and ordinary members of the party can enter it quite easily‟ (1954; p109).    He also observed 
that the consequences of the mass party was the decline in independent MPs, since the mass 
party reinforced the authority of the Parliamentary party and the importance of the Whips.  
Comprising individuals outside the parliamentary scene, then the mass party model is one in which 
members are united around party ideology and are organisationally concerned with spreading the 
message through propaganda.   The mass party exists in various forms, depending on the precise 
role of the branch (see Duverger 1954, Kirchheimer 1957), but is fundamentally hierarchical in 
nature.  
 
The mass party model would by its very nature thwart internal democracy but Otto  Kirchheimer 
went further, suggesting that in the process of seeking the most appealing vote-maximising tactics 
the „mass party‟  had evolved in to a bland and compromising „catch-all‟ party. In the transition 
from mass to catch-all  parties, according to Kirchheimer, three phases can be identified. The first 
is the pre-war period in which  parties „gather strength‟, the second is post-war in which parties 
accommodate the needs of a more broadly based political consensus and the third is an 
„advanced‟ stage where parties attempt to hold on to their core support at the same time as 
present electoral choices with mass appeal (p355).  He concludes “where obtaining office 
becomes an almost exclusive preoccupation of a party, issues of personnel are reduced to a 
search for the simplest effective means to put up winning combinations” (p369). In aiming for the 
widest appeal possible, in an increasingly middle class era, political parties distance themselves 
from core ideologies order to bridge traditional cleavages and maximise votes.  Kirchheimer 
predicted the demise in party membership numbers in tandem with the increased significance in 
interest groups, supported by modern interpretations of „supply-side‟ party membership (Webb 
2000).  In summary, he concluded that the role of the party in constantly weighing up the trade-off 
between policy positions and votes reduced its role to one of bureaucratic necessity.  The catch-all 
party therefore offers less in terms of ideology by which voters can differentiate and make their 
choice, forcing them to rely instead on the personalities of party  leaders.    
 
Most of the literature mentioned thus far relates party organisation to the relationship between 
those seeking office and the electorate or party systems.  Panebianco, however, returned to the 
theme of examining parties as organisations.  His 1988 work develops themes that had been given 
less attention by Michels, Duverger and Kirkhheimer and describes the  transformation from the 
„mass‟ or „catch-all‟ party to one where experts and technicians  are more valuable than 
bureaucrats: the „electoral professional‟ party  (Panebianco 1988).  The transition, according to 
Panebianco, is swifter in parties that are highly institutionalised, and in party systems that are less 
fragmented.   He suggests that the transition is caused by external factors such as the growth in 
technology, where voters see party leaders on TV, removing the necessity for activists acting as 
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communicators, further weakening the traditional institutional role of the political party. This results 
in an increase in the significance of professionals with expertise in campaigning and 
communication skills, which coupled with the growing reliance on interest groups, results in the 
professionalisation and centralisation of the Party. It is this to which this research is most closely 
addressed in its key themes.  
 
Panebianco„s observations about the transitional phase in party development are particularly 
salient to this study. In particular he notes the transition from one-dimensional to multi- 
dimensional organisations, that the work parties once did is now often done by other 
organisations, and that the party is increasingly specialist, alienating it from ordinary members.  
Distanced both from core ideology and an active membership, the electoral-professional party, he 
argues, is a precursor to the eventual dissolution of  parties as organisations, together with an 
ideological backlash against valence issues and toward extremism. Panebianco predicts the 
consequent re-emergence of the collective identity through new political organisations as  parties 
become more incorporated in to the state and the importance of  leaders & advisors increases.  He 
focuses on the transitional nature of this phase and argues that the expertise offered by interest 
groups usurps the role of members in policy making, and is replaced with tasks such as 
fundraising and generating electoral support.  At the same time Panebianco foresaw that, in order 
to maximise mass appeal, political parties would be less committed to divergent ideological 
positions and would rely instead on personalities, and the use of professional marketing, to offer 
distinct choices to the electorate. This is a pivotal text in helping with an understanding of 
organisational development and party evolution.   
 
It is useful here to draw upon a more recent case-study that focuses on Panebianco‟s use of the 
term „professional‟. Webb and Fisher‟s seminal study of New Labour‟s employees at Millbank in 
2003 pinpoints five characteristics that can be used as indicators of professionalism:  
 
“A professional may be regarded as a member of the workforce with a relatively high 
status and strong position in the labour market flowing from a special degree of expertise, 
commitment, autonomy and capacity for self-regulation, which in turn reflects a particular 
education and training.  By contrast, traditional party bureaucrats will have less status, 
expertise, job autonomy or capacity to regulate their own activities and are less likely to 
have been through  a special formal education.” (Webb and Fisher 2003; Webb 2008). 
 
These characteristics represent ideal-types, and in operational terms, for example in a study such 
as this, present some difficulties. Precisely what education and training might rightly be considered 
to provide expertise, for instance, and to what extent might the parties themselves have an interest 
in being seen to be increasingly „professional‟?  (Negrine 2005; Webb 2008).    The five indicators, 
therefore, are best used loosely, as a guide to identifying professionalising traits.  Webb allows for 
a „soft‟ use of the term professional when some but not all of the characteristics set out in the 
ideal-type, such as when commitment and effectiveness are present but not autonomy and self-
regulation. This “enhanced degree of work-place effectiveness flowing from a greater sense of 
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commitment of devotuion to work-related duties” is often what is meant by professionalization in 
the context of this thesis (Webb 2008). Where relevant  these characteristics these are explained 
at the start of each chapter in order to provide the closest possible definition of professionalism 
and how that relates to the area of party life under examination.  
 
By far the most-cited new development since Panebianco in the literature on party development is 
Katz & Mair‟s addition of the „cartel model‟.  This suggests that the modern party acts as more of a 
broker between the state and the electorate.  They argue that change is a consequence of the 
gradual adaptation by political parties, to the modern political system (Katz and Mair 1995). 
Furthermore they argue that, in established democracies where party membership is in decline 
and class dealignment, state funding and the use of new communication techniques is increasing, 
parties now act primarily to ensure their own survival. In a challenge to Duverger and 
Kirchheimer‟s theory, which focused on the relationship between party and society, Katz & Mair 
focus on the relationship between party and state, arguing that the mass-party model is outdated 
and fails to recognise the emphasis that party organisations place on their own agency.  In 
common with Panebianco they argue that the professionalisation of campaign methods turns even 
the fundamental propositions about party organisation on their head:  „party oligarchy becomes a 
virtue rather than a vice‟ (Katz & Mair, 1995. p14). In their depiction of party models and their 
characteristics Katz & Mair state that since the coming of universal suffrage, a combination of 
professionalisation, capital intensive campaigning, and the blurring of the distinction between 
member and non-member concludes in the gradual development of the party as agent of the state.  
 
This recent addition to the literature on party models introduces a number of significant changes in 
the way we think about political parties. It hinges partly on the ability of parties to extract a 
„commission‟ for their services. This might include holding office and receiving pay but could also 
include payments to the party to ensure the survival of the organisation. Katz & Mair argue that 
parties that are able to manipulate the electorate to their own ends are capable of manipulating 
governments in the same way, so that their own position becomes a necessity to the smooth 
functioning of the electoral system.  Also In an earlier study Katz & Mair also provide a useful way 
of dissecting parties for study: any party can be divided up in to the party on the ground, the party 
HQ and the party in parliament.  This approach was adopted in an extensive comparative project 
on parties in western democracies (Katz and Mair 1994) and provides a useful template here (see 
also Bale and Sanderson-Nash 2011).  
 
However, placing the Liberal Democrats in the context of models devised by political scientists 
presents a problem, since before May 2010 the party had been permanently in opposition and 
much of the literature assumes office-holding (for example McKenzie, 1955).   In addition, without  
the consistent financial or electoral support of large groups such as the trades unions or business 
community, the Liberal Democrats have had to rely on individual votes, and single-issue 
campaigning to win, making them a poor fit for the models described (Russell and Fieldhouse 
2005).  They are to an extent a „hybrid-party‟ that combines the characteristics of both mass and 
elite models (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005; Evans 2007), although the evidence in this thesis 
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suggests that latterly the party has conformed to the electoral-professional type (see also Evans 
and Sanderson-Nash 2011).  
 
These ideal types, however, do not neatly follow one another and parties may exhibit some but not 
all of the model‟s characteristics.  What this taxonomy can offer, is a set of broad classifications 
that depict the transitional nature of political.parties. In the case of the Liberal Democrats its 
predecessor parties come from distinct and different traditions, the Liberal Party would be 
described as more „elite‟ than „mass‟ party, while the short-lived SDP existed as a hybrid between 
the „mass‟ and „electoral-professional‟ models.    However, its successor, the Liberal Democrats, 
appear to increasingly exhibit more of the characteristics of the „electoral-professional model‟, in 
particular by adapting a more professional marketing style of campaigning, by increasingly 
concentrating power in the hands of the leader and by embracing modern communication 
methods.  There are no deterministic laws that would govern the development of political parties 
such as the Liberal Democrats, although we are able to see by this examination of its evolution in 
three areas of activity (policy, campaigning and the distribution of resources) that as it becomes a 
more credible contender for power, the leadership has sought greater autonomy from the rest of 
the party in order to achieve maximum strategic flexibility.  Arguably this created favourable 
conditions in which Nick Clegg was able negotiate the coalition in May 2010 in spite of the party‟s 
continuing, (albeit reduced or temporarily suspended) sense of internal democracy.  
 
iv)  Parties, power, and organisational change 
 
Academic case studies of party organisational change adopt a number of approaches. Robert 
McKenzie‟s „Political Parties‟ is the first extensive examination of the internal workings of the 
Labour and Conservative Parties, (though noticeably not the Liberals), and has provided a classic 
text to scholars of political parties for over half a century.   The more recent comparativist 
approach has added explanatory power, providing classifications for parties within different party 
systems (Sartori 1971; Wolinetz 1988; Lijphart 1994; Ware 1996; Mair 1997; Webb, Farrell et al. 
2002; Chhibber and Kollman 2005; Frankland, Lucardie et al. 2008). There is a growing body of 
recent work that focuses specifically on party organisation and organisational change and here we 
find a framework for a study of this kind (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kitschelt 1989; Powell and 
Dimaggio 1991; Harmel and Janda 1994; Katz and Mair 1994; Webb 1994; Muller 1997; Dalton 
and Wattenberg 2002; Harmel 2002).   
 
The influential study of British Political Parties by Robert McKenzie aims to see the extent to which  
the „iron law‟ explains intra-party power the Conservative and Labour Parties (McKenzie 1955).  
While accepting the manipulation of the hierarchy, particularly in the Labour Party, by the  
leadership, McKenzie concedes that the membership have the power to remove the Labour 
leader, and survival therefore depends on the co-operation of the mass membership and the 
popularity of leaders.  He focuses on the relationship between centralisation and office holding, 
concluding that parties‟ internal affairs are directly linked to electoral success, reflecting the 
different needs of a party in government compared with a party in opposition. Although he accepts 
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that tensions exist, Mackenzie argues that MPs and leaders ultimately do no more than pay „lip 
service to the theory of inner-party democracy‟. While accepting this is most acute when in power, 
he says even in opposition no party leadership will allow itself to become merely a „spokesman‟. 
 
Since, in the course of this research, the Lib Dems have had their first taste of power, the 
relevance of the party in office and the link between centralisation and power come to the fore. 
Harmel & Janda provide us with a series of definitions, assumptions and prepositions that help 
underpin studies such as these providing a useful framework in which to closely examine party 
change.  Of particular interest is the identification of independent variables linked to causation, for 
instance – that vote maximising  parties react with change to electoral failure; office maximising 
parties react to changes in the leadership coalition; policy and ideology advocates react to events 
the directly influence a policy decision and intra-party democracy maximisers react to factors that 
influence the make- up of party membership.   Here Muller‟s study of the Austrian Socialist Party 
provides a useful example, looking closely at the study of party organisational change, dealing with 
“only one country, only one party in that country, only with organisational change and with only two 
specific aspects of organisational change”(Muller 1997). The study investigates which of the 
causal factors proposed by Harmel & Janda (2004) fit most closely with their case, and if it is 
possible to rank them in order of the relevance of each explanatory factor – in this case the 
conclusion is that  leadership tops the list.  Harmel groups previous work in to three approaches; 
„lifecycle‟ (Michels 1911), „system-level trends (Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1969; Panebianco 
1988; Katz and Mair 1995), and „discrete change‟ (Harmel and Janda 1994; Bille 1997; Muller 
1997).   
 
In all these studies, but particularly the more recent contributions to this field, the focus shifts to the 
agency of the  leadership, and which factors have an impact on achieving maximum flexibility 
within the structures of party, and what might constrain this (Hellman 2011). What becomes clear 
from the increasing practice of individual and comparative case-studies of this kind is that the 
causes are not exclusive and that party organisational change is increasingly best explained using 
a combination of integrated factors.  
 
iv)  The Liberal Democrats 
 
Academic literature on the Liberal Democrats pre-May 2010,  is thin on the ground. There is much 
for historians interested in its predecessor parties, but little for political scientists.   There are six 
books in print that are dedicated to the party, all of which are useful contributions, looking at its 
early years (Stevenson 1993; MacIver 1996), gradual maturation (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005), 
its grassroots and voter profile (Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006), ideology (Hickson 2010) and coalition 
(Laws 2010; Beech and Lee 2011). The Party does, however, benefit from enthusiasts among its 
membership whose archiving and attention to detail has proved valuable to this research. The 
Liberal Democrat History Group produces a quarterly journal, an up-to-date website, organises 
regular conferences and produces books and book reviews that are enormously helpful to those 
interested in the party.  
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The party has also been the subject of a dedicated issue of the Political Quarterly which brought 
together a number of accounts of campaigning, leadership style, policy making and predictions 
about the Party‟s future.   This revealed some of the tensions that become more accentuated in 
the transitional period from one leader to another. Duncan Brack rigorously defends the Ashdown 
period and criticises Kennedy‟s style (Brack 2007).  This is in contrast to Richard Grayson, who 
defends the Kennedy term and suggests that, when he left office, he had done more long-term 
good than Ashdown, who wasted time bargaining with Labour.   Both worked as Director of Policy 
under the respective  leaders they defend.  This highlights the pitfalls of insider writing, a category 
in to which much literature on the Liberal Democrats, including to an extent this study, falls.  
Collections of essays by a combination of academics and prominent politicians (MacIver 1996; 
Hickson 2010) are no bad thing, but the body of literature makes its greatest strides when people 
unconnected to the party make more extensive contributions to it (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005; 
Beech and Lee 2011).  
  
The first of these studies (MacIver 1996) is a useful, if now dated, text that collects both insider 
and academic writing and is the first to acknowledge the potential legacy of the merger of two 
disparate political organisations. MacIver begins by describing the conflicts between key 
individuals, over political philosophy and leadership style (Steel, Jenkins and Owen). He goes on 
to conclude that the Party was unlikely to make the breakthrough it sought for three reasons. 
Firstly, he doubts the “coherent ideological position” claimed by the new party whose efforts to 
synthesise the progressive radical tradition of the Liberals with the Social Democrats were 
“handicapped” by a failure to communicate. Secondly he questions whether the new party could 
deliver the organisation required:  
 
The extent to which the party organisation itself has cultivated a centralised, elitist, top-
down decision-making and management style in some respects remote from the 
membership cannot be entirely welcome in a party dedicated to participative democracy.  
(MacIver, 1996, p17) 
 
Thirdly, MacIver questions the Liberal Democrats‟ strategy for effectively winning votes, given their 
strong activist base but electoral disadvantage.  In short he argued a number of hurdles faced the 
new party, some in its control and some not.   What is clear from this text published in 1996 is that 
the trajectory of the Liberal Democrats was unpredictable. In particular MacIver hinted that 
breakthrough was likely to be in the form of replacing one of the other parties, rather than 
incremental. In many respects, however, he insightfully set out the problems that faced, and 
continue to face, this Party. 
 
Russell & Fieldhouse update MacIver in what is the most comprehensive text book on the Liberal 
Democrats to date. “Neither Left nor Right” published in 2005 is a carefully considered account of 
the Party, returning to the same themes but in a more optimistic light, taking account of the party‟s 
resilience, success and growth.  The Party did, after all, survive a decade between publications.   
Their statistical analysis and series of case-studies of the Party‟s electoral fortunes points to the 
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effective, (indeed it could be argued, vital) adoption of „targeting‟ in order for the party to progress. 
The process of transforming an apparently static, or at least slow-growing popular vote, into 46 
seats in the 1997 general election, is depicted as something of a turning point. They highlight five 
important factors in the development of the Liberal Democrats, which appear to have both revived 
and at the same time thwarted their position on the British political landscape.  
 
The first of these is the “alternative opposition” which transformed the role of opposition from being 
a government in waiting, to being an end in itself.  The „effective opposition‟ declared by Charles 
Kennedy and particularly effective in opposing the Iraq war, has, they argue, placed the third party 
in an important and distinctive role in British politics.  They conclude that while the strategy works 
well for the Party in theory, the reality is that, with the Conservatives in opposition, the Lib Dems 
would need to “emulate” them to a point that would be at odds with the core political philosophy of 
the party membership (p253). They also point out that the move from equidistance helped to 
secure the party significant rewards, its continued attack on the Conservatives needs to be 
replaced with a more “multi-faceted set of identities” if the Party is to progress (p254).   
 
The second factor deals with the „credibility gap‟ which refers to the problem faced by a seemingly 
popular party, whose governmental experienced remains untested, and who suffer from the classic 
and self-perpetuating two-party system (Duverger 1954).  Russell & Fieldhouse point to this as the 
key obstacle for political marketers to overcome for Liberal Democrat success.  They conclude that 
following their own detailed assessments of the Party‟s electoral fortunes this remains the greatest 
obstacle, not only borne by quantitative studies, but acknowledged by the majority of interviewees.   
 
Linked to this is their third factor, that of „creeping liberalism‟, and which many party activists 
euphemistically term the „orange glow‟, namely that credibility is achieved through local success 
and incremental achievements.   Russell & Fieldhouse conclude, unsurprisingly, that 
“whilst…contiguity to other Liberal Democrat seats may be an advantage, it is certainly no 
guarantee of success” (p257).    
 
The consequences of this lead to their fourth factor, that of the “dual identity” - not as has 
previously been identified elsewhere in this thesis as that of liberal versus social democratic, but of 
the tensions between the local, regional and national layers of a federal party. This is of particular 
interest to this thesis especially their assessment of that tension and whether it is increasing or 
staying the same.  They conclude that the „dualism‟ is increasing, suggesting that what Lib Dems 
say nationally might differ from what they say at the state, regional or local level – but that this is 
“more than the triumph of necessity; it is part of the ideological make up of the Party‟ (p258).  
Russell & Fieldhouse suggest this works very well for the Party, with the elite exercising control 
over message without “neutralising” local parties, upon whom they remain dependent. Their final 
factor looks at “issue based mobilisation” which links their assessment of the grassroots and  
leadership.   In the case of Paddy Ashdown they point to his insensitive suggestion that the Party 
rename itself “Democrats”, coupled with the somewhat secretive joint venture with Tony Blair, the 
Joint Cabinet Committee, and in the case of Charles Kennedy, to fail to unite over Europe.  
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Lib Dem leaders are faced with a serious dilemma and Russell & Fieldhouse conclude: “Liberalism 
as a philosophy has inbuilt tensions which will never be resolved” (p85).  They argue that the Party 
has an unusual following, and one that cannot rely on the traditions of trades union or business 
support.  It does, however, continue to attract popular politicians and popular leaders, and at times 
mobilise around effectively communicated policy issues. What stands between the Party and 
electoral breakthrough remains the „credibility gap‟, fuelled by financial constraints and a two-party 
system. Russell and Fieldhouse suggest that incremental growth is their only realistic chance of 
progressing. They predict that the circumstances on offer to the Party between 1995 and 2002 
may not arise again and were a unique opportunity, (perhaps missed) by a party that does not 
always make obvious choices (p252).   Power sharing in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh 
Assembly, while helping close the credibility gap, exacerbated the „dual identity‟ in the Party‟s 
federal structure.  It is, they conclude “a long way from power” (p259).  
 
The most recent text to look specifically at the Liberal Democrats is part of the series by Paul 
Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Anthony Billinghurst which focuses on the Lib Dems and the party‟s 
grass roots (Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006).  In the first instance they note that without the party‟s 
activist base it would have disappeared (p23) and so an understanding of what attracts activists to 
a party that shows few signs of forming a government raises interesting questions. They provide a 
useful breakdown of party activists by type, having collected data from 4424 party members in 
1998, and while interesting it is unfortunate that it took so long to come to publication.  We are 
able, however, to see a decline in party attachment and activism when they conducted their 
surveys, and the 26% decline in activism was higher than that of the other parties. There will, of 
course, have been other important exogenous factors at this time such as the 1997 Labour 
election victory.  Also of particular interest is their assessment in the change in membership base 
between the early 90s and later in the decade when they note a significant increase in the 
proportion of  public-sector members, at a time when coalition looked possible (pp33).   They also 
reach interesting conclusions some of which chime with both MacIver and Russell & Fieldhouse 
and others that illustrate the difficulty of using current themes to describe data that is now ten 
years old.  It would be interesting to update this work, particularly in view of its potential with 
regard to May‟s law (May 1973) and the arguments contained in this thesis that suggest there has 
been shift at the grassroots away from radicalism toward pragmatic politics. 
 
There is agreement within the literature on the following two points:. 1) the party suffers from a 
lack of resources, and 2) in common with other parties, membership and activism are declining. It 
is also true to say that a decline in traditional loyalties is likely to play to the strengths of the Lib 
Dems‟ tradition in local politics.   What the literature fails to provide any tangible support for, 
however, are claims that 1) the party‟s reluctance to adopt a more „electoral-professional‟ model in 
favour of grassroots activism will be to its advantage and 2) the party‟s federal and de-centralised 
structure constantly remind the leadership of its dependence on, and value of, ordinary members.  
The existence of a grassroots tradition, and a strong one at that, does not necessarily mean the 
absence of an electoral-professional model, to the Party‟s detriment or otherwise.  Similarly, the 
federal structure of the Party in its constitution does not guard with any guarantee against top-
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down decision making. Finally, as the study of changes in intra-party democracy to date suggests,  
leadership, and in particular, changes in leadership, are a strong causal factor (Russell, 
Fieldhouse et al. 2007). In order to understand the drivers behind changes in the Liberal 
Democrats, then, it is important to understand its  leaders, and dominant faction.   
 
vi) Conclusion 
 
The iron law of oligarchy is one of the most well known phrases in the study of political parties, and 
having survived over 100 years deserves to be continually tested with regard to new parties, and 
indeed old parties behaving in new ways.   Party models and their testing, together with a working 
definition of the term „professional‟ also provide a useful framework for this research. The Liberal 
Democrats are both a new party, having been established in 1988, and one that has made the 
transition from a small and third party with few realistic aspirations to office, to one that has now 
entered government in spite of remaining a small and third party. This shift in goal-orientation is 
important and suggests a transition from policy and vote maximising toward the goal of holding 
office.  In the case of the third party, strategic seat-maximising represents a critical development. 
In 2010 its vote declined marginally, but its influence grew massively.  The changes that have 
taken place inside this particular party and building up to that important transition have the 
potential to inform our understanding of party adaptation more generally.  
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Chapter 3 Background 
 
i)  Introduction 
 
The party‟s position has been that of a surfer, waiting patiently for the right wave to ride 
and then using all its skills to stay upright and to travel as far and as fast as possible. 
(Walter, 2003, p3).
7
 
 
The Liberal Democrats have historically been unable to break through on their own initiative and 
have instead needed to wait for the political weather to change to best realise their chances. 
Senior politicians have privately acknowledged the party‟s inability to make significant progress 
under the current voting system, and have pointed out instead  the crucial role that coalitions 
present to the Lib Dems, giving them their only realistic chance of holding office and demonstrating 
the pragmatic politics the party espouses.
8
  
 
The Liberal Democrats are different from the Conservatives and the Labour Party - and not simply 
because they represent a coalition of sorts between the ideologies of the SDP and Liberal Parties. 
It is, after all, easily argued that all parties represent ranges of views, for instance that New Labour 
is a „political composite‟ (Driver and Martell 2006). They are different because they are shaped by 
coming third at Westminster.  The parliamentary party is traditionally weak, or at least smaller in 
number, and the local government base is strong. The party has developed survival techniques for 
decades out of office, relying on by-election wins to boost morale and continuing to enjoy relatively 
solid support in rural Scotland and the west of England. Analysis of the dynamics of Liberal 
Democrat support also suggests its vote is different from the other two parties.  The party is likely 
to benefit from a „leadership heuristic‟, based on personality rather than its record in office 
(Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006) (Kelly 2007).   
 
Being the third party in a two-party system has created an unusual and sometimes misunderstood 
political party – one that owes as much to its non-conformist roots as to its activists, both of whom 
are held simultaneously responsible for the party‟s survival and failure to break through.  This has 
created an interesting and untypical narrative, and one which this chapter explores using a 
combination of literature, including biography and a number of interviews with politicians, party 
officials and activists, many of whom belonged to either the Liberals or the SDP. 
 
This chapter looks at the position of the third party in history, the Liberal Party, the SDP, the 
Alliance and the creation of the Liberal Democrats. What is the party‟s past and what has it 
learned?  It examines the trends in third party voting, and asks what the Lib Dems and their 
predecessors needed to do to survive for so long in the political wilderness.   
 
Firstly then, this chapter looks at the party‟s origins. An understanding of the Liberal Democrats 
requires a thorough understanding of the component parts that were brought together in the 
                                                                    
7  Former BBC journalist and Director of Communications for the Liberal Democrats. 
8  Interview 3, 2009. 
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merger of 1988. The Liberal Party was a small and stubborn force in British politics, the SDP 
conversely a politician-created top-down entity.   Exactly what happened during first, the Alliance 
and then the merger is important in this study, since it enables us to understand the party‟s overall 
design.  The second section of this chapter looks at the party‟s electoral fortunes in more detail.  
The third party has experienced mixed electoral success, coming to dominate scores of local 
authorities but without making the breakthrough at Westminster many had hoped for.  The 
arguably fortuitous outcome of the 2010 general election notwithstanding, since its inception the 
party has polled between 9% and 23% of the vote, which has always translated in to fewer than 
10% of seats at Westminster. Furthermore its share of the vote typically dips between general 
elections, a pattern repeated in the elections of its separate state counterparts in Scotland and 
Wales, in the election of the London Mayor and at the European level.  This is at variance with 
support for the party at the local level and helps in an understanding of the perception of the party 
and its vote winning capacity.  Similarly the Liberal Democrats‟ ability to deliver some sensational 
by-election victories but failure to roll out similar results at the national level indicates the 
uniqueness of its position in the political landscape.   This section considers factors likely to 
influence Lib Dem votes and paints a picture of a party far more dependent on leadership than its 
grassroots philosophy likes to suggest.    
 
ii) Party Origins and Merger 
 
The Liberal Party 
 
“None of us in this party is interested in office for office‟s sake. If we were we would never 
have joined the Liberal Party” (David Steel‟s speech to 1974 Liberal Assembly).  
 
The post war Liberal Party was one smarting from damaging leadership splits, a lack of 
distinctiveness and a strengthening Labour movement, returning just 6 MPs in 1951 on 2.5% of 
the national vote.  It was a bitterly divided movement, constantly outflanked by its wealthier and 
better supported competitors, but one which continued to survive.  What followed was a period of 
mini-revivals, each time the party learning new lessons only to face further set-backs in a cycle of 
near-breakthroughs and disappointments.  Firstly, the party has benefited from popular leaders.  
With the exception of Nick Clegg, whose constituency Sheffield Hallam, is in South Yorkshire, 
every leader since 1945 has been drawn from the party‟s strongholds (from which they drew the 
majority of their MPs) in rural areas of Scotland and Wales or the south west of England, yo-yoing 
between the two: 
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Table 1.   Liberal leaders, 1945-present, by constituency. 
 
Leader   Period in office  Constituency 
 
Clement Davies  1945-1956  Montgomeryshire 
Grimond  1956-1967  Orkney & Shetland 
Thorpe   1967-1976  North Devon* 
Steel   1976-1988  Tweeddale Ettrick & Lauderdale 
Ashdown  1988-1999  Yeovil 
Kennedy  1999-2006  Ross Skye & Lochaber 
Campbell  2006-2007  North East Fife** 
Clegg   2007-present  Sheffield Hallam 
 
*Between May and July 1976 Jo Grimond returned as Acting Leader 
**Between October and November 2007 Vince Cable was Acting Leader 
 
In 1956 the party elected Jo Grimond leader.  Grimond was a popular politician who enjoyed both 
the affections of his party, and respect at Westminster in spite of his iconoclastic style.    His phase 
in office reversed the trend that, had it continued, would have meant the end of the Liberal Party.  
Grimond‟s period as leader saw the party developing tactics that it continues to employ, in 
particular: 
 
- attracting popular and unconventional candidates.  The charismatic and popular MP for 
Orkney and Shetland was able to draw an unusually talented group of candidates to his 
small and stubborn political party, including Robin Day, Ludovic Kennedy and Clement 
Freud.  His former career in the services helped the party attract a higher proportion of ex-
servicemen as candidates than either of the other two major parties (Douglas, 2005). 
 
- focusing on community politics and local elections.  Grimond fought the 1959 general 
election with so few resources his party was barely able to campaign on a national basis, 
and instead candidates focused on their own individual seats. They were however buoyed 
by the result, in which of the 216 seats contested only 56 deposits were lost and in the 
seats they held in 1955 and 1959  the vote increased from 15.1% to 16.9%.  This change 
in fortunes was mirrored by a gradual swell in numbers of Liberals winning council seats, 
something that the party sought to prioritise and did so by creating a new post at HQ, 
capably filled by Pratap Chintis,  for the co-ordination and support of local councillors 
(Walter 2003). 
 
- exploiting support in universities.   At a time when Labour and Conservatives were 
beginning to find their own extremists a hindrance, the groundswell in student radicalism 
suited the Liberal party, who recruited greater numbers on university campuses than 
either of their rivals (Walter 2003). 
42 
 
 
- winning by-elections.  Many in the party point to by-election successes in Torrington 
(1958) and Orpington (1962) as the moment the party‟s fortunes began to turn.  The party 
had consistently done well in local council elections and built a strong local campaigning 
team. It adopted a young and fresh candidate and benefited from an unpopular 
Conservative Government against which they polled a sensational 22% swing (Young 
1997). 
 
- thinking radically about policies, many of which were adopted by the mainstream, and 
sometimes by other parties  (Curtice 1988). 
 
The party, however, failed to make a breakthrough in the 1964 general election, as their Leader 
famously marched his troops “towards the sound of gunfire”9, and the Liberals made slow and 
patchy progress in the following decade.  Their share of the national vote went down, while their 
share of seats in parliament went up. The party‟s dependence on by-election wins to continue to 
provide the party with much-needed publicity, and to lend momentum to its local campaigning 
effort, was essential to its survival.   Grimond‟s phase of  leadership achieved two further things of 
significance that were unique to the Liberals: 
 
- the party was able to rely on support on the Celtic fringes, particularly in 
Scotland where the Liberal Democrats continue to hold his former seat of 
Orkney and Shetland.  
 
-  the party adopted a united and unique policy on Europe, supporting the UK‟s 
membership of the EEC, a pro-European stance that the Liberal Democrats 
retain today, on an issue that at times has badly divided its competitors. 
 
Grimond‟s time as leader is seen as one in which the party fought off extinction with a leader 
whose charisma and ideas secured its future, in part organisationally, but also because he inspired 
the next generation of Liberal party politicians.  
 
In 1967 Jeremy Thorpe, the MP for North Devon, beat Eric Lubbock (MP for Orpington) and Emlyn 
Hooson (MP for Montgomeryshire) to become its next leader.   Thorpe‟s introduction to the party 
drew together the themes introduced under Jo Grimond.  Thorpe was a stylish and charismatic 
young man who appeared to understand the modern media (Douglas 2005).  He was recruited to 
the Liberal Party while at Oxford where he became President of the Union.   He also benefited 
from the existence of a relatively strong local campaigning machine that had come together in 
1958 during the Torrington by-election where Mark Bonham-Carter won the seat. Thorpe built up 
the party organisation, successfully fundraised and embraced the party‟s increasingly 
decentralised structure by championing community politics.  
 
 
                                                                    
9  Jo Grimond, Liberal Assembly, Brighton 1963. 
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Thorpe led the Liberals from 1967 to 1976 and his period in office is marked once again by  the 
developing of survival skills.  During this time the party made further gains in by-elections, 
returning some of the party‟s best-known politicians, notably David Steel in 1965 and Cyril Smith in 
1972.   The party faced a bitter disappointment in the 1970 general election and returned just 6 
MPs and 7.5% of the popular vote. Its Assembly the following autumn acknowledged the 
importance of local campaigning and local government, passing a motion placing “primary 
strategic emphasis on community politics” (Copus 2007). 
 
Its active youth wing, the Young Liberals, continued to support local efforts and between 1972 and 
1973 the party enjoyed another essential series of mini revivals, wining 5 by-elections and 
continuing to build on previous success in Scotland and rural England.   It also gained 1500 
council seats in the spring of 1973 (Thorpe 1999), and in the general election of February 1974 
increased the party‟s popular vote to over 19%.  In the negotiations that followed Thorpe refused 
to enter in to coalition with the Conservatives without a guarantee on electoral reform, and in the 
subsequent general election of October 1974 the party lost 1% of the vote and returned with just 
13 seats.  The discrepancy between the popular vote and seats in Westminster was never greater. 
 
Table 2.  Liberal votes and seats 1950-1989 
 
Year 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 f 1974 o 1979 1983* 1987* 
Seats 6 6 6 9 12 6 14 13 11 23 22 
% votes 2.5 2.7 5.9 11.21 8.5 7.5 19.3 18.3 13.8 25.4 22.6 
% seats 1 1 1 1.5 2 1 2 2 1.7 3.5 3.3 
(* Alliance) 
 
Table 3.  Liberal Democrat votes and seats 1992-2010 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Seats 20 46 52 62 63 
%  votes 17.8 16.8 18.3 22 23 
% seats 3 6.9 7.8 9.5 9.6 
 
The party learned from this, that, as well as embracing local campaigning and making headway 
with the media and the beginnings of personality politics, representation would not improve with an 
even distribution of 20% of the vote. This led the party to adopt a twin strategy of targeting where it 
was most popular, whilst arguing for changes to the electoral system. It also realised that having 
such unusual and locally popular politicians acted against it making a more generic breakthrough 
in places where it had less historic support (Walter 2003).   What followed however, was a further 
slump, and a difficult period for the party dominated by scandals in Thorpe‟s private life, resulting 
in his resignation as leader, and withdrawal from public life (Freeman and Penrose 1996; Penrose 
and Freeman 1996).  
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In December 1976 the party announced David Steel had beaten John Pardoe in its first democratic  
leadership contest
10
, and began his term without an inkling that he would be the party‟s last.    
Steel was never welcomed as warmly as Grimond, nor thought to be as skilful with the media as 
Thorpe.  He inherited a party with a strong and radical youth movement opposed to any kind of 
pact with the Labour party.   However, in 1977 Steel entered in to negotiations with Labour, 
proposing PR for European elections and devolved parliaments for Scotland and Wales.  The „Lib-
Lab Pact‟ that followed saw the Liberals able to participate in government, at a level unseen for 
decades
11
, but anti-pact Liberals, particularly Cyril Smith made it a divisive period, and the party 
was punished at the local level, losing three-quarters of its county council seats (Walter 2003).  
The pact become increasingly unpopular, legislation on PR was defeated and the pact dissolved in 
1978.    In the general election that followed Steel secured just 11 seats and the Liberal‟s share of 
the popular vote was reduced to 13.8%.  The 1979 general election was the only campaign fought 
by Steel alone. The two general elections that followed were conducted in alliance with the SDP, 
whose launch in 1981 was to permanently and radically affect the Liberal Party.  In the meantime 
the party employed what was now a favourite response to poor election results – to rebuild at the 
local level. The Greaves and Lishman booklet “The Theory and Practice of Community Politics” 
published by the Association of Liberal Councillors in 1980 became the activist‟s bible. 
 
The Social Democratic Party 
 
 “..went up like a rocket…..came down like the stick”. (Crewe and King, 1995 pvii).   
 
Former Cabinet members, Shirley Williams, Roy Jenkins, David Owen and Bill Rogers left the 
Labour Party in 1981 increasingly distant from its policy on Europe and defence and frustrated by 
internal party democracy.   The party launch created tremendous excitement and within the party‟s 
first year, boosted by Shirley William‟s victory in the 1981 Crosby by-election, claimed a paid-up 
membership of over 65,000.   The Party its founders had created was different organisationally 
from the Labour Party they had left and the Liberals they ultimately joined, in several fundamental 
ways. In the first place, only individuals could join, not organisations such as trades unions. The 
party was run by its National Committee which was elected but heavily dominated by MPs, as was 
the party‟s powerful Policy Committee.  The party launched without any grassroots movement 
behind it, and created a centralised and eventually computerised membership system.   Although 
the SDP attracted strong support from the previously un-politicised blue-collar sector, it had no 
following in local government and there is some evidence that these newly engaged members 
eventually slipped away from politics entirely (Crewe and King 1995).   
 
Crewe and King argue that the implications of its failure are far reaching.   As well as mounting a 
serious challenge to the two-party hegemony, the SDP seized a moment of mounting unpopularity 
for the two old parties, and represented the ongoing process of party dealignment.  They set out 
                                                                    
10  This was the first  leadership election of any of the national parties to elect a leader by a ballot of the full  
membership. In 1976 a new procedure was agreed, and David Steel beat John Pardoe 12,546 votes to 7032.  
Douglas, R. (2005). Liberals - A History of the Liberal and Liberal Democrat Parties, Hambledon & London. 
11  The Lib-Lab pact was short of full coalition as the Liberals did not participate in government but had an  
agreement to support the Labour minority government in parliament.  
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two key reasons for the failure of the SDP: 
 
- tactical errors made by the party‟s founders or its rank and file;  the party paid a high price 
for its ineffective and amateurish internal machinery and was unable to cope with the 
„media party‟ it had created.  
 
- that the party may have fared better if it had never set up on its own and had instead 
moved directly to join the Liberals. This argument highlights the crux of the contradiction 
that the new party was based upon. As Crewe and King say „if offered the choice of 
becoming Liberals or staying in the Labour Party, most of them would have stayed‟  
(Crewe and King 1995).  
 
Together with these observations they also point out the potential error in selecting Jenkins 
over Owen as leader, whose style they argue failed to capture the nation‟s imagination – a job 
perhaps better suited to Owen (Stephenson 1982). None deny that the process was fraught, 
but it is widely accepted that, were it not for David Owen‟s opposition to the Alliance, merger 
may have happened more swiftly and smoothly (Douglas 2005). The wider implications of the 
short life of the SDP are perhaps greater for the Labour Party than the Liberals. The Labour 
Party suffered from the loss of some of its prominent figures, and suffered a protracted period 
in opposition.  It was able, however, to retain the loyalty of many of its „big beasts‟ and 
crucially, funding from the Trades Union movement.  It emerged then, following the transitional  
leadership of Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair, able to convince the electorate in 
significant numbers.  The SDP represented many of the ideas of New Labour in embryonic 
form, but its position in the centre of a two-party system ultimately dealt it the same hand as 
the languishing Liberals.  
 
Alliance 
 
Rather than fight one another, the two parties agreed to work together.  Before merging in 1988 
the SDP fought two general elections in alliance with the Liberals. Prior to the 1983 general 
election the SDP had 29 seats, dwarfing the Liberals 12, and without having fought an election, 
since their number came from 26 defections from Labour, 1 from the Conservatives and 2 by-
election wins.  Their combined number, support in the country and forceful personalities meant 
when the two parties worked together they became a force to be reckoned with at Westminster.   
Leaning on one another for support the two parties  agreed to contest the 1983 and 1987 general 
elections in alliance, largely since neither had the resources to fight one another as well as the 
bigger two parties.  The parties had already experienced success adopting a co-operative strategy 
in by-elections in North West Croydon and Crosby, comfortably won by the Alliance candidate.  
 
The 1983 general election was according to many sources a chaotic and poorly judged marriage 
of these two centrist political parties which sealed the fate of the SDP (Owen 1992; Rogers 2000). 
The Liberals and SDP agreed not to put candidates forward against each other, which resulted in 
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the country being „carved up‟ between them (Stephenson 1982). The Alliance leadership of Roy 
Jenkins was criticised and against the backdrop of a popular Thatcher government, boosted by 
support for the Falklands War, won the Alliance just 23 seats despite netting 25.4% of the popular 
vote.   The election was followed by Michael Foot‟s retirement as Labour leader, and Roy Jenkins 
stepping down as SDP Leader, to be succeeded by Neil Kinnock and David Owen respectively.   
The 1987 general election that followed made matters even worse for the third parties, with David 
Owen and David Steel failing to find common ground. The alliance and its component parties 
divided publicly over nuclear disarmament, and the Alliance losing a number of previously held 
SDP seats.  The „two Davids‟ ridiculed by political satirists and commentators, suffered from the 
ambivalence that has dogged the centre parties ever since. David Owen was considered to lean to 
the right, David Steel to the left. Bringing the two together in government, let alone in coalition, 
looked impossible. The Alliance returned 22 seats and soon set about permanently merging in 
order to avoid continuing a cycle of electoral muddles that did not benefit either party.   David 
Owen made it clear he would oppose merger, and resigned when the party opened negotiations. 
 
Merger 
 
“The way in which the organisation was formed, will leave an indelible mark” (Panebianco 1988 
pxiii) 
 
Time and again studies of party organisation point to the party‟s origins and the way it came in to 
being as of crucial importance. Panebianco states: “Party analysis must go back to the party‟s 
formative phase and introduce the historical dimension as central”. Central to this thesis is his 
„genetic model‟ that, combined with institutionalisation, form the fundamental stages of modern 
party organisation.  Having already examined a little of the background to each of the parties that 
came together in the merger of 1988, we now turn to that process in order to see how and why the 
Liberal and SDP merged to form the Liberal Democrats.  
 
Academic literature on merged parties is far from extensive, and mostly in the form of case-
studies, for example the merger of the Dutch Reformed Political Unit (GPV) and Reformed Political 
Federation (RPF) which became the Christian Union in the Netherlands (Coffe and Torenvlied 
2007), and the Progressive with Conservative Party and Reform with Canadian Alliance parties in 
Canada (Belanger and Godbout 2010).  These two examples both see merger as an extreme form 
of party adaptation, in which the primary concerns are goal orientated, and put vote-maximising 
and policy advocacy over other concerns such as office maximising or the representation or 
participation of members.  Belanger and Godbout note three factors that are likely to lead parties 
to merge: votes to seats disproportionality, access to new resources and rebranding (Belanger and 
Godbout 2010).    In addition, studies of the merger that drew together the „German Left‟ are 
insightful (Olsen 2007; Lees, Hough et al. 2010). The process by which the Party of Democratic 
Socialism (PDS) and the Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG) transformed 
in to the „Left Party‟ is used in their study, to identify a series of specific stages in the process of 
party merger. In particular Lees, Hough and Keith identify risk-taking and consequent trust-building 
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at the elite or leadership level and the tasks subsequently given to a „development‟ or professional 
team, as fundamental stages bring the new party into being.  
 
 Two under-represented parties, such as the SDP and the Liberal Democrats, would naturally 
benefit from merging to increase their levels of representation. It is also fair to say, and Chapter 7 
on resources helps demonstrate this, that each predecessor party brought with it a degree of 
organisational strength that its partner was lacking.  One interviewee explained that, put simply the 
SDP lacked a grassroots organisation which the Liberals were able to offer, and the Liberals 
lacked internal discipline which the SDP had been able to demonstrate.
12
 The SDP had a number 
of highly rated former office-holding politicians in its ranks, lending credibility to a party that was 
unable to counter the charge of inexperience.  
 
Rebranding, however, created some difficulty. Liberals refused to accept any title that excluded the 
word Liberal, such as Alliance or Democrat, and the SDP insisted on including something 
sufficiently new to reflect that this was a merger of two parties and not the bolting on of the SDP to 
its more established neighbour.  The Party compromised on The Social and Liberal Democrats, 
and free from David Owen, decisively elected Paddy Ashdown its first leader.   Ashdown used his 
first conference as leader to tackle the pilloried new name and shortened it to „Democrats‟. This 
was narrowly passed but this owed more to uniting behind the new leader than preferring the new 
name, and while the party‟s support continued to slide amidst ongoing internal turbulence, it was 
eventually dropped in favour of Liberal Democrats (Douglas 2005).  
 
Merger meant an end to the otherwise uncomfortable and unpopular muddle in which the Alliance 
had conducted the past two elections. In merging with the Liberals the SDP achieved a structure, a 
working party HQ, and an army of local party activists.
13
  The Liberal party was able to use the 
opportunity to drop some of their more frustrating internal procedures, including the Liberal 
Council. Plans to merge, however, divided the SDP into those that supported the move and allied 
with Roy Jenkins, and those that opposed it, led by David Owen.   The Liberal Party harboured 
opposition too.  Cyril Smith famously commented that the SDP “should have been strangled at 
birth”, and the Young Liberals and radical wing associated with the publication „Liberator‟ 
campaigned vehemently against what they considered to be an end to the liberal movement.   The 
negotiations took longer than expected and opposition was strong on both sides (Pitchford and 
Greaves 1989).
14
 Post merger both parties continued to suffer from some minor complications 
caused by their un-merged separate entities, which continue to exist as The Liberal Party
15
 and 
The SDP
16
 although only in insignificant numbers and at the local level.
17
 
                                                                    
12  Interview 64, 2009. 
13  The Liberal Party had their Party HQ in the National Liberal Club, the SDP setting up temporary offices in  
the more up-market offices at 4 Cowely Street, Westminster. The ultimate moving of Liberal Party staff in to  
Cowley Street created hostility in Liberal ranks, there is some anecdotal evidence that for some time the move 
was a bone of contention.  
14  Pitchford & Greaves offers a day by day account of the merger negotiations. 
15  http://www.liberal.org.uk/ (accessed 8.11.10). 
16  http://www.socialdemocraticparty.co.uk/ (accessed 8.11.10). It is arguable that the current SDP is not a  
successor to the former party of the same name, since the founders of the SDP formally disbanded the party in 
1990. 
17  In 1994 Richard Huggett exploited confusion over the party name, standing in the European Parliamentary    
elections of that year under the name “Literal Democrat” and won over 10,000 votes. Deliberately attempting to 
mislead the electorate in this way was outlawed in 1998. 
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The consequence of merger is a theme often returned to in analysis of the Liberal Democrats, and 
one mentioned by a number of interviewees who framed party successes and failures in the 
context of the predecessor parties.  The SDP was a failure according to Crewe and King, 
something naturally disputed by those whose legacy depends upon it having been a success.  It is 
described as “the aggressive takeover of the SDP by the Liberals” (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005) 
and organisationally at least, the SDP were the more junior partner.  Biographies of the „gang of 
four‟ describe four very differing responses to its alliance and eventual merger with the Liberals. 
Shirley Williams‟ actions spoke louder than words and she left the UK in 1988 for an academic 
career in the USA, eventually returning in 1995 to take a more active role in the House of Lords 
where she led the party between 2001 and 2004
18
 (Williams 2009). David Owen blamed a lack of 
independence for the SDP‟s swift demise, and believed that the general election Alliance was a 
mistake.  It was “looking like the Liberals” that led to its shared third-party squeeze and eventual 
demise (Owen 1992).  Roy Jenkins and Bill Rogers enjoyed distinguished careers in the House of 
Lords. Although the framers of the merger are no longer at the forefront of politics, there are some 
that argue their legacy can be seen in the coalition of May 2010 – a theme returned to later in this 
thesis (Ley 2011).   
 
iii) Electoral Fortunes 
 
1988-1992 
 
As the vote in the country goes down the party‟s number of seats goes up.  As support for Labour 
grows, support for the Lib Dems grows. Its very existence calls in to question some of the 
fundamental nostrums.  Durverger‟s law states that a first past the post electoral system favours a 
two-party system, implying there is no place in the UK for a third party (Duverger 1954). The 
Liberal Democrats however, have confounded this by competing and consistently making gains 
against the other two parties, failing to make the breakthrough at the national level but displaying a 
permanence at the local level, they bounced back from bad results with some regularity. The 
party‟s pattern of election results suggests that there is a strong link between success at a local 
level or at by-elections that is then reflected in success at Westminster. For this reason the 
assessment that follows looks at election results across the UK, at the state parliament level, in 
Europe, and in local elections, together.  The party‟s survival owes much to these sub-national 
victories. 
 
The new party had a difficult task ahead. Voters that left the Liberal Party in the 1960s and 1970s 
were showing no signs of voting Lib Dem (MacIver 1996).   The party continued to reel from the 
damage of the divisive merger, to contend with confusion caused by the unmerged „rump‟ of its 
predecessors, and to suffer from ongoing internal battles over the party name.   In the local 
elections of 1988 and 1989 the party lost 122 and 195 council seats respectively.  The party‟s 
lowest point came in the European elections in June 1989 when it polled 6% coming fourth behind 
the Green Party whose vote was more than twice that returned by the Lib Dems. What may have 
                                                                    
18  The author of this thesis was personal secretary to Baroness Williams in the House of Lords 2001-2003.   
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saved it was that Ashdown began to establish a voice over the issue of passports for Hong Kong 
nationals and began to be a familiar face on the television (Leaman 1998). The party continued to 
suffer in local elections in 1990, while Labour grew in strength; however, Labour was never likely 
to win a by-election in the affluent south east, and the new party‟s fortunes were temporarily 
revived with a sensational by-election win in Eastbourne (October 1990). The „dead parrot‟ had 
squawked. These individual moments of success became the glue that held the party together. For 
activists they represent success and triumph, although British by-elections are fundamentally 
„second-order‟, and as such are inclined to reflect protest votes rather than positive votes for the 
Lib Dems. (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Heath, McLean et al. 1999).   While it is not disputed that by-
elections are a vehicle for protest and tactical voting, their impact on party morale, for smaller and 
third parties as in this case,  should not be underestimated  (Crewe 1997). 
 
Eastbourne gave Paddy Ashdown an opportunity to boost party morale, to enjoy much-needed 
positive publicity and accelerated the process that many in the party argue led to the eventual 
resignation of Margaret Thatcher (Bale 2010).  It established Ashdown within his own party as a 
credible leader. His military background attracted a lot of attention, making him an unusual figure 
in the House of Commons, and a popular one in the country during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
and by 1991 he was declared the most popular of the three party  leaders (Butler and Kavanagh 
1992).  In the 1991 local elections the party gained 407 seats and their number of councillors rose 
to 3672, pushing their vote up from 17% to 22%.  As Ashdown‟s popularity grew, and opposition to 
the Conservatives soared, the party was boosted by two further by-election wins (in Ribble Valley 
and Kincardine and Deeside) just prior to the 1992 general election. 
  
Success was short-lived however, and the party slipped back to 20 seats, with a reduced share of 
the popular vote in the 1992 general election.  The party had secured itself as a serious third party, 
seen the demise of the Owenite SDP who lost all their seats, and had driven its vote up from 
below 10% to consistently polling in the high teens and often in the 20s.  The Conservatives were 
returned to office, and one month later in May 1992 during a public speech in Chard, Paddy 
Ashdown formally ended equidistance, promoting co-operation with Labour on specific issues. 
 
1992-1999 
 
In the years that followed the party continued to make strong gains in local elections and by-
elections. In 1993 the party had 4123 councillors - more than the Conservatives - and were 
sharing power in 28 out of 36 English county councils.  This total rose again in 1994 when the 
party also won its first two seats in Europe.  Huge swings against the Conservatives delivered 
sensational by-elections victories in Christchurch, Newbury and Eastleigh. The successful 
conversion of local campaigns in to seats at Westminster certainly convinced many in the party 
that this tactic should be paramount,  but its embrace may have owed more to a lack of resources 
than an ideological commitment to local politics (Harrison 2007).  
 
Of perhaps the greatest significance in the  leadership of Paddy Ashdown however, was the death 
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of John Smith and the election of Tony Blair as Labour leader.   Seeing the momentum of New 
Labour, Ashdown began engaging in secret meetings that sought to draw the two parties  together 
in a pre-election pact known as „the project‟, known only to a handful of his closest advisors. 
Scholars point to this as clear evidence of power being concentrated at the  leadership level 
(Russell and Fieldhouse 2005). Meanwhile the party on the ground continued to make strong 
gains in 1995 and 1996 by which time it had 5078 councillors, and won another impressive by-
election victory at Littleborough & Saddleworth.  By now the party had a very strong by-election 
winning formula, and a campaign department that valued the importance of these incremental 
victories.  In these local contests the party benefited from the unusual circumstances a by-election 
brings but remained unable to transfer these gains at a national level, largely due to a „fickle and 
inconsistent‟ vote that suffered when its support was evenly spread at the national level (Curtice 
1996). 
 
The 1997 general election brought a landslide for Labour and a historic result for the Liberal 
Democrats, netting them 46 seats on a popular vote that went down by 1%, the largest 
parliamentary number for a third party since 1929.   The party had adopted a highly successful 
strategy for targeting its resources and focusing ruthlessly on seats it believed to be winnable 
(Douglas 2005).  Ashdown‟s close relationship with Blair continued, but it was now largely 
superfluous to New Labour‟s needs and the „project‟ began to fall apart (Ashdown 2001).  
Ashdown had a lot going for him.  He was by now well established, made good use of Prime 
Ministers Questions, was outspoken and impressive over the war in Bosnia.  He suffered however 
from his closeness to Blair, who failed to deliver on private promises of cabinet seats for the Lib 
Dems leaving Ashdown in a weakened position with his own party. It became difficult to find 
distinctive policy, and the party inevitably moved to the left to counter New Labour‟s move to the 
right (Butler and Kavanagh 1997).  The 1997 result is also particularly significant to the Lib Dems 
since it greatly increased their „Short Money‟, and in this case became the life-blood that enabled a 
transformation of professional efforts at HQ and in Parliament.  This is covered in greater detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
After 1997 the Conservatives began to claw back some of the councils they had lost but the 
Liberal Democrats were by now campaigning hard in the first round of elections to the Scottish and 
Welsh  Assembly s, and in the European parliamentary elections.   A drop from 17% to 12% was 
converted in to an increase from two to ten seats at the European level.   Predictable results 
followed where the party achieved in 17 seats to the Scottish Parliament and 6 in the Welsh 
Assembly largely reflecting their traditional support in rural areas at the Westminster level.  What 
was significant however, was the coalition deals that followed, teaching the party important 
lessons for the future (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005).  
 
 
1999-2006 
 
In 1999 Ashdown stepped aside and Charles Kennedy became party leader. His first move was to 
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re-establish equidistance from both parties and put a clear end to notions of co-operation with 
Labour.  The latter‟s honeymoon was over and although the Lib Dems took the Romsey seat from 
the Tories in a by-election, the party stood still at the local level and polled a poor 12% in the first 
election for London Mayor. By 2001, however, Kennedy himself soon become established as a 
popular political figure  The party‟s additional funds enabled it to produce a professional and 
properly costed manifesto, adding environmentalism and a focus on civil liberties to make it 
distinctive and keep the pressure up on Labour (Butler and Kavanagh 2001).  Kennedy had to lead 
a party now making headway against the Labour party in the north east and in urban areas across 
the UK, requiring consistency at best and coherence at least. The result was a geographically 
more widely-spread vote and a small increase of six at Westminster.  
 
The September 11
th
 attacks in New York and subsequent “war on terror” marked a shift in Liberal 
Democrat political positioning and support.   The party‟s stand against the Iraq war is covered in 
more detail in Chapter 5 but the groundswell of support for this decision can be seen in the growth 
once again of council seats, this time in Labour areas.  In 2002 and 2003 the pattern of party 
support began to change, with the Liberal Democrats gaining 200 councillors and control of five 
further councils.  The party stood still in the second round of elections to the Scottish Parliament 
and Welsh Assembly, returning 17 and 6 members respectively, holding on to its support in areas 
of strength. While the Welsh campaign was judged a poor one, it did lead to a build up of support 
in promising council areas, delivering  4 councils as a result in 2005 (Deacon 2007).   
 
The by-election victory by Sarah Teather in Brent East (September 2003), however, marked a new 
and significant point for the party that was now taking votes from Labour in inner cities, in part due 
to opposing the invasion of Iraq earlier that year.  This extraordinary result, a massive swing of 
29%, was followed with another sensational victory in Leicester South where the party elected its 
first minority MP. At the same time the Conservative Party were experiencing a  leadership crisis of 
their own and failing to portray themselves as a credible opposition (Bale 2010).  The Lib Dems 
failed, however, to extend this at the European elections (June 2004), where they suffered from an 
increase in support for UKIP who beat them to third place with 16% of the popular vote, nor at the 
London Mayoral elections, where the party lost out to the personally popular Ken Livingstone. Its 
candidate Simon Hughes brought the vote up to just below 15%. This pattern strongly suggests 
the Brent-East result reflected dissatisfaction with Labour rather than a consistent surge in support 
for the Liberal Democrats, although Sarah Teather was able to hold the seat in 2005 and after 
boundary changes in 2010.   
   
This was reflected in the 2005 general election, which was very different in tone and style than 
Kennedy‟s first effort in 2001. Despite polling 22% of the popular vote and returning its best ever 
result with 62 MPs, the party fell short of the breakthrough of between 70 and 100 it had hoped for.  
The numbers, however, fail to tell the full story, as the pattern of Lib Dem support underwent a 
subtle but significant shift away from the tradition of doing well mainly in Conservative seats, to 
doing well in traditional Labour areas.  The party failed to make numerical gains at local elections 
but did make an important shift in the demographic of its local support, continuing to rely on its 
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traditional support in the rural heartlands but making strong gains in the inner cities, taking control 
of Liverpool, Sheffield and Newcastle and working in anti-Labour coalitions in scores of others 
(Butler and Kavanagh 2005). The manifesto continued on the party‟s theme of opposing Labour on 
the war in Iraq, defending civil liberties and a centre-left policy supporting public spending on 
social care.  Support was minimal in Conservative heartlands, where the party‟s strategy of 
„decapitation‟, aiming to deliver a series of Tory front-bench scalps, failed completely.19 The 2005 
general election is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly it positioned the party as anti-Labour, 
although its vote failed to penetrate in Conservative strongholds. Secondly it demonstrates that, in 
spite of strong performances and by-election wins the party failed to make breakthrough gains.  
The dual nature of the party‟s appeal rendered it fragile (Driver 2011), leaving it with a paradox  
“the party must fight Labour in Labour held seats, but still win Labour sympathisers in 
Conservative Liberal areas” (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005).   
 
2006-2010 
 
What followed was a period of turbulence and soul-searching that lead to the party‟s turning away 
from this conundrum and instead following a path that eventually led to coalition with the Tories in 
2010. In 2006 Charles Kennedy resigned following pressure from his parliamentary colleagues, 
amid questions over his ability to lead following his confession to alcoholism. Opinion remains 
divided over Kennedy‟s legacy, from those that believe he led a consistent and successful phase 
in the party‟s history, making gains at every level (Hurst 2006), to those that believe his lack of  
leadership skills left the party without direction (Brack 2007) particularly when faced with a 
revitalised Conservative party (McAnulla 2009). What is significant about Kennedy‟s resignation is 
that it highlights the growing power of the parliamentary party, members of whom issued 
ultimatums to Kennedy which led to his departure, and whose influence has steadily grown since 
(Russell, Fieldhouse et al. 2007).  
 
Following Kennedy‟s resignation, scandal engulfed the party, resulting in  leadership hopeful Mark 
Oaten declining to stand, Simon Hughes withdrawing his candidacy, and Ming Campbell emerging 
as the unity candidate.  Despite this the party still won a by–election victory in Dunfermline and 
West Fife, believed to be a reflection of growing opposition to the Iraq war.   Campbell‟s two years 
as leader began a process of internal change for the party, which again made little progress in 
electoral terms.  In the 2007 Welsh assembly elections the party stood still with 6 seats and failed 
to secure a potential coalition with Labour, an opportunity seised instead by Plaid Cymru.  In 
Scotland the SNP support surged giving them an opportunity to enter minority government, while 
the Liberal Democrat vote remained static, and their numbers at Holyrood reduced from 17 to 16 
MSPs.  The party vote dropped in the London mayoral contest in 2008 with Brian Paddick‟s vote 
representing a drop overall of 6%.    The party managed to make gains in local government, 
however.  With the Blair government in overall decline, taking control of a further 12 Councils 
pushed the Labour Party in to third place. Campbell then stood down. His successor Nick Clegg‟s 
first two years as leader were relatively uneventful, his only national-scale election being the 2009 
                                                                    
19  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/lib-dems-hold-inquest-after-their-decapitation-strategy-misses-
targets-489833.html (accessed 19.09.11). 
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European parliamentary elections, where the party returned only 11 MEPs.  The party‟s numbers 
at the local level held firm, however, its default position in local government enabling the  
leadership to steady the ship and rebuild once again.  
 
iv) The Party Leader  
 
Prior to merger, the leader of the Liberal party was elected by the party‟s MPs until 1976 when the 
party introduced a ballot of all party members. The Party Constitution sets out the formal process 
for electing and removing the Party Leader and stipulates that a  leadership election is triggered 
under the following circumstances: 
 
a) leader calls it 
b) leader dies or is incapacitated 
c) leader loses parliamentary seat 
d) leader resigns  
e) parliamentary party in House of Commons passes vote of no-confidence by simple 
majority  
f) 75 local parties  call for contest having held quorate meetings 
g) none of the above circumstances have occurred 1 year since a general election providing  
 i) the FE can postpone this by 1 year with a 2/3rds majority 
ii) the leader is a member of the government.
20
 
 
The rules of election of the Leader have changed very little, with two exceptions. First, following 
the leadership contest of 1999 (in which five candidates put themselves forward, three of whom 
failed to secure more than 10% of first preferences), a rule was passed at the 2005 Federal 
Conference requiring candidates to secure more than 10% of the Parliamentary party in a 
nomination process; previously only a proposer and a nominee had been required. This would 
prevent the expensive and potentially embarrassing situation in which too many candidates with 
minimal support use the process to gain publicity without having a genuine hope of winning.  
Second, inconsistency and confusion in the 2005  leadership election led to the passing of a 
further rule in 2006, which enabled candidates to communicate directly with the membership via 
email. Previously rules about direct contact with the membership relied on candidates obtaining 
contact details from sympathetic membership secretaries, rather than having access to the central 
list from HQ, and was seen as unfair. The election is conducted via single transferable vote, and 
there have been four  leaders and four contests,  summarised below. 
 
                                                                    
20  Point g) means that the Leader is required to be re-nominated after each general election. This is a „rubber  
stamp‟ exercise conducted by the parliamentary party
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1988 Launch of Liberal Democrats – Ashdown the uniting candidate 
 
The contest focused on two areas of identifiable difference between the two candidates, Paddy 
Ashdown and Alan Beith,  that of the party name, and of its ongoing proximity to Labour (Francis 
2010). The campaign was generally considered to be somewhat „bland‟ (Punnett 1992), and the 
result above all suggested a party weary of crisis. Beith and Ashdown, although very different in 
style, both supported the merger and were widely considered to be „uniting‟ candidates. Just under 
72% of the eligible party membership returned ballot papers and Ashdown won a strong victory 
polling, 71.6% of the votes.  Ashdown‟s period in office was one that provided stability (Brack 
2007) and a new, somewhat untypical, character to the office (Williams 2009). His candid auto-
biographies frequently describe moments where he is thwarted by the party grassroots at 
conferences and through representatives on its various committees.  He was able to begin to 
make progress on his own agenda of co-operation with Labour toward the end of his period as 
leader, albeit through clandestine discussions with Blair. This was contrary to his somewhat 
combative style in negotiations with his own party where he had a reputation for blasting through 
the middle of anything that stood in his way.  
 
1999 Ashdown stands down – Party chooses Kennedy and equidistance 
 
A key component in the election of  leaders is the timetable and what triggers the election in the 
first place.  Paddy Ashdown, who chose when to go, wrote a letter to the party‟s FE informing them 
of this intention, giving a six-month period in which to conduct the contest for his successor.
21
 The 
issue at the heart of this campaign was where candidates stood on Ashdown‟s flagship „project‟, 
and of continuing to work closely with Labour (Alderman and Carter 2000).  Five candidates came 
forward: Jackie Ballard, Malcolm Bruce, Simon Hughes, Charles Kennedy and David Rendel.  
Perhaps of equal significance, however, were those considered to be potential candidates - Nick 
Harvey, Menzies Campbell, Paul Tyler and Don Foster - who did not put themselves forward, an 
indication that the pro-project stance
22
  was losing popularity (Francis 2010). The single 
transferable vote resulted in Charles Kennedy‟s overall victory. In the final round of redistribution 
Charles Kennedy secured 57% of votes to Simon Hughes‟ 43%, following a first preference 
distribution of 54% (Kennedy) to 39% (Hughes).   Turnout was atypically low, at 62% in this 
contest and went back up again to exceed 72% in the next  leadership election in 2006.  
 
2006 Kennedy resigns – A party in crisis 
 
In January 2006, following the resignation of Charles Kennedy after 7 years as Leader, the party 
was plunged into a period of crisis.   When nominations opened the following individuals were 
expected to stand; Simon Hughes, Mark Oaten, Ming Campbell and Chris Huhne.  Mark Oaten‟s 
nomination was never received, following scandal about this private life, and having failed to 
                                                                    
21  Ashdown declared his intention to resign 20th January 1999, aged 57, after 11 years of leading the Party, 
to spend more time with his family.  He ceased to be leader when Charles Kennedy took office, 11th August 1999. 
22  „Project‟ became the term for referring to Paddy Ashdown‟s plans for closer co-operation with the Labour  
Party. 
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gather sufficient support among the Parliamentary party to continue.
23
 Further revelations about 
the private life of Simon Hughes made this a particularly painful period for the Party.
24
 The single 
transferable vote resulted in Menzies Campbell being elected with a redistributed 58% of the vote 
to 42% for Huhne, following 45% of first preferences, compared with 32% first preferences to 
Huhne and 23% of first preferences to Hughes. A less than resounding victory dogged the new 
Leader, who within 18 months had resigned amid negative press over his age and health (Kelly 
2007). It was a campaign that began with some promise that it might reflect a wider debate in the 
party sparked by the publication of The Orange Book but which descended in to one of personal 
tragedy and crisis, and a party craving unity (Francis 2010).  
 
2007 Ming Campbell steps down – Victory for the „Orange Bookers‟ 
 
The unhappy circumstances surrounding the resignation of Kennedy, the disastrous events around 
other potential  leadership candidates, and the unsuccessful tenure of Campbell, led to a decisive 
two-way fight between the party‟s latest two front-runners, Chris Huhne and Nick Clegg. In practice 
the immediate effect of Campbell's resignation led to Deputy Leader, Vince Cable, assuming the 
role of „Acting leader‟. Although Vince Cable was highly rated during this period, he was 
persuaded by close colleagues of the need for younger blood and did not put himself forward 
(Cable 2009). Again this two-way contest stimulated a relatively low turnout from members, with 
64.4% of the eligible membership returning ballots, giving Clegg a very narrow victory over  
Huhne. Clegg won 20,988 first preferences (50.34%) compared with Huhne‟s 20,477 (49.12%).  
With just 511 votes separating the two, this represents the closest of all recorded contests for the 
Leader of the Liberal Democrats (Kelly 2007). The election was more bad-tempered in tone, with 
talk, for instance, of „Calamity Clegg‟ 25, and yet very little to distinguish the two candidates from 
one another on policy.  
 
vi) The Party President  
 
In the Liberal Democrats the position of party President is important. The position is similar to that 
of a deputy leader, but is open to individuals outside the parliamentary party and acts as a go-
between speaking typically on behalf of the party grassroots and representing their interests to the 
leader. It is left very much open to individual interpretation and what follows is a brief history of the 
individuals that have held this post.   
 
Sir Ian Wrigglesworth won the election for President of the newly merged party in 1988 against two 
other contenders in a clear battle for the heart of the party. A former Labour MP, then SDP 
member, Sir Ian secured just under 50% of the votes from a ballot of the entire membership 
against Des Wilson, former member of the Liberal Party, who secured 38%, and Gwynoro Jones 
from the Welsh Party with 12.5%.
26
 Turnout was high at over 71% of those balloted. He faced the 
unenviable task of sacking more than half the party‟s staff and securing sufficient private funds and 
                                                                    
23  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article717349.ece accessed 6.7.2009. 
24  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4651640.stm accessed 6.7.2009. 
25  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7100615.stm (accessed 15.10.10). 
26  http://www.cix.co.uk/~rosenstiel/ldelections/presidential.htm (accessed 13.10.10) 
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loans to keep the party from bankruptcy.   His reputation within the party was one of a well-liked 
northern businessman, disinclined toward being a puppet of the  leadership while at the same time 
able to demonstrate managerial competence.  During this time of the crisis his role was one of 
overseeing the General Secretary and the day-to-day business at HQ in Cowley Street.    
 
Seen by some as an attempt to balance the „liberal‟ leadership of Ashdown, the 1990 Presidential 
election saw a further triumph for the former SDP, in the resounding success of Charles Kennedy, 
securing 82% of the vote, with a markedly reduced turnout of 36.3%, arguably a demonstration of 
the healing of old wounds and a foregone conclusion in favour of Kennedy. His period as 
President was also a popular one, in which he became known throughout the country speaking at 
local party fundraising dinners and  at  conference in the build up to the 1992 general election. He 
was re-elected President in 1992, again with a low turnout, and with 70% of the vote.  
 
Charles Kennedy‟s period in office was followed by his Highland neighbour, MP for Caithness and 
Sutherland and former SDP member, Robert Maclennan.  Again the contest represented a ballot 
between three well-known figures from the Liberal Democrats' former parties  and the component 
countries of the federal party, with Maclennan from Scotland, Don Foster from Bath in England, 
and Martin Thomas former President of the Welsh Liberals.  Maclennan was a less well-known 
and less convivial character, credited by the party elite for skillful negotiations during the merger 
and a passionate advocate for a Scottish parliament.  He was nonetheless re-elected unopposed 
for a second term.   
 
Maclennan was succeeded by Diana Maddock, whose victory in the 1993 Christchurch by-election 
was a symbolic moment for the party. Despite being defeated at the 1997 general election, Diana 
Maddock occupied a particularly sentimental place in the party‟s heart.   Her failure to hold the 
seat was widely considered to explain support for her election as President, which she won 
unopposed but held for just one term and was succeeded by Navnit Dholakia, a former Liberal and 
the party‟s first ethnic minority President.  
 
Dholakia was also well-known and a popular figure across the party, and was elected twice 
unopposed. As well as giving the party an opportunity to demonstrate diversity, something its 
parliamentary party failed to do, he traveled widely in his duties as President, and oversaw what 
many consider to be the most difficult period for the Federal Executive. During this time FE 
meetings were regularly disrupted by radical grassroots activist Donnadhach McCarthy. Dholakia 
also oversaw the difficult departure of Charles Kennedy.  He was succeeded following a second 
unopposed term, by unsuccessful  leadership candidate but darling of the grassroots, Simon 
Hughes.  
 
The interpretation of the role of party president was most critically tested by Hughes, who without 
consultation with the FE or amendment to the constitution, created four new senior „Deputy-
presidents‟ in his second term in office.  Hughes cleverly used his position as Chair of the Federal 
Executive to obtain backing for this decision, which was supported by an FE vote, but which was 
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overturned when Hughes failed to produce the necessary annual reports and reviews on the post, 
which were required for its continuation. He also failed to seek what many felt were necessary 
amendments to the constitution, added to which there was apparent  leadership fury at his 
appointing of his own supporters to these newly created posts. Vice-Presidents are determined by 
the state parties; in England the Chair of the English party is automatically a Federal Vice-
President, and in the Welsh and Scottish parties  the Vice President is a person nominated by the 
Executive.   
 
Informally the President is not usually expected to take sides in a  leadership contest, but again 
Hughes broke with convention in 2007 when he publicly backed Nick Clegg, while other senior 
politicians including former  leaders Charles Kennedy and Menzies Campbell, refused to back 
either candidate.
27
  Hughes, however, remains highly popular  among party activists, strongly 
associated with the party‟s radical wing. He enjoyed a high profile Presidency, renewed 
unopposed in 2006.  
 
Lembit Opik stood against Simon Hughes in 2004, losing by 14,331 votes (37% of the vote), but 
stood again against Ros Scott amid a backdrop of negative publicity about his private life.  On this 
second occasion Scott won by 14,489 votes, a victory for intensive lobbying by the party elite, 
keen to keep maverick Opik out of the spotlight, and by the Association of Liberal Democrat 
Councillors (ALDC) supporting Scott, a former group leader on Suffolk County Council.  Opik‟s 
name on the ballot for President appeared also to have the impact of returning turnout numbers 
from the low 30,000s to almost 50,000.   Ros Scott was another popular figure among the activists, 
highly visible in the party, brokering the relationship between members and the leader, and touring 
the country speaking at fundraising events.  She was formally responsible for drawing the party 
together at the special conference called in 2010 to demonstrate the „triple-lock‟, (although it is 
clear from David Law‟s account that the need for this „event‟ was already at the forefront of the 
minds of the coalition negotiation team) (Laws 2010).  Scott, however, resigned her post shortly 
after the coalition was agreed, only serving one of the potential two terms, and was replaced by 
Tim Farron MP in what appears to be an early demonstration of the role coming to represent 
differing factions within the party.  Farron has been outspoken and openly opposed the leadership 
on the abolishing of university tuition fees and has been critical of the coalition.  
 
v) Conclusion 
 
A party without a record in office suffers from being unable to point to success. On the other hand 
it has no failures on its watch. The Liberal Democrats have traditionally been able to maximise 
protest votes by attracting charismatic and popular local politicians.  Combined with a strong base 
in local government they have become, in spite of an electoral system that works against them, a 
permanent force in British politics.  
 
 
                                                                    
27  http://www.libdemvoice.org/should-the-lib-dem-president-be-neutral-in- leadership-elections-1819.html accessed 
11.06.2009. 
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This brief summary of party history demonstrate lessons the party has learned over the years. The 
first is that the party benefits from strong charismatic  leadership by both the leader and the 
president. Jo Grimond was praised for his memorable oratory, Jeremy Thorpe for his flamboyance 
and charm, Paddy Ashdown for his military-inspired style, Charles Kennedy for his „chat-show‟ 
ease. Ashdown and Campbell in particular took over the party in crisis, and having united the 
party, were followed by  leaders, Kennedy and Clegg, able to enjoy improved electoral results.  
Kennedy, Dholakia and Hughes have also all played important parts in the important role of Party 
President.  The second is that it has been dependent for its survival on grassroots members, 
particularly in its rural heartlands and among the young, acting as the glue that binds the  
leadership and the electorate together. 
 
Local elections and by-elections matter to the Liberal Democrats. They represent moments of 
reflection and the opportunity to protest for the electorate,  and are interpreted by activists as 
evidence of   party revival.  The largest share of by-election victories that have resulted in a 
change in party since 1979 have been won by the third party, benefiting from both „campaign 
specific‟ and „referendum‟ wins (Norris 1990) and while accepting the second-order nature of these 
contests, these are very important to the third party.   Although the Lib Dems often lose these 
seats at general elections they have held on to enough to survive. Votes for the Liberal Democrats 
at general elections, however, have been cast in a voting system that discriminates against 
smaller parties that lack regional concentrations of support. Although their vote could be seen to 
be gradually increasing, it was the jump in seats delivered in 1997 that is most worthy of note.  It 
signaled a step-change not just in the size but also the character of the parliamentary party. It 
doubled the party‟s Short Money and marked the end of a trend in Lib Dem support mirroring that 
of the Conservatives.  From this moment on the party began to make advances at Labour‟s 
expense. It could threaten both parties, but failed to ever look convincingly like replacing them. 
This on the face of it suggests that the party benefit from fluctuating protest votes (Curtice 2007), 
although recent research indicates that it is more closely connected to a protest against the party 
in opposition and particularly the opposition leader (Belanger, Nadeau et al. 2010). We can see, 
therefore, that its political positioning is seen by those outside, and crucially inside the party, in 
terms of equidistance or lack of it.  Notwithstanding the events of 2010, these three lessons are 
not unique in any political party, but seem particularly crucial to the Liberal Democrats. 
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Chapter 4 The Constitution and party structure  
 
i)  Introduction  
 
Our decision making arrangements arise out of a constitution that was formed when the 
parties merged and you had a Liberal tradition that you never trust the  leadership, and an 
SDP tradition that you never trust the membership. (Interview 46, 2009) 
 
This chapter focuses on the party constitution, and how the party was designed.  It explains the 
formal rules that govern it, and explains how these rules work in practice.  It aims to capture the 
nature of the party as an institution, and look at how that has changed over time. The constitution 
of the Liberal Democrats came in to effect in 1988 as the document that formally brought together 
its founder parties, The Social Democratic Party and The Liberal Party.
28
   A more detailed account 
of the merger is contained in Chapter 3.  At 284 pages the constitution represents a lengthy 
document, which embodies the party‟s commitment to democratic processes.  Controversial 
amendments to the constitution are few and far between, since it may only be altered by a two-
thirds majority of representatives at the Federal Conference (Article 2.5 (a)).  As a piece of formal 
documentation it is important, largely because the transformation of the party described elsewhere 
in this thesis, the primacy of manifestos, the centralising impact of PPERA, the standardising effect 
of the internet and crucially the ceding of power from the Federal Executive to the Chief Officers 
Group, have taken place without recourse to its articles. 
 
At the heart of this thesis is the tension between the democratic principles that guide the ideology 
of the party, and the bureaucracy necessary for it to function. The constitution aims to achieve two 
main objectives, one concerning the people involved, the other concerning process. Firstly, it puts 
in place a series of systems that divide the roles and responsibilities of the federal party‟s main 
sections so that it can carry out its day–to-day duties.  These duties are; “determination of policy, 
the party‟s overall strategy, preparations for parliamentary and European elections, the 
presentation, image and media relations of the party and its international relationships” (Article 
2.3).  In particular it sets out how various individuals and committees should be elected in order 
that these functions can be carried out by a collection of party bodies.  Secondly, the constitution 
puts in place a method by which the party can arrive at policy decisions.  Woven into its text are its 
framers' attempts to reconcile the needs of the grassroots activists and the leadership.  Rather 
than provide a system of checks and balances to guard against over-zealous leadership, it is 
designed so that the grassroots of the party have a number of means by which they can play a 
central role.  This chapter looks at the written word of the constitution, and the workings of each 
component part to see how it functions in practice. It describes a constitution fundamentally 
unchanged since the party‟s birth.29 It sets out the framework for a democratic and grassroots 
orientated party, with policy at its centre, which has enabled the party to function with a 
                                                                    
28  The Constitutions of the Liberal Democrats exist in one single document that encompasses the entire UK- 
wide party structure, thus comprises “The Federal Party, The Liberal Democrats in England, The Scottish  
Liberal Democrats, The Welsh Liberal Democrats/Democratiaid Rhyddfrydol Cymru”. 
29  The party conducted a constitutional review in 1992-1993 following which extensive changes were made to  
the English Constitution, but the fundamentals in the Federal Constitution remained the same.  
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considerable degree of organisational stability. It demonstrates that the document remains useful 
in enshrining party principles, and providing rules and regulations. It also provides evidence that at 
times the party elite can exploit and even by-pass the constitution when the need arises.  
 
Federal Structure – an overview 
 
The Liberal Democrats exist to build and safeguard a fair, free and open society, in which 
we seek to balance the fundamental values of liberty, equality and community, and in 
which no-one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity. (Preamble to the 
federal constitution). 
 
The preamble is a set of principles that guide the party, and the remaining 284 pages explain how 
the party intends to achieve a working organisation to promote these ideals.   The Liberal 
Democrats are unique in British politics, existing as defined by the Party Constitution as a 
federation of three separate state parties: The Liberal Democrats in England, Scottish Liberal 
Democrats and Welsh Liberal Democrats.  Each state-level party has its own constitution, and with 
it considerable powers, including different membership rules, model local party constitutions and 
each state party also produces its own manifesto.   They are sub-divided into regions, and regions 
are comprised of local parties divided, broadly speaking, across Westminster constituency 
boundaries.  
 
Table 4. The Federal structure of the Liberal Democrats 
 
                                                   Federal Party 
English party Scottish party Welsh party 
English regions (11*) Scottish regions (8**) Welsh regions (4***) 
Constituency parties  Constituency parties  Constituency parties  
Branch Branch Branch 
 
* English regions, comprise Devon & Cornwall, western Counties, London, Eastern England, 
Southern Central & South East England, East Midlands, West Midlands, North West, Northern 
England, Yorkshire & Humberside. 
**Scottish regions are Central Scotland, Mid Scotland & Fife, Glasgow, North East Scotland, 
Highlands & Islands, Lothian, South Scotland and West Scotland. 
***Welsh regions are North Wales, Mid & West Wales, South West Wales and South West Wales 
Central. 
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Table 5. Responsibilities of different party strata 
 
Federal party UK wide policy 
Federal Conference 
Parliamentary elections 
Fundraising 
State party Operation of local parties  
State policy 
Day to day management of membership services 
 
Regional party Oversee region-wide campaigns 
Regional conference 
Regional events and fundraising 
 
Constituency party 
 
Local campaigns and fundraising 
Candidate selection 
 
Branch* Elect representatives to attend federal conference.  
 
 
*Not all constituency parties are broken up in to individual branches. 
 
The party‟s federal structure is an important factor in understanding the character of the merged 
entity.  In the years immediately post-merger the Liberal Democrats debated the inconsistency of 
the existence of a Scottish, Welsh and English Party each with its own constitution and 
conference, but for which the policy-making powers of the English party presented an anomaly.   A 
constitutional review conducted by the party in 1992-1993 changed the system so the English 
Conference gave policy-making powers to the Federal Party on its behalf.  Although the day-to-
day business of operating within the federal structure is at times laborious, and often 
misunderstood outside the party framework, challenges to this most fundamental part of party 
philosophy have not been made. Indeed, the federal structure of the party provided a useful head 
start when devolution to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assemblies became reality. It has 
survived the test of time. 
 
ii)  Membership and Local parties  
 
Membership 
 
When the two parties came together in 1988 a number of interviewees explained that precise 
membership figures were impossible to cite, either because they had been exaggerated during the 
negotiations, or because they had simply never been centrally collated.
30
  Membership figures for 
the Liberal Democrats were not regularly published until required by the Electoral Commission 
under the Political Parties Elections and Referendum‟s Act (2000) (PPERA).   The figures quoted 
in this chapter (and elsewhere) are derived from total numbers of ballots sent out during various 
„all-membership‟ votes to internal elections, such as for the party President or Leader.  
                                                                    
30  Interview 10, 2009 & Interview 64, 2009 gave differing accounts of reasons for the discrepancy in the  
membership numbers provided by both parties prior to merger. They argue that this led to a budget for the  
new party based on incorrect membership tables, which led to the mass redundancies of 1989.  
This is described in greater detail in Chapter 7.  
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Membership of the Liberal Democrats can be achieved in four ways.  
 
- by joining the local party for the area in which you live 
- by joining a different local party outside where you live with its prior permission 
- by joining the youth and student Specified Associated Organisation  
- by joining a state party direct (where there is no local party, i.e., for overseas voters) 
 
Membership can be refused or revoked on the following grounds. 
 
- disagreement with objectives of the Party 
- bringing the Party in to disrepute 
- membership of or support for another Party in Great Britain 
- standing against the Party‟s official candidate at any level 
 
In keeping with the Party‟s federal structure, a Joint State Membership Committee coordinates the 
promotion of membership in the UK, and the Party‟s Federal Executive following consultation with 
state parties, sets the membership subscription rate, subject to approval by federal conference.  A 
proportion of the funds raised through membership is remitted back to the Federal Party. Overall 
levels of membership have been in decline, with figures up until 1996 between 80,000-100,000, 
which dropped to approximately 60,000 (Marshall 2009) then saw a revival following the 2010 
general election.  According to the party, membership peaked in 1997 in response to the 
unpopular Conservative Government, as membership swelled in seats where Liberal Democrats 
represented a genuine threat to the Tory incumbent. Subsequent decline broadly follows periods 
when the Party was preoccupied with itself, ie; changing leaders and making pronouncements 
about its own organisation.  One senior party official commented: “It dips when we‟re inward-
looking – the membership don‟t like it”. 31 
 
                                                                    
31  Interview 34, 2009. 
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Table 6.  Membership figures Federal Liberal Democrats 1988-2010.
32
 
  
P – figures obtained from internal presidential elections (ballots sent out) 
L – figures obtained from internal  leadership elections (ballots sent out) 
*membership lapses after 3 not 6 months 
 
Year Source Total 
1988 L 80,104 
1988 P 80,071 
1990 P 82,455 
1992 P 101,768 
1994 P 101,091 
1999 L 82,827* 
2004 P 72,868 
2006 L 72,064 
2007 L 64,713 
2008 P 60,357 
2010 P 65,861 
 
More detailed analysis of party membership trends, including the most recent data derived post-
coalition, and  the socio-economic groups of members is discussed in Chapter 6. 
  
Local Parties  
 
Local Parties are encouraged to adopt a formal constitution, exist within single constituency 
boundaries, and must have at least 30 members.  The Local Parties can be suspended by the 
State Party if; 
 
- membership has been below 30 for 6 months  
- failing to comply with PPERA (2000) 
- if events have taken place that are seriously detrimental to the party 
 
The most significant change to the function of the Local Parties has been the requirement under 
PPERA legislation, that they disclose all gifts or donations over £200, and that they are received 
from a legally acceptable donor. Disclosure has to be made by the Local Party Treasurer, and in 
the absence of a Treasurer, the Local Party Chairman. The Liberal Democrats require Local 
Parties to give them this data on a monthly or bi-monthly basis, which is then checked and 
submitted by the Compliance Officer, to the Electoral Commission who then publish it quarterly on 
their website.  All this promotes uniformity: 
 
                                                                    
32 Tables taken from website of Colin Rosenstiel, accessed 07.10.10 
 http://www.compulink.co.uk/~rosenstiel/ldelections/welcome.htm 
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Prior to PPERA the average constituency would vary radically and that would be a 
reflection of its electoral significance. In theory now they all have the same level of contact 
with Headquarters.    All constituencies are the same – they have to do the same stuff – 
it‟s a legal requirement. (Interview 2, 2009). 
 
That said, the party experiences occasional rogue party behaviour, and exercises its right to 
suspend individuals or entire parties accordingly. In 1992 the party held an internal inquiry in to the 
campaigning activities of the Tower Hamlets Liberal Democrats and expelled three members 
whose campaign literature was thought to have “pandered to racism”. With the exception of this 
inquiry which attracted national attention, expulsions and suspensions are, generally speaking, of 
a personal and localised nature.  
 
iii) Policy-making, Federal Conference and Federal Policy Committee 
 
The policy-making process in the Liberal Democrats is clearly laid out in the Constitution:  
 
..the Conference shall be the sovereign representative body of the Party, and shall have 
the power to determine the policy of the Party… (Article 6.7).  
 
Chapter 5 looks at this is greater detail and here the rules as set out in the constitution are 
explained.   Firstly, the constitution states that the State parties are separately responsible for 
policy on State party matters, and the Federal Party on federal matters.  It establishes The Federal 
Policy Committee (FPC) that consults, develops and researches policy matters.  FPC draws up 
federal policy papers which are then submitted to the party‟s twice yearly federal conferences.  
FPC is chaired by the Party Leader, and comprises 1 MP, 1 MP from each of the state parties, 1 
Peer, 1 MEP, the President, 3 elected councillors,  1 representative from each of the state parties, 
and 15 directly elected individuals elected by federal conference reps, to serve on a 2 year basis.   
The constitution makes provision for the election of a further committee, the Federal Conference 
Committee (FCC), which is solely responsible for the running of the conference, and that it should 
include the President, the Chief Whip, representatives from each of the 3 State parties, 2 members 
of the Federal Executive, 2 members of the Federal Policy Committee, the Chief Executive, a staff 
representative and 12 directly elected members, elected by Conference reps for a 2 year period.  
FCC‟s role is primarily to set the conference agenda, but also to present the party to outside 
bodies, and to “make interim policy on topical issues” (Article 7.1 (d)).  FPC is also responsible for 
preparing the party‟s general election manifesto and to set up policy-specific working groups.  The 
constitution also sets out guidelines for the party conference, which bodies should be represented 
there, and how many representatives local parties  can send. Details of precisely how the 
conference should be run, how the agenda should be set, who can speak, standing orders, reports 
back and other party business, are contained in a lengthy annex to the constitution.  At both the 
Spring and Autumn Conference the party‟s various bodies described in the constitution make 
formal reports, which are appended to the Agenda.
33
  
                                                                    
33  Reports are given by FCC, FPC, FE, FFAC, the Parliamentary Parties (Commons, Lords and Europe), the  
Campaign for Gender Balance and the Diversity Engagement Group. These reports can be seen on the  
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iv) The Federal Executive and other Party Committees 
 
The Federal Executive 
 
The Liberal Democrats operate a number of formal committees at the Federal, State, Regional and 
Local Party levels. Formally speaking, its most senior body, the Federal Executive (FE) is set out 
in Article 8 of the party‟s Constitution which states that the FE is “responsible for directing co-
coordinating and implementing the work of the Federal Party”. The FE consists of a number of ex-
officio and elected members comprising; the President (who chairs FE), three Vice-Presidents, the 
Leader, 2 MPs, 1 Peer, 1 MEP, 2 Councillors, 1 state party rep from each of the 3 state parties  
and 15 representatives elected every 2 years by the Federal Conference.   In addition there are 
non-voting members; the Chief Whip, Chair of FFAC, Federal Treasurer, Chief Executive, staff 
representative and the Chair of FPC.  
 
FE has a number of significant powers, for example, overseeing the Party‟s budget, SAOs and 
AOs, compliance with PPERA, employment and whole-party ballots on matters deemed to be of 
importance to the membership. The FE oversees the day-to-day workings of the party, including 
that it sets up a company limited by guarantee that holds and disposes of party assets, and that it 
can vary the rules on the day to day running of the party in order to comply with PPERA 
legislation.  In addition to this, the Party operates two other senior committees under the umbrella 
of the FE.  The Federal Finance & Accounts Committee (FFAC) oversees the Party‟s budget and 
its Finance Department at Headquarters, and is elected.  The Party also convenes a Federal 
Campaign and Communications Committee (FCC) that oversees communications and media, and 
is also elected.  In addition, the FE elects various other posts where Liberal Democrats are 
representatives: 
 
Chair of the International Relations Committee (IRC) 
Two members of the IRC 
One representative on European Liberal Democrats Council (ELDR) 
Two representatives on ELDR Congress 
Two representatives on the Liberal International Executive 
Two representatives to the LI Congress 
Chair Campaign For Gender Balance 
Two Vice Chairs Campaign For Gender Balance
34
 
 
Election to the Federal Executive has until recently been a hard-fought internal contest that 
provided a strong indication of overall levels of support for the Leader. The Party elects members 
to the Federal Executive by a ballot of all conference reps, which is conducted using STV. 
Significant informal lobbying on behalf of various groups, including the Leader, is commonplace. 
While the Leader is well aware that a sympathetic FE makes his life a lot easier, the Party has 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
party‟s website for example in Spring 2011: 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/PDF/conference/Sheffield%20Reports%202011.pdf (accessed 
28.03.2011). 
34 http://www.libdems.org.uk/party/partyelections2008 accessed 11.06.2009. 
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tended to elect a number of rebellious and anti-establishment members to this internal committee 
with obvious consequences. The electorate comprises those members elected to be conference 
representatives, regardless of attendance at the conference (conference representatives are 
chosen at local level based on a sliding scale according to the size of the local party).  
 
In 2009 the total number of people who had been at some time elected to the party‟s Federal 
Executive was 92, of which the longest serving elected member had served for 13 years
. 
   It reads 
like a „who‟s-who‟ of the party, including over a dozen peers and a similar number who went on to 
become MPs. MPs are not entitled to stand for election to FE in their own right but clearly it has 
been a body to which those who seek office aspire. A full list of FE elected members and the years 
they served is contained in Appendix C.   Few changes have been made to the rules governing 
these committees. The three most significant amendments are as follows.  Firstly in September 
1993 Conference passed a resolution providing four different options to formalise the type of 
campaigning members could undertake in pursuit of their successful candidature. In order to 
prevent endorsements and to stop post-merger factions developing, it was agreed that a standard 
written hustings would be produced by each candidate and circulated to each member, stipulated 
as one side of A5 per candidate. The spending limit for campaigning to membership to the Party‟s 
Federal Executive was set at zero.
35
 Secondly, the most significant change to rules governing the 
composition of the Party‟s Federal Executive was that in September 1998 a constitutional 
amendment was passed preventing MPs from being eligible to serve this committee, other than in 
an ex-officio capacity.
36
    Thirdly, in 2007 a rule was passed making a „term‟ to the Federal 
Executive two years rather than one.  The decision to switch to elections every two years arose 
from a largely pragmatic criticism that its members were becoming increasingly concerned with 
their re-election every 12 months and this was interfering with the business of the FE.
37
  
 
The radical wing of the party has traditionally realised its greatest opportunities by being elected to 
the FE, notably Tony Greaves, Gareth Epps and Donnadhach McCarthy, all of whom became 
notorious for questioning elite decisions. This is covered in more detail in the case-study on the 
decision to participate in the Stop the War rally, in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  Providing there is 
someone informally representing this faction at the federal level, the party grassroots can point to 
this as intra-party democracy in action and, historically, it has been here that some bitter battles 
have been fought.  Leader‟s biographies testify to these and the need to „handle‟ this particular 
committee (Ashdown 2001).    
 
Since its inception in 1988, until the Bones Commission in 2008, the work of the party‟s internal 
committees was fairly constant, and shifted in emphasis according to external factors, in particular 
the party‟s changing priorities according to electoral successes, and the relative strengths of 
different individuals holding office.  There is evidence of two ways in which the  leadership has 
been able to gain influence within these formal constraints. It has undertaken informal lobbying to 
gain support on the party‟s main committees, in particular its Federal Executive. Secondly and 
                                                                    
35 Interview 2, 2009. 
36 Article 7 (Federal Policy Committee), amendment to Article 7.2 at end of h). 
37 Interview 46, 2009. 
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more recently, far-reaching reforms have by-passed the party constitution altogether.  The 
Campaigns and Communications Committee that decides on the party‟s media strategy and the 
General Election Committee that decides on strategy, do not appear in the constitution.
38
  
Furthermore, the Bones Commission did not seek to alter party strategy, but its recommendations 
represent a reshaping, as well as streamlining, of the organisation that has an impact on almost 
every aspect of the constitution.  It recommended the party: “avoid the temptation to perfect our 
own constitution rather than get on with the job of pursuing power” (Bones Commission Report 
p27).  
 
The Bones Commission introduced a Chief Officers Group that is charged with “the management 
of the Party…for determining the Party‟s overall objectives and strategy, as well as ensuring 
delivery of results” (p86).  It is accountable to the FE and the federal conference although the 
recommendations of the Bones Commission are not formally constituted and include the 
delegating of authority on almost all key aspects of party management (p32).
39
 Some interviewees 
expressed the view that this was in order that the party become dependent on the new structure 
and are presented instead with a fait accompli.  In any event, the reluctance by party officials to 
bring that debate to the fore implies that these reforms go to the heart of the spirit of the 
constitution, one that has long established the party‟s internal democratic tradition. At the same 
time as the transition of power away from FE and toward COG took place, the party experienced 
the resurgence of interest in election to its Federal Policy Committee (FPC). This shift is described 
in more detail in Chapter 5 and appears to be a reflection of the fact that differences between the 
grassroots and party elite are now over matters of policy and less over matters concerning process 
and the operational running of the party.  (The Chairmanship of the party‟s internal committees is 
contained in Appendix L.) 
 
v)  The Parliamentary Parties  
 
The Federal Constitution of the Liberal Democrats sets out, simply, that the Parliamentary Parties  
of the House of Commons, House of Lords and European Parliament are those that receive the 
Whip. It states that they shall “make provision for a Chief Whip” and excluding the European 
Parliament, “if thought fit, a Deputy Leader” (Article 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3).  In effect, the Chief Whip, 
Deputy Whips and Deputy leaders in both the Commons and Lords are elected at an annual 
meeting of the Parliamentary party.  The constitution says nothing about the role the Parliamentary 
party plays in the removal of the Party Leader, but it played a pivotal role in the resignation of 
Charles Kennedy and as such represents a very powerful body (Russell, Fieldhouse et al. 2007; 
Cole 2009; Cowley 2009; Driver 2011).   Regulations governing votes of no-confidence in the 
Chair of the Parliamentary party, the Deputy Leader and the Chief Whip exist in its Standing 
Orders, but the regulations concerning votes of no-confidence in the leader remain somewhat 
                                                                    
38  CCC and GEC are not always separate bodies – this varies from election to election. 
39 At the autumn conference in Liverpool 2009, the FE report included a commitment to a review of the  
recommendations of the Bones Commission, which would report back, and would include an assessment of the 
success of the Chief Officers Group. 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/PDF/conference/Liverpool%202010%20Reports%20to%20Confere
nce.pdf (accessed 28/03/2011). The report in the FE report to Spring Conference 2011 reaffirmed the existence of 
COG which would now meet on a quarterly basis.  
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vague.
40
    
 
The Parliamentary party of the Liberal Democrats has undergone two significant transformations 
since 1988. The first is that as its parliamentary representation increased in number, its tendency 
to vote against its whip reduced (Cole 2009). Secondly Table 8 shows that the party has shifted 
politically; Cowley and Stuart demonstrate that the party had “transformed into a bona fide party of 
opposition” reflecting its uniform and consistent opposition to the Blair Government (Cowley 2009). 
The party opposed the Conservatives, demonstrated a phase of sympathy toward Labour and then 
developed a consistent opposition to Labour as its term continued.  Interviewees also often 
commented on the change in character of the parliamentary party, away from the maverick local 
campaigners, such as Cyril Smith and David Penhaligon, toward a more pragmatic and 
professional Liberal Democrat MP, bringing with them experience of the council chamber (Evans 
and Sanderson-Nash 2010).  Most notable perhaps is that, although reaching numbers that enable 
it to have both front and backbenchers, the party remained dwarfed by its competitors. 
 
Secondly, the parliamentary party has experienced a change in character since the new intake of 
1997 contained a significant number of individuals with prominent experience in local government, 
including a number of former Council leaders, as well as marking an increase in individuals from 
business backgrounds.   This trend continued and by 2010 a brief look at MPs biographies reveals 
that over 50% have at some time held office on their local authority. 
 
Table  7. Liberal Democrat Whipped Votes 1997-2007.
41
 
 With 
Labour 
Against 
Labour 
           Total 
n % n % n  % 
With  
Conservatives 
58 2 1364 52 1422 54 
Against 
Conservatives 
848 32 369 14 1217 46 
Total 906 34 1733 66 2639 100 
 
In addition it is interesting to see the careers MPs enjoyed before they were elected. Of the 56 for 
which data is available, 22 had previously had careers in business or accountancy, 16 came from 
the politics/charity sector, 10 from education, 4 from law and 4 from miscellaneous other careers 
including farming and engineering.  The increase in business experience appears to have shifted 
the character of the parliamentary party and, it has been argued, played an important part in 
providing fertile ground for the ideas that emerged in The Orange Book (Marshall and Laws 2004) 
(Quinn and Clements 2010). 
 
                                                                    
40 Interview 59, 2011.  
41  Reproduced from Cowley & Stuart 2009. 
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vi) Candidates 
 
Procedures for the selection of candidates at general, mayoral and European elections are set out 
in the constitution. Each state party is required to set up a Candidates Committee, and that 
committee oversees the approval, selection, adoption, and training of candidates.  In effect these 
procedures have allowed local parties  a significant degree of autonomy, although they have been 
lengthy and subject to some amendment over the years.  This is considered more fully in Chapter 
6.  Candidates to the Westminster parliament are required to complete a questionnaire on 
„competencies‟, which are then tested before a panel of both activists and office-holders.  Once 
candidates have become approved following this process they are added to the list of approved 
candidates held by the state party which operates a Candidates Committee with, importantly, the 
“power of substitution” (Article 11.2).   
 
The local party is required to select a candidate based on the approved list, from which it draw up 
a short-list of applicants, where a list of between two and four must include at least one member of 
each sex, and five or more must include two members of each sex and the local party are required 
to give „due regard‟ to the representation of ethnic minorities (Article 11.5 (g)).  A hustings is then 
convened by the local party and all members of that party are entitled to vote. Re-selection of a 
sitting MP requires endorsement by the local party and procedures are in place to remove a 
candidate in whom local party is thought to have lost confidence.  Successful candidates then 
receive extensive training co-coordinated by the Candidates Officer at party Headquarters, and are 
encouraged to join the Parliamentary Candidates Association (PCA). This research revealed little 
or no interference from the party  leadership on matters of candidate selection.  Controversy has, 
however, arisen out of the party‟s gender-balance policies to ensure more women are selected 
(Evans 2008), and the procedures that allow for entirely different rules to come in to operation 
during a by-election (Article 11.8). These are considered more fully in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  The 
party has stood candidates in every parliamentary seat at general elections since its launch, with 
the exception of that held by the Speaker (as is the tradition) and 1997 in Tatton, and  2001 and 
the Wyre Forest in 2001 and 2005.
42
 
 
vii) Officers 
 
The party constitution sets out procedures for the election of other prominent office holders, 
namely the President, Vice-Presidents, Treasurer (for PPERA purposes), Treasurer (for 
fundraising purposes) and the appointment of the Chief Executive. The President is often 
portrayed as a „dual‟ leader, and someone that represents the ordinary member‟s interests 
(described earlier).  The formal role and remit of the Party President is set out in Article 12 of the 
Party Constitution entitled „Officers‟ which also details the election and rules governing State Vice-
Presidents, the Federal Party Treasurer, the Chief Executive and a Nominating Officer.
43
 
                                                                    
42  It was agreed that the party did not stand a candidate in Tatton when Martin Bell, former BBC journalist,  
agreed to stand as an independent in order to maximise the chances of removing the Conservative candidate .  
The party agreed not to stand candidates in the constituency of Wrye Forest (formerly Kidderminster) because the 
independent MP had a better chance of winning than that Lib Dem candidate.  
43  The role of the nominating officer is to ensure the Party‟s compliance with the 2000 Political Parties,  
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The President of the Liberal Democrats has become a hotly contested position, arguably second 
only to the Leader. The definition of this formal role explains that the President is …”the principal 
public representative of the Party” (12.2).  Potential candidates for the office require 50 signatures 
to be nominated, and are then elected by all party members for a 2 year term, and are limited to 
only 1 re-election (therefore can only hold the office for a maximum term of 4 years).  The 
President‟s role is to represent the Party‟s ordinary members, and the only formal function is to 
Chair the Federal Executive. Other than this, the role is entirely open to interpretation, which has 
varied heavily depending on the individual. One party official described the role as having four 
different functions. Firstly, the President chairs the Federal Executive. In addition to this he or she 
advises the leader. A large part of the role involves doing the rounds at fundraising dinners and 
'geeing up' the local parties, and finally they are often called upon to act as an alternative leader in 
formal situations or in the media.
44
 It is a role very much open to individual interpretation, and will 
depend on the chemistry between the Leader, the President and the Chief Executive. It is also a 
role interpreted by some as passive and by others as active and examples of the individual 
tenures in this role are listed and described in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Party Treasurer 
 
The Liberal Democrats, in keeping with the PPERA legislation of 2000, have since then operated 
with two Treasurers. The first is the Chair of the party‟s Federal Finance and Accounts Committee, 
sometimes referred to as the Registered Treasurer, and is legally responsible for complying with 
PPERA and ensuring returns are made on time.  The second Treasurer, more commonly known 
as the Party Treasurer, is an individual elected by the FE and acts as a figurehead fundraiser. 
They are usually well known throughout the party particularly for organising the party‟s annual 
flagship fundraising event, the Ball, and for making an appeal for funds traditionally ahead of the 
Leader‟s speech at federal conferences.45 The role of the Federal Treasurer and the party‟s 
fundraising operation was the subject of close scrutiny and significant reform following the Bones 
Commission and this is explored in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
 
viii)  Associated Organisations, Specified Associated Organisations and party communications. 
 
The Liberal Democrats allow for the recognition of various organisations that “have a common link 
of interest”. These are separated into two categories, Associated Organisations (AOs) are those 
that it is established share the interests of the Party, and those Specified Associated Organisations 
(SAOs) are those who are already AOs but whose membership comprises entirely of Party 
members. New SAOs have to be proposed by the party‟s Federal Executive and approved by the 
federal conference.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Election and Referendums Act.  
44   One interviewee explained that the policy was to put the leader on television when a by-election was won,  
 and the President on when it was lost.  
45  In recent years this traditional task has been carried out by comedians or celebrity supporters. 
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The SAOs are listed in the Party Constitution and currently comprise: 
 
Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors, 
Association of Liberal Democrat Engineers and Scientists, 
DELGA (Liberal Democrats for Lesbian and Gay Action), 
Ethnic Minority Liberal Democrats, 
Liberal Democrat Agents and Organisers Association, 
Liberal Democrat Youth and Students, 
Parliamentary Candidates‟ Association, 
Women Liberal Democrats 
Liberal Democrat Lawyers 
 
Current AOs:  
DAGGER (Democratic Action Group for Gaining Electoral Reform) 
Green Liberal Democrats 
Scottish Green Liberal Democrats 
Liberal Democrat Christian Forum 
Liberal Democrat European Group 
Liberal Democrats for Peace & Security 
Liberal International (British Group) 
Humanist & Secularist Liberal Democrats 
Liberal Democrat Disability Association 
Liberal Democrat Education Association 
Liberal Democrat Friends of Kashmir 
Liberal Democrat Friends of Pakistan 
Liberal Democrat Friends of Palestine 
Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel 
 
AOs and SAOs can be suspended by the FE and suspension revoked by a two-thirds majority at 
the next Federal Conference.  The Party regularly reviews SAOs and AOs to ensure they satisfy 
the Party‟s criteria.  While this power exists there have been no cases of SAOs or AOs being 
suspended, although informal involvement by Party HQ staff has occasionally been necessary in 
the resolving of internal disputes. The formal process would require a conference decision that 
“should be avoided at all costs”. 46 Four „types‟ of SAOs and AOs have been identified (Evans 
2007): 
 
- semi professional, such as the PCA, that is close to the  leadership and works in 
co-operation with party officials 
- centrally funded, such as LDYS and WLD, who work closely with the Federal 
Executive and campaigns department 
- special interest groups, such as DAGGER, who provide specialist knowledge on 
                                                                    
46   Interview 2, 2009. 
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a particular issue, in this case electoral reform 
- common interest organisations, such as Christian Liberal Democrats, who 
conduct politics together through meetings where they have a shared interest, 
rather than lobbying on behalf of that interest. 
 
The function of SAOs and AOs had been the subject of some controversy, since some appeared 
to be largely dormant, but requiring consideration according to the constitution at various points in 
the policy making process.  The list was streamlined following the Bones Commission.  Of those 
that remain two received special mention by Russell & Fieldhouse and party staff confirm that only 
ALDC and LDYS (now Liberal Youth) represent a sufficiently strong organisation and membership 
base to be independently worthy of mention. This is based partly on these two obtaining funds 
from Headquarters and having their own full-time staff. This is also the case for the „Gender 
Balance Task Force‟, a party body created in 2001 and not an AO or SAO. Offering a separate 
membership base, campaigning strategy and organisation sets these bodies apart, although their 
ability to influence decisions for example on matters of policy is said to be in overall decline.
47
  
 
In a recent re-design of the party website the section „Who We Are‟ includes lists of the party‟s 
SAOs and AOs. Interestingly these are in a list that also combines the party‟s elected committees, 
such as the Federal Policy Committee, and entirely unconstituted bodies like Lib Dems Online and 
The Liberal Democrat History Group. This is a change from the party‟s original website that 
specified the organisation‟s constitutional status, and separated the party‟s managerial committees 
from other special interest groups as above.  This suggests an attempt to appear less formal on 
the party‟s website while at the same time drawing attention to groupings with special interests that 
might appeal to the potential new member.
48
 Again this move away from formal and constitutional, 
more traditional ways of encouraging party support and activity, is enshrined in the Bones 
Commission which is examined in closer detail in Chapter 7.  
 
Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors 
 
ALDC used to have the reputation in the Liberal Democrats for representing the party‟s „vanguard‟.  
It came in to being in 1988 as the new merged party was launched, and represented the merging 
of similar organisations in the predecessor parties, namely the „Association of Liberal Councillors‟ 
(ALC) which was formed in 1965 and the „Association of Social Democratic Councillors‟ (ASDC) 
formed in 1981 and performs an important function in the party.  Of particular interest to this study 
on party organisational change are two things. Firstly, ADLC appears, in common with other 
alternative power-bases within the party, to have modernised.   The website, for instance, offers a 
wide range of information for activists including legal and campaigning advice, leaflet and budget 
templates, and a strong support network for elected councillors.
49
   Secondly, over the past 22 
years its interests have come to be represented through the Parliamentary party, via councilor-
turned-MPs, notably, Andrew Stunnell, David Howarth and John Barrett. For example in 2009 the 
                                                                    
47 Interview 10, , 2009. 
48  http://www.libdems.org.uk/party_organisations.aspx?pgNo=1 (accessed 06.10.10). 
49  http://www.aldc.org/ (accessed 28.03.2011). 
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party elected councilor and former local government stalwart, Baroness Ros Scott, as its 
President, after Charles Kennedy rewarded her dedication to Suffolk County Council with a life 
peerage in 2000.    
 
ALDC co-ordinates Liberal Democrat campaigns across England and Wales as a parallel but 
separate entity from the Party. It is historically considered to belong to a more radical wing on the 
party‟s political spectrum - radical at least in its passionate commitment to community politics and 
refusal to be bound by top-down decisions.  In spite of being an often-used platform for warring 
factions, pro and anti-merger, the ALC and ASDC achieved a “pain-free” merger, and was 
renamed ASLDC with Bill le Breton and Andrew Stunnell at its head.
50
 The party made its first 
major gains at local level in 1991 and has continued to be a strong force.  ALDC‟s key role is to 
assist with campaigning by providing an election briefing service, „Campaigner‟ magazine, advice 
and support, including on election law, it runs a well attended conference offering a wide range of 
training, providing a by-election and election results monitoring service and representing Liberal 
Democrat Councillors on Party and non-Party bodies.  ALDC is a membership based organisation, 
with just under 3000 paid-up voluntary members in 2010, the majority of whom are current Liberal 
Democrat Councillors, although this is not a pre-requisite.  Retired councillors and supporters of 
local government make up a small proportion of the membership, and membership of the Party is 
required. Approximately half of eligible (that is elected) Councillors join ALDC, although at more 
senior levels of local government membership is significantly greater, particularly within 
Metropolitan authorities.
51
 
 
Unique among federal party bodies, ALDC is outside London, based in Hebden Bridge, Yorkshire. 
As well as testimony to the devolved principles that govern the Liberal Democrats organisational 
structure, this also gives it a bias with regard to political experience. As one party official put it; 
“People are more used to fighting Labour than the Tories. The staff all live up here – in gritty 
northern towns. That‟s where we are and its what we‟re used to”.52  Russell and Fieldhouse (2005: 
p62) go so far as to say that it is ALDC that „dilutes any centralising tendency in the Party‟, 
particularly since so many Liberal Democrat parliamentarians rose up through its ranks to their 
positions in the party elite.  One interviewee argued that despite this many Liberal Democrat local 
government representatives see the local authority as an end in itself.
53
  “They have a bigger role 
than they would as a backbencher”.54 
 
ALDC primarily exists to offer campaigning support at the local government level.  As an SAO it 
has the same rights as a local party in proposing motions to Federal Conference, but these are 
declining in frequency and the organisation is more “compliant”, according to one insider.  This, he 
argues, is more a consequence of having gained power and being engaged in the day to day 
running of local authorities, than it is any instruction from the party elite.  
 
                                                                    
50  ALDC Chief Executives: Tom Picksone (2005 – present), Howard Sykes (1997-2005), Andrew Stunnell  
 (1988-1997).  
51 Interview 42 2009. 
52  Interview 42, 2009. 
53  Interview 42,2009. 
54 Interview 7, 2009. 
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Almost exclusively people that run big city councils are too busy to be involved in the 
organisation of the national party. You go to enough meetings, you‟re busy with public 
service or winning seats, or delivering leaflets. (Interview 42, 2009)  
 
The 1997 creation of the Local Government Association, which offers extensive training for 
councillors, irrespective of party, as well as professional advice on „best practice‟, has removed 
one of ALDC‟s primary functions, diluting its role to that of a campaigning and fundraising 
machine.
55
  In addition the Bones Commission recommended the grant from the federal party to 
help finance ALDC be reduced, in response to this and as a reflection of the   £36m earned each 
year by its Councillors. The Bones Commission also recommended all elected Lib Dem councillors 
be required to join ALDC to further increase its revenue. The role of activists and councillors is 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Liberal Youth 
 
Another section of the party associated with its radical and „red guard‟ are its youth movement.  
Described as “essential” in making the merger possible, the Young Liberals were cited by many 
interviewees as being critical to party survival of the 1960s and '70s (Pitchford and Greaves 1989; 
Crewe and King 1995).   The Liberal Democrats in Parliament traditionally hold the record for 
consistently having the youngest MP in the House of Commons.
56
  Holding the record for 14 out of 
20 years for „Baby of the House‟ bears testimony to a strong tradition of youth and activism.  The 
only membership section of the Party that had been growing (at least until recently) was its youth 
and student organisation, re-branded in 2009 as „Liberal Youth‟.   
 
Table 8.  Membership of Liberal Youth (formerly LDYS) 2002-2009.
57
 
 
 Members Income £ 
2002 2000 76,187 
2003 2100 75,598 
2004 2800 87,090 
2005 2800 90,064 
2006 2800 55,994 
2007 2900 47,364 
2008 2600 38,853 
2009 3000 unknown 
 
                                                                    
55  Interview 46, 2009. 
56
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby_of_the_House#List_of_Babies_of_the_House_of_Commons accessed 
 01.07.2009. 
57  Interview 28, 2009. 
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The Liberal Democrats‟ Youth Organisation was formed in the early years of the new Party 
following an exceptionally lengthy and protracted set of negotiations between the YLDE (Youth, 
Liberal Democrats England) and Liberal Democrat Students. It was not until late in 1991 that these 
two movements successfully came together and formed LDYS, in part because the YLDE 
represented the Liberals and Liberal Democrat Students had a strong SDP heritage.  The closely 
contested battle for its first Chair was seen by many to represent a closure of the tensions 
between the two merged parties, in which Sarah Gurling
 
and Keiron Reid both ran strongly 
partisan campaigns on behalf of the SDP and Liberal tendencies respectively, Reid 
overwhelmingly secured the post. 
58
 
 
Although the organisation has been steadily growing in number and as a proportion of overall party 
membership, its income has reduced significantly since ceasing to conduct is annual fundraiser 
„Westminster Day‟. This was a day-out organised across UK campuses including a tour of 
Parliament and meetings with MPs and Peers but was stopped following take-up on a scale far 
beyond the organisation‟s administrative capability. As well as receiving financial support, LDYS 
run a full-time staffed office at Party Headquarters and successfully propose more policy motions 
to the Federal Conference than any other Party body outside the Federal Policy Committee. The 
organisation continues to have a similar structure to that set up in the early 1990s, in which a Party 
member under the age of 26 or full-time student is eligible to join, and their full membership money 
paid to the Membership Department is returned by way of a levy. 
 
Party communications 
 
In common with other political parties, the Liberal Democrats communicate regularly with their 
ordinary membership in a variety of ways, through meetings, post and the internet.  There is no 
one body that oversees this, but responsibility lies with individual teams. For example, 
membership services deal with online communications to members and donors, the campaigns 
department use online communication in key seats and during by-elections, the press team take 
care of the party website, and individual bodies like ADLC communicate to their own members (in 
this case elected councillors).   The party operates a Campaigns and Communications Committee 
(CCC) but that is only concerned with the general election. The systematic use of email on a wide 
scale started in 2000 and due to cost savings is strongly encouraged by the party.    Originally the 
communication was mainly by post, and the party continues to send twice yearly mailings to its 
membership.   In its 22 year history the party has produced just one regular subscription based 
newspaper, Lib Dem News, that comes out weekly and contains regular updates from the 
parliamentary party, local by-election results, topical articles and a letters page. In pre-internet 
days it was the place for leaders to make announcements, and was where Ashdown chose to 
announce an end to equidistance in 1995.   
 
The party has also been an enthusiastic, lively and in some respects ground-breaking in its 
extensive use of the internet through conferencing groups, in particular with the early and 
                                                                    
58  Interview 28, 2009.  
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extensive use of The Compulink Information Exchange, known as „CIX‟. This provides subscribing 
email users with a free conferencing service and was embraced by early internet users within the 
party.    Thousands of party members joined topical conferences throughout the 1990s, enabling 
member-only discussions on matters of internal party business and policy.  In particular CIX 
enables users to communicate with other grassroots members across the UK, and was used by 
party activists to mobilise around certain issues, in particular by Donnadhach McCarthy in 
organising the party‟s radical wing to propose motions to the FE. Prior to CIX this had to be done 
by physically collecting signatures by hand and by post. Although CIX has been through various 
changes to its technical base and corporate ownership, reduced in numbers to a few hundred, the 
„threads‟ that form the basis for discussion among its members remain in use.  
 
The party operates an interactive website, which is overhauled once per parliament and in 2010 
launched „huddle‟, a members-only interactive site, which allows members and the party to share 
files.  In particular „huddle‟ is aimed at encouraging members to interact with the party on matters 
of policy and to engage with one another on matters such as the party conference. It is widely 
used, has significant scope, and is described as a „game-changer‟ in party communications. 59   
Aside from email, by far the greatest recent innovation has been the party‟s active blogging 
community, brought together under Liberal Democrat Voice which started in August 2006. The 
blog has had 573 contributors, the majority writing single contributions but has well-known regular 
contributors such as Mark Park (2,722 contributions) and Stephen Tall (2,292 contributions) and 
attracts approximately 60,000 readers per month.
60
 The party also operates a website “Flock 
Together‟ which attempts to collect information about „social events, policy discussions, 
campaigning sessions, forthcoming conferences and by-elections‟ under one roof. This new 
interactive site, that includes facebook and twitter feeds, is run by a volunteer, Martin Tod, with 
some success particularly in advertising local party events.
61
  The impact of new media on party 
communications is considered in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
As well as communicating through various channels that are role-specific, the party, although 
described as under-factionalised (Grayson 2010), has, notably in the past decade, developed a 
small number of specific policy-driven or ideologically motivated groups.  What follows is a brief 
summary of these groups which is important, particularly with regard to the evolution of different 
camps crudely divided between „economic liberals‟ and „social liberals‟, and their place within the 
dominant faction: 
 
Liberator 
 
Liberator magazine was first published in 1970 and states that it “acts as a forum for debate 
among radical liberals in all parties and none”. It has out-lived other publications such as the 
Radical Press, Alliance, New Democrat and Reformer – all independent party magazines 
representing small groups prior to or around the time of merger. Liberator advertises links to the 
                                                                    
59 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/7899271/Huddle-used-by-Lib-Dems-to-improve-
communications.html (accessed 20.01.2011). 
60  Interview 65, 2010. 
61  www.flocktogether.org.uk (accessed 30.3.2011). 
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party website, advertises the Liberal Democrat Conference,  the popular „Lord Bonkers Blog‟ and 
Liberator Song Book.
62
  Liberator has become the place to air grievances with the party 
bureaucracy and elite, and although it produces intelligent articles of a high standard is seen 
increasingly as a fringe activity for radical party supporters.  Membership circulation is consistently 
between 450-650
63
 and an annual subscription currently stands at £24 for 7-8 copies a year.  It is 
organised by a “voluntary editorial collective” which comprises 17 named members64 of which only 
one, Gareth Epps, is a former member of the Party‟s Federal Executive. Viewed with lasting 
affection by many in the party, the power of Liberator has dwindled in recent years. On long term 
activist stated bluntly: “It doesn‟t win us any seats so it‟s not important”.65 
 
The Reformer 
 
The Reformer was a short-lived journal whose founders claim it had lasting impact.  Launched in 
September 1993 by a group of former SDP activists, the journal pushed specifically for then leader 
Paddy Ashdown to take a stronger line on ending equidistance.   Following Ashdown‟s famous 
„Chard‟ speech of 9th May 199266, and the formal end to equidistance, early editorials set out the 
case for closer co-operation with Labour.  It‟s publication was the culmination of work by a group of 
activists, Justine McGuinness, Clive Parry, Mark Glover and John Dickie, who together with other 
former SDP members Tom McNally, Dick Newby and Ian Wrigglesworth, had already fought for 
places on the party‟s Federal Executive, on an informal but widely understood „pro-project‟ 
agenda.  In addition to supporting closer co-operation with Labour, Reformer also recommended 
the party take a new approach, to looking more professional and better organised, and to 
promoting Charles Kennedy as the natural successor to Paddy Ashdown.   As one former activist 
put it: 
 
There was a feeling in the party that this was suits vs. sandals, and the people behind 
Reformer were definitely the suits. 
67
 (Interview 38, 2010) 
 
The journal came out quarterly and its circulation figures were soon in the hundreds, accompanied 
by packed conference fringe meetings. To those that approved it offered a way in which prominent 
individuals could ally themselves with a particular view or party strategy.  To others it appeared to 
re-draw old battle-lines.  Liberator was for Liberals, and the London-based activist-professionals 
behind Reformer, looked very much like the SDP.  As the initial excitement ebbed away, private 
funds from prominent supporters such as Richard Wainwright and Roy Jenkins, enabled it to 
                                                                    
62  The Song Book is an irreverent set of lyrics to well-known tunes sung traditionally late in to the night at  
 every Autumn Party Conference at a meeting of activists known informally as the „Glee Club‟. 
63  Data supplied by Mark Smulian 6.10.2009. No formal circulation tables are kept “since it has no  
 advertising market to speak of”. 
64  The Liberator Collective: Ralph Bancroft, Jonathon Calder, Richard Clein, Howard Cohen, Gareth Epps,  
 Catherine Furlong, Peter Johnson, Wendy Kyrle-Pope, Tim McNally, Stewart Rayment, Kiron Reid, Harriet  
Sherlock, Mark Smulian, Simon Titley, William Trnby, Chaire Wiggins, Nick Winch. Taken from Issue 335 
September 2009.  
65  Interview 10, , 2009. 
66  The Chard speech can be accessed online (07.10.10.) at  
http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=82&item=history. 
67 Interview 38, former party activist, 2010.  This quote became the title for an article about party professionalisation: 
Evans, E. and E. Sanderson-Nash (2011). "Sandals to Suits - Professionalisation, coalition and the Liberal 
Democrats." British Journals of Politics and International Relations 13(4). 
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switch its efforts to set up a new think-tank, the „Centre for Reform‟.  This then became „Centre 
Forum‟ and is described in more detail below.  One interviewee claimed its legacy was significant :  
 
It became a faction. It changed Liberator. It changed the Party. Had it not been for 
Reformer, the ideas, the network it produced, you‟d probably not have Vince Cable. 
(Interview 38, 2010).
 
  
 
Liberal Future 
 
Liberal Future marked the beginnings of the development of organisations specifically designed to 
generate debate about party ideology. It was set up in 2001, aimed at developing a free-market 
driven emphasis in Liberal Democrat policies. Many of its supporters were later associated with 
The Orange Book, including once  leadership-hopeful former MP, Mark Oaten and the Chairman 
of its Advisory Board, Chris Fox, who went on to become the party‟s Chief Executive in 2009 under 
Nick Clegg.   It was set up in response to what some in the party perceived to be a move away 
from “traditional liberal values”, and growing overall hostility to private markets.68  Although Mark 
Oaten was the only MP to be involved, Liberal Future‟s events often featured speakers such as 
Vince Cable and David Laws, while the interpretation of liberalism embodied in „The Orange Book‟ 
began to take shape. Organisationally Liberal Future was very informal, without a constitution, 
structure, funds or staff, holding meetings in pubs and at private addresses. It became the focus 
for much hostility at party conferences, activists singling out Oaten in particular, as representative 
of a shift to the right.  The organisation was wound up in 2005.  The „young turks‟ may have had a 
false start with Liberal Future, but it appears to have marked the beginnings of a gentle kind of 
factionalism, later to include The Beveridge Group and Social Liberal Forum, broadly speaking on 
the left, and Centre Forum, Progressive Vision and Liberal Vision, on the right.  
 
The Beveridge Group 
 
In 2001 Alistair Carmichael MP, Paul Holmes MP, John Barrett MP and John Pugh MP, set up The 
Beveridge Group in response to the growing shift toward economic liberalism espoused by Vince 
Cable and Mark Oaten and those associated with Liberal Future.
69
 Listing a membership of over 
half the parliamentary party, the Beveridge Group failed to build on this,  and failed to take off.   
Although the Group has not been formally disbanded, it appears to be dormant, and is cited by 
those that espouse the realignment of the left as a strong indication of the success of the „Orange 
Bookers‟.70 Indeed only 3 of its 28 members (all of whom are MPs) have achieved government 
posts in the coalition – possibly because many associate it and its founders with the left of the 
party (Smith 2010). Its inactivity does not mean, however, a complete lack of opposition to The 
Orange Book however, but a shift in the organisation of that view, replaced with the Social Liberal 
Forum, which includes both activists and parliamentarians. 
 
                                                                    
68  Interview 71, June 2011. 
69  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beveridge_Group) (accessed 07.10.10). 
70  http://leftwingpolemics.blogspot.com/2010/05/right-wing-entryism-and-neo-liberals.html (accessed  
28/03/2011) 
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Social Liberal Forum 
 
The Social Liberal Forum exists to foster debate within and beyond the Liberal 
Democrats, with the aim of developing social liberal solutions and approaches which 
reflect these principles and which find popular support.
71
  
 
In February 2009 Social Liberal Forum formally launched its website (http://socialliberal.net/) as a 
place for members of the Liberal Democrats that broadly supported the publication “Reinventing 
the State” to share ideas and discuss policy.  One insider described this particular move as “the 
beginning of factionalisation”.72  Reliant on people both inside and outside the party it has 
effectively replaced the MP-driven Beveridge Group and operates a free membership to those 
already in the party.   Self-funded on a volunteer basis, the SLF has a governing board and an 
advisory board, and has become identified as a left-leaning faction within the party, listing Lynne 
Featherstone MP, and ex-MPs Evan Harris and Sandra Gidley on its advisory board.  The website 
lists links to relevant publications, which include Liberator and the New Statesman, and The 
Guardian site Comment is Free.  It also lists links to Liberal Democrat AOs and SAOs, and links to 
The Equality Trust think-tank, but not to Centre Forum.
73
  
 
Progressive Vision and Liberal Vision 
 
In contrast Progressive Vision and Liberal Vision exist to draw together supporters inside and 
outside the party with a more libertarian position.  Progressive Vision was founded by former party 
Director of Communications, Mark Littlewood, in 2007 as a small campaigning organisation to 
bring conservative and liberal thinkers together. Progressive Vision describes itself as an 
independent and campaigning think-tank for classical liberals, which stresses that it intends to 
„reclaim‟ the term „progressive‟ and that is not connected to any political party.74  
 
A more mainstream off-shoot from this, Liberal Vision, then launched shortly behind Social Liberal 
Forum, in March 2009, and invites supporters and members to join in a series of threads about 
party policy and its shared political philosophy.  Its „vision‟ lists three priorities:  „Smaller state, 
lower tax and personal freedom‟ and its 'about-us' section directly tackles the party‟s traditional 
love of procedure:  
 
It is an unincorporated association which is run as a “benign dictatorship”. If you expect 
internal democratic elections, AGMs, committee meetings and minute taking, this may not 
be the organisation for you. (http://www.liberal-vision.org/vision/). 
 
Its mission states that it is set up „for Liberal Democrats‟ and exists as a „group blog‟ of like-minded 
people.
75
 
                                                                    
71  http://socialliberal.net/ (accessed May 2011) 
72  Interview 10, 2010. 
73  SLF did not respond to requests for data about its operation. 
74  http://www.progressive-vision.org/general/faq.htm (accessed 20.01.2011) 
75  Liberal Vision did not respond to a request for data about its operation. 
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Centre Forum 
 
By 2005 the Centre for Reform had become what was described as one insider as “little more than 
a vanity publishing house for Lib Dem MPs who wanted to get their thoughts out there”.76  It was 
transformed when co-editor of The Orange Book, Paul Marshall donated £1m to set up an 
explicitly liberal think-tank, and one explicitly independent of the party. Centre Forum was then 
launched with Julian Astle as its Director, Paul Marshall as Chairman and David Laws MP as Chair 
of its Advisory Board.  Astle is a former member of party staff, having worked as Research 
Assistant to Nick Harvey and Archy Kirkwood, for the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, then 
with Paddy Ashdown as advisor in Bosnia & Herzegovina.  It sets out its aims as “seeking 
solutions”, and with no explicit mention of the party, although it has a website dominated by 
photographs of senior Lib Dems. Centre Forum produces pamphlets on various policies with an 
economic bias, organises events and discussions and is thought to have played a significant role 
in the shaping of the party‟s pro-market agenda.77   Astle has been clear in his view that the 
difference between social and economic liberals is real and should be acknowledged by those in 
the party that deny such divisions exist.
78
  He has also co-authored the follow up to The Orange 
Book in 2006 with Paul Marshall and David Laws Britain after Blair (Astle, Laws et al. 2006).  The 
role of Centre Forum is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
 
ix)  Conclusion 
 
The Liberal Democrats operate as an institution governed by a formal constitution, and at the 
same time are evolving a number of less formal committees, communications tools and changes 
to its culture that can be broadly described as modernisation.  The constitution sets out three key 
elements of party organisation. Firstly the party is organised with a federal structure. Secondly it 
gives preference to important internal committees that are elected by the party membership and 
finally it operates a twin-track  leadership with a prominent role for the Presidents as well as the 
Leader.  This prompted academic sources to suggest: 
 
It is possible to see the dispersal of power that is designed into the structure of the party. 
On the other hand the influence of the  leadership and bureaucratic elite is evident in 
many of the federal institutions of the party. (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005, p53). 
 
When Russell and Fieldhouse wrote this in 2005 they painted a picture of a party disinclined to 
move away from its formal democratic structures and yet, in common with other parties, also one 
where  leadership exploits and makes best use of various mechanisms within the formal structure.   
It is evident from this chapter that the party has in place a relatively unchanged constitution that 
was designed to build democratic processes in to the fabric of the party. In spite of the constitution 
remaining the same, we can draw some conclusions from this assessment about the way in which 
the party is evolving.    
                                                                    
76  Interview 4, 2010. 
77 Interview 4, 2010. 
78  http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-events/59/the-future-of-liberal-democrat-thinking (accessed  
20.01.2011). 
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Firstly, the Bones Commission specifically set out to introduce changes to the party bureaucracy 
without recourse to the constitution. Whether that remains the case is not yet clear, but it is 
important to point out that given the constraints on amending this party document (which requires 
a vote in support by two thirds of conference representatives), much activity that influences the 
real day-to-day work of the party is likely to be conducted outside its confines.   Secondly it is 
interesting to see that on the parliamentary party and the party leader, the constitution is 
deliberately vague. The document therefore enables flexibility and, as we see elsewhere in this 
thesis, enables growth in the authority and autonomy in both these areas potentially at the 
expense of those aspects of party life more closely constitutionally defined.  Thirdly, in recent 
years new activity has grown up around the party involving new technologies, and groups, which 
although resisting the label of factions, are coming to represent different views on policy and 
different ideological traditions. The party‟s once radical Councillors' organisation ALDC, has 
changed in character since the launching of the Local Government Association in 1997, which 
offered training and support to elected officials, reducing its role and significance within the party, 
for instance.  At the same time it is possible to track the development of the two strands of 
ideological thought from the old Liberal Party, through Liberator representing its radical wing, to 
The Beveridge Group and finally Social Liberal Forum. Equally it could be argued that the old SDP 
thread ran clearly through The Reformer magazine and was taken up by organisations such as 
Liberal Future and Centre Forum.    
 
On balance then, the constitution was designed to establish democratically elected committees, an 
elected party president to represent the party‟s ordinary members and a body of associated 
organisations to enable interests to organise and lobby. With regard to this it is successful. It often 
frustrates the party elite.  As this thesis will demonstrate, however, there are ways around it.   
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Chapter 5 Making Policy 
 
i) Introduction 
 
This chapter examines Liberal Democrat policy. Those moments where the policy priorities of the 
leader and the membership are at odds, and how those tensions are resolved, can provide a 
strong sense of who is winning in an overall struggle for power.   The formal rules that govern the 
policy-making process are set out in Chapter 4. In this chapter, drawing on data collected in 
interviews with party staff, politicians and party officers we take a more in-depth look at how the 
process works in practice, as well as assessing, briefly, the content of key policy pronouncements 
and general election manifestos.  This chapter aims at identifying whether the leader can exercise 
greater control over policy than was enjoyed by his predecessors, and whether the process has 
become more professional.  In keeping with the definition of professionalism set out on page 31, it 
would be reasonable to expect to see changes within the organisation, such as the employment of 
experts (as opposed to party bureaucrats and long-term party members), in the policy-making 
process.  It would also be relevant to examine other indiators such as the extent to which those 
engaged in the policy-making process are able to exercise autonomy in what they do, and whether 
they are able to enjoy some mobility within the work-force (for instance finding work outside the 
party). Finally two further characteristics of professionalism, as defined, would involve assessing 
the extent to which the employee is able to exercise self-regulation, and whether they are 
expected to demonstrate a higher than usual degree of commitment to the tasks undertaken 
(Webb and Fisher 2003). It is important to note that the characteristics of professionalism used 
here look specifically at party employees, although an overall understanding of the 
profesionalisation of the party might also include looking at the work undertaken on a voluntary 
basis, such as by committee members and activists.  In this respect the characteristics set out by 
Webb and Fisher are not be strictly applicable and may instead reflect a less rigorous, or so-called 
“soft”  interpretation of professionalism, involving assessments of “commitment and effectiveness” 
in each aspect of party activity (Webb and Fisher 2003).  
 
Policy-making involves the complex interaction of five parts of the party; the party leader, the 
parliamentary party, federal policy committee (FPC) and its policy working groups, federal 
conference committee (FCC) and the federal conference (Brack 1996), each with interests of their 
own.  In order to understand intra-party power we examine the shifting balance of power among 
these five groups.
79
  This chapter begins with the formal process, and an assessment of where 
policy originates and how the federal conference has evolved over the years.  The clearest 
statement of a party‟s aims and intentions is set out in the general election manifestos and next in 
this chapter we look at each manifesto in turn as well as other policy themes associated with each 
leader. We look at The Orange Book and Reinventing the State (Marshall and Laws 2004; Brack, 
Grayson et al. 2007) - two publications that have been formative in setting out the ideological 
differences between, as we have already seen, the increasingly factionalised sections of the party, 
loosely divided into „economic‟ or „social‟ liberals. In each case we are interested in evidence of 
                                                                    
79  Article 5.1 of the Federal constitution of the Liberal Democrats states “the federal party shall determine the  
policy of the party”.  Federal conference is frequently referred to as the party‟s „sovereign body‟.  
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one policy taking precedence over another, and to whom these ideas belong, rather than analysis 
of the content of the policy itself.  
 
The next section of this chapter contains two detailed case-studies examining the party‟s 
opposition to the Iraq War, and secondly the party‟s internal struggle over its policy on the abolition 
of university tuition fees.  These issues were selected because they demonstrate two areas where 
tensions existed between the  leadership and the party on the ground. Although the party was 
widely in agreement over the decision to oppose the war in Iraq, how to proceed in opposition 
became the subject of an internal battle of wills between the leader, Charles Kennedy, (and those 
representatives associated with the leader or party establishment), and radical grassroots activists 
led by Donnachadh McCarthy.  More widely known are the party‟s difficulties over policy on 
university tuition fees, and the division this has caused between the Clegg leadership and the 
grassroots.  This case-study looks at the process by which party policy was developed on this 
issue, rather than the content of the policy itself, and shows that the grassroots policy-making 
process set out in the constitution, continues to take precedence. The extent to which this actually 
constrains the leader is, however, a moot point; Clegg was able to enter into a coalition that 
trebled university tuition fees and he did so in clear contravention of the policy of his own party. 
The consequences of this are discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
Having examined how the party makes policy, what policy it has come up with and how it 
communicates that policy, we then consider what it does in practice.  In particular we are 
interested in the activity of the parliamentary party and the party‟s voting record.  Does the party 
on the ground, the policy-making conference, guide the parliamentary party in its legislative activity 
or is the reverse true?  Does the agenda of parliamentary party guide the policy preferences of the 
wider party and Federal Conference Committee (FCC)? The parliamentary party has experienced 
a number of changes in size and character and here these, together with its voting record, are 
considered in more detail.  An examination of these different strata within the process enables us 
to build a picture of a shift in influence from the Federal Policy Committee (FPC), FCC and the 
federal conference toward the parliamentary party and the leader. These shifts are subtle and 
gradual, and crucially appears to have the support of the party at large. Party members, while 
being given an opportunity to exercise their democratic right in the process of policy-making, 
increasingly seem to acknowledge that this must be undertaken in such a way as to maximise the 
party‟s primary goal – away from „policy for the sake of policy‟, toward policy as part of the pursuit 
of votes and/or office (Harmel and Janda 1994). 
 
ii) The origin of policy  
 
Since the constitutional review of 1992-1993, there have been few alterations to the formal 
process. The party continues to produce a number of policy papers and follow the procedures set 
out formally in the constitution, which are described in detail in Chapter 4, and illustrated in 
Appendix E.
80
 What is of interest to this study is that the source from which policy originates and 
                                                                    
80 It is worth mentioning again that the party operates a federal structure in policy making, so the Scottish  
party make policy on issues that would fall under the remit of the Scottish parliament, for instance.  
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the status of formal policy appears to have changed with the emphasis now on papers by 
spokesmen. According to the constitution, the party makes policy based on motions coming to 
conference from two sources. The first is motions coming from party members through their local 
parties or SAOs, or through any ten conference representatives, in a motion to conference.  The 
second is from FPC, which undertakes research that, aided by staff in the Policy Unit, develops 
into a policy paper.  In both cases motions are formally submitted, redrafted by FCC and the Policy 
Unit if necessary and are debated in full at the federal conference before being put to a vote (often 
with amendments) of conference representatives. Anything passed becomes formal policy.  The 
agenda is decided by the party‟s elected FCC, increasingly in close co-operation with the leader‟s 
office and portfolio spokesmen.
81
  In general the debate in conference is about policy papers 
although more often over amendments brought to these papers – the essentially reactive means 
by which, more often than not, local parties and activists, since they are not as proactive as is 
commonly assumed, have their say.  As one elected official interviewed notes, 
 
There‟s a caricature that really radical and controversial ideas come from the grass roots 
and the Stalinists on FCC spend all their time weeding them out to avoid causing offence 
to the  leadership. I only wish that was true. We don‟t get radical exciting ideas from the 
grass roots and I‟m not sure if we ever actually did. (Interview 10, 2009).  
 
A third but less formal way by which the party arrives at policy is through a relatively new initiative 
referred to as „spokesmen papers‟.82 This process is not constitutionally recognised by the party 
and is delivered, typically, through press releases to the media.  This occurred initially on subjects 
where the need for a rapid response to fast-moving issues was always understood, such as on 
foreign affairs, but increasingly across the full spectrum of parliamentary portfolios and is, 
therefore, a much more „top-down‟ process.    Interviewees explained that in recent years and in 
order to avoid contradictions or conflicting opinions emerging from this three-way method for 
arriving at policy, the conference has become a way in which they are drawn together and 
reconciled. One party insider explained: 
 
The reality is that increasingly spokesmen are adopting a similar approach to their 
parliamentary portfolios leaving the conference as more of a „washing up‟ exercise that 
brings parliamentarians‟ statements and written policy together. (Interview 39, 2009). 
 
While policy generated in this way has increased, the number of motions put forward by local 
parties has roughly halved in 20 years. At the same time FPC and FCC have “become more alive 
to handing ammunition to the other parties” and consider the consequences of motions from local 
parties with this in mind.
83
     
 
Turning first to the formal process, there have been two important developments in the production 
of policy that have modernised and professionalised the process.  Firstly, in 1992 the Policy Unit 
                                                                    
81  Interview 39, 2009. 
82  The party has always had a system whereby spokesmen were able to raise issues through less formal  
„topical papers‟, although these have increased in significance over the years. 
83  Interview 59, 2009.  
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produced the party‟s first fully costed manifesto, shortly followed by a costed alternative budget.84  
Providing costings for policies came in response to criticisms that the party produced idealistic 
policy that lacked financial rigour, and was intended to make the party appear more business-like 
and economically aware.  Secondly, in 1993 the party abandoned its two-part consultation 
process, involving „green‟ and „white‟ papers, which was considered too time-consuming and 
confusing, as part of an attempt to streamline the process. It is also suggested that this process to 
modernise policy making, which began in the early 1990s, meant that those party members with a 
particular interest in policy, who had once put motions to conference through their local parties, 
were now usefully connected to the party through working groups instead.  In this way differences 
of opinion were ironed out at the working-group level, rather than on the conference floor, behind 
closed doors. 
 
The federal conference 
 
Although the formal process at the level of policy initiated through the Policy Unit, working groups 
and FPC has changed very little, the purpose of the federal conference has.   Policy papers 
continue to dominate the conference agenda, but no longer represent the central purpose of the 
event for many attendees.  Creating an impression on the world outside has become more 
important as time has gone on as this politician noted:  
 
Years ago it didn‟t matter if you defeated the Leader at Conference. It was actually quite 
good sport. (Interview 7, 2009). 
 
Ridiculed for debates on subjects the media caricatured as, for example, banning goldfish (1992), 
legalising cannabis (1994) and abolishing the monarchy (1994), FCC soon became aware of the 
potential the mass media presented for damage to its image as a serious political party.
85
 As 
recently as 2005 Liberal Democrat spokesman for Trade and Industry Norman Lamb, was 
defeated by delegates on a proposal to sell off two-thirds of the Post Office delivery service.
86
  This 
was, by this time, an unusual occurance and since then no front-bench spokesmen have been 
defeated in a federal conference vote.  One veteran conference goer and politician summed it up: 
 
Conference … is a lot more professional. There are more MPs and full-time advisors and 
that hasn‟t shifted the balance of power, but it has shifted the balance of influence. 
(Interview 14, 2010). 
 
In part as a reflection of this changing culture, the party in 2003, conducted a comprehensive 
review of the party‟s federal conference by FCC87 that aimed to see if the twice yearly federal 
conference “still meets effectively the demands of a modern, dynamic political party” (FCC 2003).  
It focused on participation and access, marketing and communication, and briefly on  
                                                                    
84 Interview 10, 2009 
85  http://blogs.ft.com/westminster/2010/09/top-ten-lib-dem-conference-moments-ever/ (accessed  
25.01.2011). 
86  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/sep/21/liberaldemocrats.libdems20051 (accessed 25.01.2011). 
87  The author of this thesis was employed as party staff to conduct and report back on the 2003 review of  
federal conference.  
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Policy.
88
  It acknowledged that networking, training, fringe meetings and the exhibition had grown 
significantly, particularly the fringe, firstly in 1992 - „when it became clear the party had survived‟ -  
then again in 1997
89
 and steadily ever since.   
 
The Review proposed no fewer than 137 recommendations which when considered in detail give a 
revealing insight into the priorities of FCC.  The overall recommendations fell in to two broad 
categories that would satisfy party modernisers and continue to demonstrate internal democracy; 
professionalising the event, and encouraging participation. Firstly a number of recommendations 
specifically referred to the party‟s need to be more „professional‟. This included reference to 
material produced by the Conference Office, and “background information on the party itself and 
its recent achievements in government at all levels should also be produced and presented 
professionally” (p53 (3.7)).  An increase in professionalism was also encouraged with regard to the 
Conference Marketing Group‟s strategy, to be pro-active in encouraging the event raised 
significant funds (p133 (6.7)), and the conference stewards (p128 (6.30)) in helping to create a 
more professional-looking event.   Secondly the review recommended the party make increased 
use of celebrities (p110 (4.18)), as well as a proposal to reduce the amount of time available for 
policy debate (p108 (4.6)).   It acknowledged the growth in importance of the fringe (p115, (4.3)) 
while also proposing that the committee consider ways of “encouraging people to spend more time 
in the hall” (p121 (4.25)).    
 
Using conference agendas it has been possible to calculate the time spent in the main hall divided 
in to keynote speeches (which include Questions & Answer sessions), and policy (which excludes 
debates on emergency motions).  It is worth bearing in mind that although television interviews are 
often conducted outside the hall, an empty hall or poorly attended debate projects an image the 
party seek to avoid.   Table 9 shows two clear patterns. First,  that as a general election 
approaches, unsurprisingly, the party gives its politicians a platform, making the best use of media 
coverage, and that the further away the party is from a general election, the more inclined it is to 
allow policy debates to dominate.   Second, overall there is, other than in response to approaching 
general elections, a small decline in time given to policy, but a consistent gradual increase in the 
time given to keynote speeches, both of which are conducted in the main hall. 
 
                                                                    
88 The review recommended the FCC and Conference Office staff carefully review the applicability of hybrid and 
state vs federal policy, since devolution in 1999 had created some confusion. With this exception other mentions 
of changes to policy procedures were confined to changing process deadlines and comments advising ways to 
encourage and facilitate an improvement in the standard of motion drafting.  
89  Interview 10, 2009. 
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Table 9.  Conference Keynote speeches & Policy Motion time allocation 1995-2008.
90
 
 
Year Venue Keynote 
Hrs & mins 
Policy 
Hrs & mins 
Total 
Hrs & 
mins.
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Years from 
general 
election 
2008 Bournemouth 7.50 14.40 22.30 -2 
2007 Brighton 8.35 13.30 22.05 -3 
2006 Brighton 4.50 15.25 20.15 -4 
2005 Blackpool 7.10 11.30 18.40 0 
2004 Bournemouth 4.00 19.25 23.25 -1 
. 2003 Brighton 4.00 18.45 22.45 -2 
2002 Brighton 3.30 16.00 19.30 -3 
2001 Bournemouth 3.05 14.30 17.35 0 
2000 Bournemouth 3.15 21.00 24.15 -1 
1999 Harrogate 3.00 15.35 18.35 -2 
1998 Brighton 3.55 21.45 25.40 -3 
1997 Eastbourne 2.10 10.30 12.40 0 
1996 Brighton 5.45 15.30 21.15 -1 
1995 Glasgow 3.00 20.35 23.35 -2 
 
A note dated November 2008, prepared for FCC based on the party‟s own calculations, confirms 
this trend, and breaks this down in more detail, between Q&A and debating policy papers for 
instance, for the three years between 2006 and 2008.  In conclusion Table 9 demonstrates a 
preference toward key-note speeches by senior politicians, namely front bench spokesmen.  
 
This can be seen in greater detail in Table 10, data taken from the party‟s own analysis,  and 
shows the gradual increase in Q&As and keynote speeches from 26% to 30%, and a decrease in 
the time allocated for policy papers from 27% to 20%. This, the paper points out, is according to 
conference representatives who complete a post-conference questionnaire, a welcome move.  It is 
fair to say that this represents not a move away from policy per se, but a shift in emphasis towards 
policy that is communicated by parliamentary party spokesmen and draws bigger audiences. 
 
                                                                    
90  The tables contained in this table were collected from data produced in the party‟s Agenda which contains  
the full timetable for all items discussed in the main conference hall.  
91  This omits „party business‟ items. 
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Table 10. Conference key-note speeches and policy motion time allocation breakdown 2006-
2008.
92
 
 
Minutes and % of total spent on: Autumn 2006 Autumn 2007 Autumn 2008 
Non-debate items (speeches, 
presentations, Q&As, etc.) 
435 (26%) 590 (33%) 525 (30%) 
Party business (reports, business 
motions) 
250 (15%) 145 (8%) 280 (16%) 
Policy papers 450 (27%) 410 (23%) 345 (20%) 
Emergency motions, urgent issues 130 (8%) 125 (7%) 130 (7%) 
Other policy debates 430 (25%) 495 (28%) 460 (26%) 
Total 1695 1765 1740 
 
With regard to the origin of policy motions a note to FCC dated November 2007 highlights their 
ongoing decline (from 126 in 1996, to 62 in 2006, and 54 in 2007). Of greater interest is the overall 
division in the origin of motions that appeared on the Final Agenda - an increase in the number of 
motions originating from FPC or the parliamentary of party, and a decrease in those coming from 
other sources (such as SAOs and local parties), shown in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Origin of motions appearing on Final Agenda 2002-2007 
 
Conference Motions FPC (%) Parly Party (%) Other (%) 
Autumn 02 21 24 43 33 
Autumn 03 22 32 41 27 
Autumn 04 27 41 44 15 
Autumn 05 16 12 62 25 
Autumn 06 17 29 53 18 
Autumn 07 17 29 59 12 
Average 20 28 50 22 
 
Notes to FCC repeatedly stress the committee‟s commitment to encourage more speakers, 
particularly new speakers, and an improvement in the diversity of the origin of motions, with 
various initiatives coming forward to help with drafting and making submission and deadlines easy 
and achievable. It has had little success. There was no significant change in the number of 
speaker cards being put to the Chair, with an average between 2006 and 2008 of 21.5 cards put 
forward per motion, and an average of 11.5 speakers being called.  Table 11 clearly shows the 
prominence of the Parliamentary party in getting motions on the Agenda. 
 
In summary, there have been some significant shifts that reflect some new thinking by FCC, and a 
number of recommendations to reform the Liberal Democrat‟s federal conference. Firstly the 2003 
                                                                    
92  Report to FCC, „Conference Agenda: Motions, Timing and Overall Balance”. Duncan Brack, November  
2008. 
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review reflected FCC‟s desire to professionalise the conference. This resulted in a change of 
personnel in the Conference office with the replacement of long-term staff (Penny McCormac had 
run the office for over a decade), by an individual hired after consultation with professional 
recruitment specialists.
93
 Secondly, in terms of process the use of spokesmen papers and policy 
originating from the parliamentary party is increasing, in what could be seen as a centralising 
move giving greater power to the parliamentary party to use this important platform.  Thirdly, 
moves to encourage participation in policy have shifted away from debating policy papers toward 
Q&A sessions or presentations. Finally, FCC acknowledged the growing potential for conference 
as a campaigning workshop, with increased training opportunities and greater emphasis on 
networking to the benefit of party candidates. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 on 
„resources‟.  The conference has, since 2003, been recognised as an important campaigning, 
fundraising and media event at the same time as fulfilling its traditional policy and debate function, 
which draws increasingly from the parliamentary party to please the crowd (Evans and Sanderson-
Nash 2010).    
 
iii) Leaders, policy papers and manifestos 
 
Ashdown – Our Different Vision 
 
The spring conference of 1989 was the party‟s first attempt at setting out its overall policy 
direction, in a federal „green‟ paper entitled “Our Different Vision”.    This document stressed the 
importance of „liberty, equality and community‟, drawing closely on the preamble to the party 
constitution and particularly emphasising the party‟s commitment to community (Jones 1996).   
Through FPC and conference, the party continued to add to this body of papers in order to bring 
together former SDP and Liberal party members by producing philosophy-driven „theme‟ papers 
over coming years. At the same time it produced an increasingly detailed set of papers drawn up 
by researchers and working groups, for instance “Energy and the Living World”94 in 1990, setting 
out the party‟s environmental agenda and a connection between portfolios, theme papers and 
specialist researchers which worked well and evolved in to the „shadow cabinet.‟95   
 
These papers were carefully constructed and increasingly slick in presentation, drawing on the 
expertise of NGOs and charities and making best use of the party‟s policy unit and working groups 
as well as giving the members a body of text upon which to conduct debates at the federal 
conference.  They also demonstrated the beginning of a closer relationship between the 
parliamentary party and policy process as the growing number of specialist researchers began 
playing an important role in policy development.  This worked well in bringing the party itself 
                                                                    
93               Interview 54 (ii), 2010.  
94  This paper was produced by Norman Baker, then Research Assistant to the party‟s environment  
spokesman, Simon Hughes MP. The author of this paper was at that time Parliamentary Assistant to  
Simon Hughes.  
95  Other specialist policy papers include:  
1991 Economics for the future,  
1995 Investment, partnership, sustainability. 
1995 Transporting people, tackling pollution 
1998 Moving ahead, towards a citizens Britain 
2000 Reforming governance 
2000 Strategy for sustainability 
2000 Global response to global problems. 
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together but had a less positive impact on the media and electorate and was notoriously long-
winded.  The constitution adopted at merger contained a commitment to conduct a review of 
policy-making procedures in five years, hitherto described as “the blind leading the bland” (Titley 
1991).  The party was criticised for misunderstanding the difference between „expert opinions‟ and 
„political decisions‟ and the review concluded that the process should be streamlined, and Green 
papers abandoned. One source pointed out that the party at that time often failed to bring together 
the different priorities of “policy-makers, campaigners and communicators” sometimes leading to a 
disjuncture between the party‟s policies and its campaigning.  „Our Different Vision’ however, 
successfully served three purposes: i) to form the basis of the 1992 general election manifesto; ii)  
to establish Ashdown as a leader iii); and to establish  the Liberal Democrats as a realistic political 
force (MacIver 1996).   
 
1992  manifesto - Changing Britain for Good  
 
The first manifesto of the new party, “Changing Britain for Good”, was produced by Paddy 
Ashdown and agreed by FPC, and in no way looked to the wider party or its institutions for 
guidance, let alone sought its approval.
96
  In both 1992 and 1997 Ashdown prepared a draft then 
took this draft to FPC and sought their support,
97
 a process which in the event produced few, if 
any, real obstacles.  The pre-election manifesto was privately circulated among the party‟s „Equal 
Opportunities Audit Group‟ in order to ensure the party steered clear of prejudice, but in general its 
contents were a closely-guarded secret.
98
 Richard Holme and Duncan Brack produced and 
discussed drafts with the parliamentary party and the FPC at regular intervals throughout the 
process. In the spirit of equidistance and the first real test of the new party, the somewhat bland 
1992 manifesto ran to almost 17,500 words, and drew together five key themes, known inside the 
party as the “5 Es”; economy, environment, education, Europe and electoral reform.   
 
The manifesto detailed party policy on each of these subjects and successfully established 
Ashdown as a credible leader of a credible third party, following the damaging Alliance, merger 
and difficult post-merger years.  The document was fully costed for the first time, and the party 
benefited from the much-publicised „penny on income tax‟ to fund its policy on education (Curtice 
1996). The 1992 manifesto has been described as „classic liberalism‟ (Hickson 2010) but failed, 
however, to seize upon any single issue that the electorate found exciting or distinct.  The party 
suffered a net loss of 2 seats  (Butler and Kavanagh 1992). The game-changer came with the 
Labour party‟s election of Tony Blair in 1994, turning Ashdown‟s attention toward talks with 
Labour, and the party‟s policy-makers facing the prospect of a somewhat crowded ideological 
centre (Curtice 1996).  The party had been until now only easily differentiated from the two other 
parties by its policies for electoral reform, and being pro-European (Butler and Kavanagh 1997). 
The period that followed saw the federal conference debate motions to elect the head of state and 
consider legalising cannabis at conference, while behind the scenes leader Paddy Ashdown 
                                                                    
96  Interview 3, 2009. 
97  Interview 3, 2009. 
98  The author of this thesis was a former member of the party‟s Equal Opportunities Audit Group.  
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conducted protracted talks with the Labour  leadership.
99
  
 
1997  manifesto - Make The Difference  
 
The 1997 election was a very different general election for the party, in particular facing a now 
deeply unpopular Conservative government, and having formally abandoned equidistance. In 
Chapter 6 we look more closely at the strategy employed by the party against this backdrop. The 
policies upon which it based its manifesto were known inside the party as „CHEESE”: crime, 
health, education, the economy, sleaze and the environment
100
; this was similar to the „5 Es‟ of 
1992, but played down the party‟s policy on Europe.  In response to positive feedback that the 
party was most closely associated with its policy on education, and on its media-friendly penny on 
income-tax to pay for it, the Lib Dems adopted taxation and fairness as its key policy theme 
(Holme and Holmes 1998).  The leader and his advisors had realised it was necessary to cost the 
manifesto with sufficient attention to detail that it was able to withstand rigorous scrutiny, “rather 
than produce a wish-list and have to whittle it down”101, but it remained the work of the leader and 
his team. “Make the Difference” at 14,429 words was shorter and more concise than the 1992 
publication, but not much.
102
 This election owed much more to a clever targeting strategy, and 
coupled with a popular campaign saw the party more than double its number of MPs – its overall 
share of the vote, however, was marginally down.   
 
Kennedy – It’s About Freedom’ and ‘Meeting the Challenge 
  
With regard to policy there are three things worthy of note during Charles Kennedy‟s period of  
leadership.  The first is that he is criticised for showing little or no interest in it (Brack 2007). A 
popular leader with the public, nicknamed „chat-show Charlie‟, Kennedy was relaxed and non-
confrontational, which some have suggested shows the beginnings of the „cult of personality‟ in the 
third party. The second is that the party continued to produce a regular stream of lengthy and 
detailed policy papers (Grayson 2007).    Kennedy was thought to be pro-Europe, and keen on the 
environment and the 20,000-word pre-manifesto the he put to the Harrogate conference in 
September 2000 emphasised these things (Butler and Kavanagh 1997). More often than not, 
however, questions on policy suggested the party at that time failed to carve out anything 
particularly distinct. The third is that he led a parliamentary party that turned from voting mostly 
with the Labour government to voting mostly against it (Cowley and Stuart 2006; Cowley 2009) – 
this in spite of the fact that the party on the ground appeared to be moving not only to the left, but 
to the left of Labour (Quinn and Clements 2010). Kennedy‟s period as leader was perhaps lacking 
in direction on the formal policy pronouncements associated with Paddy Ashdown, which may in 
part be due to the events of 11
th
 September 2001, which required policy to be made „on the hoof‟ 
in reaction to a rapidly changing international situation.  He was closely associated with policy to 
oppose the war on Iraq, and he voiced clear opposition to aspects of the anti-terrorism laws, such 
                                                                    
99  Even though the conference debated more serious motions on the usual topics it was these that became  
the caricature.  
100 Interview 44, 2009. 
101  Interview 39, 2009. 
102  Interviewees differed on recollection of the costings of the party manifesto. Each manifesto has been  
appended by a costing, although this has become more substantial and detailed, notably in 1992.  
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as control orders. In 2000 FPC established a working group to set out his main themes. The 
outcome,  „Its About Freedom‟ explained the Liberal Democrat‟s commitment to civil liberties, with 
public services, particularly the NHS, at its centre. The paper also established the party‟s 
commitment to political reform, the environment and internationalism. It received a lukewarm 
response.  Three years later Kennedy tried again.  In order to rectify criticism of his domestic 
policy record, and in part responding to what for many was a missed opportunity in the 2005 
general election,  FPC set up a policy review, „Meeting the Challenge’. The outcome was „Trust in 
People – Make Britain fair, free and green‟ in July 2006, a review of existing policy and a guide as 
to how and where it should be developed.  This was too little too late, and was launched by a 
beleaguered leader (Hurst 2006). It was however, well received by the party who endorsed it at the 
Autumn conference, but again was criticised elsewhere for failing to make specific policy pledges 
(Dorey and Denham 2007).  
 
2001 manifesto - Freedom, Justice, Honesty  
 
From 2001
103
 onwards the party has published the pre-election manifesto for debate at the federal 
conference prior to the election being anticipated. These pre-election manifestos have been 
approximately half as long as their predecessors. One interviewee suggested that one reason for 
this is that the pre-manifesto is sent to the Scottish and Welsh parties, so that parts of it that do not 
apply can be taken out and bits that are state-specific can be added in.  It is “Scottified”.104   In 
2001 a nominal board of advisors close to the leader were drawn together in the „manifesto group‟.  
When the 2001 general election manifesto, “Freedom, Justice, Honesty”, was published it was 
longer than ever, at  21,332 words,  and reflected the more wide-ranging consultative approach 
taken by Matthew Taylor, who was charged with bringing issues forward and creating the early 
draft  (Bentham 2007).    
 
2005 manifesto - The Real Alternative  
 
By contrast, the 2005 manifesto “The Real Alternative” was half the length, and much more  
leadership-driven, Matthew Taylor again taking the lead this time producing a first draft from which 
the final version apparently deviated very little (Bentham 2007). In contrast with previous years, 
the leader convened a new sub-group headed by Taylor to co-ordinate the various parts of the 
party in bringing forward early manifesto drafts. This process is described by one interviewee as 
being a response to the enlarged parliamentary party and the range of expertise that the new 
intake of MPs represented, in particular those who were former councillors. One insider stressed 
that the pre-manifesto document, far from having policy input by the enlarged team working on it, 
became a poorer quality document - “full of soundbites” - with greater emphasis on individual 
issues with which the party was closely associated. Another described it as “picking up policies in 
a vacuum”.105 One interviewee described how the original title of the pre-election manifesto,  
“Freedom, Fairness, Trust”,  designed to provide „ideological coherence‟, was changed without 
                                                                    
103  A pre-election manifesto was also produced in 1990 but not in intervening years. 
104  Interview 6, 2010.  
105  Interview 18,   2009. 
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discussion to „The Real Alternative‟.  Opposing the council tax, opposing the Iraq War, and 
proposing free personal care for the elderly were popular campaigning points but failed to come 
together in a document that reflected the party‟s wider policy themes.  
 
Campbell – The Green Switch  
 
To an extent the short and relatively uneventful  leadership of Ming Campbell had more to do with 
“steadying the ship” following the departure of Charles Kennedy and the trauma of the  leadership 
contest (described in Chapter 3), than with any particular policy initiative. Campbell was, however, 
strongly associated with the foreign affairs portfolio, and a firm stance in opposing the Iraq War. 
Campbell, reportedly authoritarian in style, but more to the left than Kennedy in his political 
leanings, was well respected for his views on internationalism and social justice.
106
  He was, 
however, described by some as a leader who took little interest in policy, and who showed little 
respect for the party‟s democratic institutions, including FPC.107 Indeed, his inability to transfer the 
skills demonstrated as foreign affairs spokesmen were cited by two interviewees as the cause of 
his demise
108, while others found his style with colleagues, described as “paternal and distant”109, 
difficult and unappealing.   The 2006 federal conference was Campbell‟s first serious test at which 
Vince Cable proposed changes to the party‟s policy on taxation, including getting rid of the 50p 
tax-band commitment.  Campbell‟s appearance on the platform is thought to have helped the vote, 
which resoundingly backed the policy (Campbell 2006) and signalled an important change, 
combining the party‟s thinking on taxation and in the  leadership loyalty of the conference. The 
same policy paper also proposed a cut in the basic rate of income tax from 20% to 16%, the 
closing of loopholes for high-earners,
110
 and shifting the tax burden to polluters. It formed part of a 
wider campaign called „the green switch‟ which was popular but somewhat indistinct.   The second 
and last  federal conference during which Campbell, in 2007, focused again on environmental 
policy, but the conference was largely overshadowed by speculation about a snap general 
election, and in the event that one was not called, speculation about Campbell‟s imminent 
resignation.  
 
The Orange Book and its critics 
 
Quite apart from the party‟s formal pronouncements on policy there are, of course, occasional 
publications that enable a narrative to develop around certain issues, and in the case of The 
Orange Book, generate debate about a host of policies which its supporters claim was lacking 
during the latter stages of the Kennedy  leadership.  Publication of The Orange Book marked a 
new phase of ideological development for the party in which its authors aimed to „reclaim‟ the 
party‟s classic liberal roots. Although it is a collection of essays, and in no way forms any part of 
the party‟s formal policy, it has re-ignited a lively discussion within the party and beyond about 
classic or economic and social liberalism, and what these things mean in the context of the Liberal 
                                                                    
106  Interview 14,   2010. 
107  Interview, 39,   2009. 
108  Interview 40 and 16, 2009. 
109  Interview 5, , 2010. 
110  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/campbell-wins-battle-to-scrap-50p-tax-pledge-416725.html  
(accessed 07.02.2011). 
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Democrats.
111
   Contributors to the book are, with the exception of co-editor Paul Marshall, and Jo 
Holland, all Liberal Democrat politicians.
112
 It includes a powerful introduction by David Laws, 
setting out explicitly small-state economic liberalism, citing the NHS, prisons and pensions 
systems as „failures‟ in need of market driven solutions.  The remaining chapters are less 
controversial but the choice of contributors leaves no doubt about the Marshall and Laws‟ cohort.  
They are experienced city professionals and the book was a challenge to the left-leaning approach 
to public services that had been adopted by the Kennedy  leadership.
113
 
 
The publication was played down by Kennedy, who had hoped to unite the party, but was faced 
with a proportion of his parliamentary party apparently at odds with each other and the party‟s 
activist base (Garnett 2010).  Both MPs that fought the 2008  leadership contest had contributed to 
the volume, indeed Clegg and Huhne also contributed to the 2007 publication that aimed to 
reclaim social liberalism – arguing that it was possible to embrace both (Brack, Grayson et al. 
2007).   What is important to this thesis is not so much the content of these books, but the impact 
they have had on the party. They represent the beginnings of factionalism, naturally played down 
by those within the party who prefer instead to suggest the aims of both groups are potentially 
compatible. The publications were, however, followed by the development of two corresponding 
movements within the party, The Social Liberal Forum and Progressive Vision (see Chapter 3). 
Even though Clegg and Huhne hedged their bets in writing chapters for both, other contributors to 
each volume can be seen to clearly belong to one or the other camp. It is interesting to note that 
since entering government in 2010 every contributor to The Orange Book that is a Member of 
Parliament has been given a job in government.
114
 Contributors to Reinventing the State, less than 
one quarter of whom were MPs, include some of those more critical of the coalition including Tim 
Farron and David Howarth, and who remain without government posts. 
 
The „Orange Bookers‟ intended to launch the volume on the eve of the party‟s 2004 federal 
conference, but its launch was cancelled following some frantic negotiating between Marshall, 
Laws and the Kennedy office and took place with a minimum of publicity.  There was, it seems, no 
deliberately destabilising intent on the party of its authors, nor a plot to take over the party elite – 
although that is what followed. The Orange Book was intended to generate discussion and 
challenge the status quo at a time when policy pronouncements were bland, uninspiring and 
produced with the purpose of campaigning against both Labour and the Tories, in mind.    
 
                                                                    
111  Definitions of various schools of thought within the liberal tradition can be found in Brack, D and E. Randall 
(2007) Dictionary of Liberal Thought (Methuen)  
112  Paul Marshall is Chairman of Marshall-Wace hedge fund and city financier. Jo Holland is Research  
Assistant to Steve Webb MP. 
113  A breakdown of the jobs held by Orange Book contributors prior to their election to parliament is contained  
in Quinn, T. and B. Clements (2010). Realignment in the centre - the Liberal Demcorats. Britain at the Polls 2010. 
N. Allen and J. Bartle, Sage publications ltd. 
114  David Laws, Edward Davey, Christopher Huhne, Vince Cable, and Steve Webb were all given posts in  
government. Paul Marshall and Jo Holland are not MPs, and Mark Oaten and Susan Kramer no longer  
hold their seats. 
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Clegg – Make it Happen 
 
The first significant policy paper to emerge under Clegg‟s  leadership was „Make it Happen’, 
produced in 2008, and which proposed  radical revision to economic policy, proposing tax cuts, 
particularly for the low to middle earners.  Described as coming “out of nowhere” 115, it represented 
a continuation of Campbell‟s theme and a decisive shift away from any tax and spend philosophy, 
but nonetheless received strong backing from the party conference
116
. Make It Happen embedded 
tax cuts at the centre of the party‟s fiscal policy and generated one of the widest ranging, longest 
and liveliest policy sessions at federal conference for many years, with over 100 speaker cards put 
forward. Although a number of prominent parliamentarians and popular party figures spoke in 
favour of the amendment that rejected tax cuts, the vote showed strong support for the leader.   As 
one blogger recorded the event live, “Vince Cable gets up…. A conference hall swoons….” 117, and 
the party conference united behind Clegg and his team, voted for the policy, seemingly  
irrespective of the shifting centre of political gravity that accompanied them.
118
   The new breed of 
MPs were taken seriously by the media and the other parties, and therefore adored by campaigns-
driven conference representatives. 
 
Delegates to that same conference would have been eligible to vote in the two-yearly raft of 
internal committee elections, and a closer look at this reveals an interesting development in their 
thinking.  Elections that year were held for FCC, FE, FPC, IRC, ELDR and the interim peers list.  A 
significantly higher number of applicants applied for all the positions on offer, with 40 party 
members putting their names forward for FPC in 2008, compared with just 21 in the previous 
election in 2006. The party switched from annual to two-yearly elections, which may have 
contributed to the rise in applications, although a reading of the party blogs suggests an enlivened 
interest in internal committees generated both by changes to party procedures proposed in the 
Bones Commission, and by Clegg‟s rightward shift (Evans and Sanderson-Nash 2009).  There are 
strong denials of a „slate‟ or factionalism along the lines of those associated with Social Liberal 
Forum, Reinventing the State or any other groupings that might be seen as hostile to the leader. 
There is no doubt, however, that individuals such as Duncan Brack, (associated with the party‟s 
left or at least having a reputation for curbing  leadership moves to the right) triumphed in 2008, 
with Brack achieving a significantly higher number of first preferences than any other candidate.  
As one member of staff put it; 
 
At the last set of committee elections, Nick was seen as right wing, they attracted an 
oppositionist group on to FPC. For the first time in a while, they see themselves as self 
consciously stopping the leader going off taking the party to the right. (Interview 39, 2009). 
 
                                                                    
115  Interivew 19, politician, 2009. 
116  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2008/jul/17/cancleggmakeithappen (accessed 02.02.2011). 
117  http://www.libdemvoice.org/conference-make-it-happen-debate-the-liveblog-3900.html (accessed  
07.02.2011). 
118  Former policy director Richard Grayson suggests it is in part due to the trauma of Kennedy‟s demise,  the  
short-lived  leadership of Campbell, and the scandal surrounding Mark Oaten, to a lesser extent Simon  
 Hughes, that has produced a  leadership-loyal conference 
 Grayson, R. (2010) The Liberal Democrat Journey to a Lib-Con Coalition.   
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This may be so but it is interesting to note that the preferred place for anti-leader sentiment is 
behind the closed doors of the party committees, in preference to the conference floor in front of 
the television cameras. Described by one interviewee as “something of a coup, through the 
committee system, by the left”119, FPC then became the place, rather than within the parliamentary 
party,  federal conference or even the party‟s FE, that anyone with an interest in restraining the 
leader, would operate. The new FPC also impacted on the tuition fees debate, resulting in success 
for those that supported their abolition.  The leader through FPC, however, continued with theme 
papers
120
 and more portfolio-specific policy papers
121
 and in June 2009 predicted that “savage 
cuts” would be necessary in the public spending budget in order to address the financial crisis.  
The role for Vice Chairs of FPC increased in significance at the same time, now meeting ahead of 
full FPC meetings in order to prepare strategies for resolving potential conflict beforehand.
122
   The 
FPC elections in 2010 reinforced this trend, this time with 53 individuals putting themselves 
forward for the usual 15 positions, with Duncan Brack and this time former MP Evan Harris topping 
the ballot of first preferences.
123
  One insider explained the  leadership‟s response to this apparent 
challenge. In order to avoid head-on collisions with the new and left-leaning FPC, Clegg and his 
closest colleagues would argue, privately, that policy, as passed at conference, was 
insignificant.
124
 One source close to the  leadership made the emphasis very clear; “Policy is just 
that – it‟s manifestos that matter”.125 
 
2010 general election manifesto - Change That Works For You  
 
By 2010, the pre-election manifesto group had become a sub-committee of FPC,  which 
comprised individuals appointed by FPC Chair (the party leader). Danny Alexander was chief, and 
the group also included Nick Clegg, two other FPC Vice-Chairmen, Richard Grayson and Jeremy 
Hargreaves, Vince Cable (Shadow Chancellor), Ed Davey (Chair of Campaigns and 
Communications Committee), Steve Webb, David Laws and Susan Kramer, with three members of 
staff from the policy unit, leader‟s office and the party‟s treasury advisor. It began as a broad 
„themes‟ document prepared by Clegg‟s office, which was then worked on collectively by a team of 
advisors, including people preparing the  detailed costings appendix.  
 
The pre-election manifesto produced by Danny Alexander caused some difficulty for some party 
activists, many of whom had become aware of the disconnect between the  leadership and the 
party‟s instinctive policy positions. FPC had collected policy papers passed at conference, that 
offered a significant package, including tax cuts for the worst-off, abolishing tuition fees, scrapping 
ID cards, free personal health care for the elderly, an improvement in pensions and increasing the 
                                                                    
119 Interview 49, 2009. 
120  A Fresh Start for Britain” July 2009 focusing on the economy and constitutional reform. 
121  In particular: 
Our Natural Heritage – July 2009 – the environment 
Real Women – August 2009 – equality and discrimination 
Are We Being Served? Policies on Accessing Good and Services – Sept 2009 – consumer rights. 
Zero Carbon Britain – Taking a Global Lead – Sept 2009 – environment 
Thriving in a Globalize World – A Strategy for Britain – October 2009 – globalization 
Free to be Young – March 2010 – youth policy. 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/policy_papers.aspx (accessed 03.02.2011). 
122 Interview 39, 2009. 
123  http://www.cix.co.uk/~rosenstiel/ldelections/10fpc.htm (accessed 07.02.2011). 
124  Interview 49, 2009. 
125  Interview 49, 2009. 
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number of police on the beat.
126
 The pre-manifesto, however, drafted against the backdrop of 
recession, removed a number of these pledges and opened up a fierce debate within FPC about 
which pledges should be dropped, which should become aspirations and which were non-
negotiable.  It appeared to have been based instead on the  2008 FPC document „Make it 
Happen’, and although a departure from existing policy on a number of issues, was nonetheless, 
once again enthusiastically received by the membership. They appeared, for the time-being at 
least, to have swallowed the  leadership line, not least as it faced a general election widely 
predicted to result in a hung parliament, and the first ever realistic opportunity for the party to 
influence government.   
 
The Manifestos  - a summary 
 
In summary then, Ashdown was interested in policy, and believed he could push his own agenda 
by privately winning over those that might stand in his way, and push the rest through by sheer 
force of personality.
127
  His period in office was more concerned with uniting the new party and 
getting the Liberal Democrats and himself better known among the electorate. Kennedy was 
considered to be good at straddling the different interests within the party but often criticised for 
avoiding confrontation and failing to take a strong lead on policy matters. His legacy was to have 
enjoyed the party‟s greatest electoral gains against both parties, while enabling some divisions to 
have deepened and grown in to factional groups- „Orange Bookers‟ and their opponents.  
Campbell was unable to establish a distinctive policy position during his short period in office, and 
again was, according to insiders, more concerned with uniting a divided party and making 
progress on internal business.  Clegg, however, took the party into a completely new situation in 
which the leader appears to have persuaded his parliamentary party to back him on issues quite 
counter-intuitive to them, and then used this as a way to achieve the backing of conference.  
 
This section demonstrates the different priorities in each manifesto, and that their production is a 
much more leadership-led activity than the production of regular party policy. The manifestos draw 
on existing priorities and while there is no evidence that  leaders add new commitments, they 
naturally leave some out and that the design of the document can be used to stress their own 
priorities. On balance the Liberal Democrats allow their  leaders a significant degree of autonomy 
over the production of manifestos. Ashdown was committed to the democratic policy-making 
process. Indeed his biographies suggest he relished an opportunity to discuss policy detail. In 
contrast Kennedy lacked enthusiasm for the minutiae, and presided over a period in the party‟s 
history where policy appears to have been somewhat neglected.  David Laws and Paul Marshall 
filled this void and the views they espouse were then carried in to office by Nick Clegg.  
 
One feature of combining „policy-maximising‟ with „vote-maximising‟, the Liberal Democrats have 
been required to frame policy positions in light of electoral competition, specifically taking in to 
account those of their two major rivals. For a third party whose most realistic opportunity to form a 
government would come with a hung parliament and potentially doing a deal with Labour or the 
                                                                    
126 Interview 49, 2009. 
127  Interview 3, 2009. 
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Conservatives, it is clear that its proximity to the other two plays a key role in both the party‟s 
strategy and the perception of it by voters and members.  This thesis has, thus far, argued that the 
party has become increasingly top-down and the area of policy-making is no exception. Although 
the formal processes remain intact, the constitution stipulates that conference is sovereign with 
regard to policy, and policy debates continue to happen, and continue to be voted upon.   
 
It has however, demonstrated that the leader has significant autonomy in the area of manifestos, 
and that this has always been the case but only recently has this mattered. Recent developments 
show that policy debates at conference now compete with training, media and fundraising for time 
and emphasis.  There is also recent evidence that the status of policy is shifting, (at least that is 
what the  leadership would like to achieve), toward policy ambitions or aspirations in a further 
move that supports „office-maximising‟. If the party and the  leadership are of one mind in terms of 
policy, this should present no difficulty. However, when the party activists and leader take 
opposing views, such as over the policy to abolish university tuition fees, the constraints on  
leadership can be seen. There is no evidence that the argument for economic liberalism was won, 
or that the grassroots have shifted to the right. There is, however, evidence that the grassroots 
have learned to discuss these matters behind closed doors, in FPC meetings, to support the 
leader in public and to do whatever it takes to give the party an opportunity to hold office. 
 
Based on BES data from 1992, John Curtice was able to position relatively easily the Lib-Dem 
voter to the left of centre (Curtice 1996). In their survey of members from 1997, Whiteley, Seyd 
and Billinghurst were also able to show that at that time the party membership had a general 
inclination toward the left (Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006). The next substantial assessment of the 
party and the electorate was Andrew Russell and Edward Fieldhouse‟s 2005 publication on the 
Liberal Democrats which found the party, both its membership and its voters, less easy to position. 
They argue that the party represents a paradox by attempting to win support from both Labour and 
the Conservatives, and has been engaged in a battle to reconcile centre-left policy instincts with 
the need to target, particularly in 1997 and 2001, mostly Conservative-held seats (Russell and 
Fieldhouse 2005).  Similarly they argue that Liberal Democrat voters do not demonstrate a clear or 
consistent understanding of Liberal Democrat policies, in a pattern than it is argued masks a 
complex and volatile pattern of „defection‟ from the other two parties (Russell and Fieldhouse 
2005).   
 
The third party is more inclined to reflect single issues with which it is strongly associated, and 
under Kennedy this would have been the Iraq War and overall opposition to an illiberal Labour 
government. It suggests a centre of gravity that pulls the leadership and parliamentary party 
gradually away from the party in power, a pattern which helps to explain the closer proximity of the 
party under Nick Clegg towards the Conservatives in 2010.  The question is whether he has 
brought the party‟s activists with him.  Rather than a shift from the left to the right, this chapter 
suggests a shift by the party on the ground,  away from ideology and toward pragmatism (Evans 
and Sanderson-Nash 2010).  The relentless vote-maximising tactics employed in the build-up to 
the party‟s high-water-mark of 2005 appears to have been at the cost of a cohesive and coherent 
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ideological framework. Instead the party were encouraged to be all things to all voters.   The case-
studies that follow aim to explain the impact of this mis-match both with regard to the actions of the 
leader in taking a policy position, in this case on the war in Iraq, and to the difficulties caused when 
the leader has a policy position at odds with that of the wider party. 
 
iv) Case study – Opposing the War on Iraq 
 
Private polling conducted by the party suggests that in the build-up to the 2005 the party was 
strongly identified with a single policy - opposition to the Iraq War
128
(Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006). 
The decision owes more to the party‟s internationalist heritage, one strongly associated with then 
leader, Charles Kennedy, than to any tactical left-right positioning (Hickson 2010).  What is of 
interest in this case-study is both the decision to oppose the war, but perhaps more importantly the 
decision by Kennedy to address the one million marchers on the Stop the War Coalition rally in 
Hyde Park in February 2003.
129
   Although the decision was widely publicised, Kennedy being the 
only major party leader to address the demonstration, the behind-the-scenes events reveal some 
interesting tensions between the  leadership and the party‟s elected Federal Executive.  The Stop 
the War Coalition created strange bed-fellows for the party, sharing a platform with Jesse Jackson, 
Tariq Ali, George Galloway and Vanessa Redgrave, cited by some as the party‟s main reluctance 
to join the march.
130
 By the time the vote in Parliament came, the party had conclusively agreed to 
oppose military action and all 52 Liberal Democrat MPs voted against the resolution to declare war 
on Iraq on 18
th
 March 2003.
131
 
 
Accounts of the build-up to this decision vary although none on the inside would deny this was an 
interesting and perhaps pivotal moment for the party‟s FE. The party‟s FE was at that time Chaired 
by party president Navnit Dholakia, and procedures were somewhat dominated by elected 
members and in particular activists Donnadhach McCarthy and Tony Greaves.  McCarthy was 
elected to the FE in 1996, as a purely independent and non-aligned individual, indeed he had only 
recently been recruited to the party. He began by raising a series of questions that challenged the 
potential clash of interests of Richard Holme, who as a peer was a member of the parliamentary 
party, at the same time as being Executive Director for Rio Tinto Zinc, a mineral resources multi-
national corporation. McCarthy was active and vocal within the party, proposing motions at FE and 
conference and stimulating discussion on CIX
132
 and outside the party writing articles and 
generating debate on the internet, about the questions raised by parliamentarians lobbying on 
behalf of companies in which they have a financial interest.    He became Deputy Chairman of the 
FE in 2002 and was by this time well-known within the party.  On the FE he constantly challenged 
the party  leadership and questioned decisions by the party elite.   
 
Although McCarthy was unsuccessful in his campaign to force Peers to declare private business 
interests,  he became strongly associated with the party‟s activist left, making the most of every 
                                                                    
128  Interview 10, 2010. 
129  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2765041.stm (accessed 25.01.2011). 
130 Interview 30, 2010. 
131 http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2003-03-18&number=118 (accessed 25.01.2011). 
132
  Compulink Information Exchange (see description in Chapter 4) 
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opportunity to organise at the grassroots level, in particular by using CIX and the internet as an 
activist tool. He was one of the first to put the new technology to great effect in the collecting of 
signatures and support to bring forward motions to conference, for instance.  McCarthy was vocal 
in his opposition to military action against Iraq and, as the FE minutes testify, the party was aware 
of the potential damage this might cause. The minutes of the FE meeting of 12
th
 September 2002 
state that action on the recall of Parliament during recess to discuss Iraq include: „Press Office to 
provide regular briefings and updates to avoid potentially damaging „activists defeat  leadership‟ 
stories in the media‟ (4.1.3).   
 
Although the gradual shift from Kennedy being „unconvinced‟ to fully opposing the war appeared to 
be a decision reached as a result of the usual combination of formal and informal discussions 
involving close advisors, Anna Werrin and Tim Clement-Jones, to the Foreign Affairs Team 
including Ming Campbell and Shirley Williams, the minutes from the FE reveal a strong internal 
campaign.  The FE minutes of January 2003 state that the FE noted the party position was that 
“there is no compelling argument for military action to be taken against Iraq at the present time” 
(4.2.3 (2)) and went on to request that the parliamentary party send one of their number to speak 
at the rally on behalf of the federal party (4.2.3 (8)). The impetus, according to some, came from 
below: “There was genuine grassroots pressure from the party at large that Iraq was such a 
defining issue the  leadership had to take notice”.133  
 
The leader, then, took the decision to oppose the war, whether driven by the advice of 
parliamentary colleagues, based on intelligence provided to him by the government, political 
opportunism or the will of the party‟s Federal Executive.  What became controversial was the 
decision to speak at the proposed „Stop the War‟ rally and what is important to this study is that 
this appears to have been an instruction delivered by the FE to the parliamentary party.  There is 
also anecdotal evidence that Kennedy attended a Guardian newspaper lunch just before the 
march at which plans to be  absent from the platform were criticised.   Against the backdrop of a 
passionate and powerful activist discussion on CIX
134
, one source describes the inconsistency of 
holding that position and then not attending the rally as the turning point for Kennedy.
135
   The 
decision was one that set the party apart from Labour and the Conservatives and created for 
Charles Kennedy a distinct platform from which to continue the party‟s attack on the Blair 
government. In the days leading up to the demonstration McCarthy began a campaign within the 
party to produce banners with the slogan „Lib Dems say NO to war‟, against the less party-
orientated „Give peace a chance‟, the preference of the  leadership. Although accounts vary, 
McCarthy‟s dogged campaigning style appears to have bounced the  leadership into a position of 
little choice but to agree, since he had already begun production of the banners.
136
  McCarthy‟s 
claims to success on this, and other issues, resulted in an even more strident approach to his 
campaign on reform of the lobbying system. He continued to dominate and increasingly disrupt FE 
meetings which eventually led to the request by Lord Dholakia that McCarthy resign as  Deputy 
Chair of FE, followed by McCarthy‟s resignation from this post, and then from the party in 2005, to 
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134 Interview 63, 2009. 
135  Interview 43, 2010. 
136  Interview 36, 2009. 
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the relief of many.   
 
This case study briefly demonstrates two interesting elements of party life. The first is the potential 
that exists within the party structure to enable grassroots members of the party to rise quickly 
through its ranks to hold office, to campaign and to influence decisions. What followed was a  shift 
in perception from McCarthy as the activists‟ hero to that of an isolated extremist and a hindrance 
to party progress, a consequence according to some of his „obsession‟ with attacking the  
leadership. What is clear is that the party elite will tolerate grassroots activists so long as they 
remain outward-looking, focusing on campaigns to further the party‟s electoral progress, but are 
less inclined to support activity that openly criticises its own internal procedures and 
personalities.
137
  The period of time during which McCarthy was at his most active is something of 
a legend among activists. It is, perhaps, a story told as a warning, that despite his good intentions 
and laudable principles, his methods, tenacity and lack of respect for party hierarchy eventually led 
to his downfall.   Those that have taken over the radical mantle from McCarthy, in particular Gareth 
Epps on the FE, have done so from a more conformist position, as an experienced local councilor 
and PPC, and sharing in the office-maximising goal of the party elite.  
 
Secondly, it reveals a Federal Executive that can make recommendations to the parliamentary 
party, and which it can rightfully expect to be carried out. 
 
Case study – Abolishing University Tuition Fees 
 
Differences of opinion over the Liberal Democrat policy on the funding of higher education have 
been evident since the party‟s beginnings. In 1994, well before the Dearing Report that triggered a 
system of means-tested tuition fees paid for by loans to students, Don Foster, Liberal Democrat 
MP for Bath and then Education Spokesman, produced a policy paper “The Key to Lifelong 
Learning” that proposed the introduction of a „Learning Bank‟ from which students would obtain a 
„student mortgage‟. The paper‟s overall emphasis was on students paying for higher education on 
a loan basis, administered through the national insurance system. It was unpopular within the 
party, and criticised for being “illiberal, incoherent and indefensible” (Ross 1994) and defeated 
after a heated conference debate at the party‟s federal conference in Nottingham that year, but 
also attracted some cautious support (Woods 1994).  
 
Labour‟s „Teaching and Higher Education Act‟ of 1998 then introduced tuition fees, which were 
increased with top-up fees under the 2004 Higher Education Bill, and both pieces of legislation 
were voted against by the Liberal Democrats in Parliament. In 2008, however, Centre Forum, the 
revived think-tank, founded by Orange Book co-author Paul Marshall,  produced a paper 
recommending the party drop its opposition to tuition fees, as the policy was too expensive (Astle 
2008).  As the party began to gear up toward an election, tension inside the party over differences 
of opinion on tuition fees began to intensify, with those on FPC wishing to assert their 
constitutional right to make policy, and the leader wishing to assert his position particularly with 
                                                                    
137  McCarthy continues to campaign on the environment and the reform of political lobbying  
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regard to what went in the manifesto.  
 
The party had always been due to debate education and in March 2009 produced “Investing in 
talent: Building the economy”. This policy paper, looking specifically at adult, further and higher 
education, committed the party to the abolition of university tuition fees and was passed at the 
spring conference that followed. It has since been preserved by FPC and yet the party‟s leader 
Nick Clegg made it clear privately, and at FPC, that his personal view was that the policy was too 
expensive and unworkable.
138
  The 2009 Spring Conference, overwhelmingly supporting the policy 
to abolish tuition fees.  During the summer of 2009 the party‟s Federal Executive debated the 
order of priorities for the pre-manifesto, and this particular policy was written in a way that some on 
FPC felt downgraded it.   Clegg then conducted a series of national media interviews that 
committed the party to three key policy areas (small class sizes, a green economy and political 
reform). The remainder, including the commitment to abolishing university tuition fees, being now 
referred to as „aspirations‟.139  On 23rd September 2009 18 of the 29 voting representatives on 
FPC had a letter published in The Guardian, explicitly stating that: 
 
Our party makes policy in an open and democratic way and those policies cannot be 
changed merely by assertion to the contrary. Scrapping tuition fees is our policy – 
reaffirmed at our conference this March – and the conference has not voted to change it. 
140
 
In response to this now explicit difference of opinion between  leadership and FPC, a deal on 
higher education policy was proposed by Phil Willis MP and Stephen Williams MP, who were 
asked to come up with a compromise between the  leadership and those who opposed him - what 
one former member of staff described as the „true believers‟ (those in the party committed to free 
higher education as a core part of party ideology) and the „pragmatic activist‟ (those in the party 
committed to free higher education in the interests of electoral gain).
141
 After serious commitment 
to drawing up appropriate comparative costings and having prepared detailed proposals, Williams 
outlined the ideas for a „graduate contribution‟ to replace top-up fees at a meeting of the party‟s 
Federal Policy Committee in November of that year.  This was also rejected, the leader‟s position 
was unchanged and the difference of opinion between him and FPC remained clear.  Nick Clegg 
was faced with leading a party with a policy he did not support and a powerful internal committee 
digging its heels in. Even his opponents, however, had some sympathy with him: one 
parliamentarian interviewed in October 2009 summarised the position: 
 
I don‟t think Nick‟s position is unreasonable, I think it is wrong, but I don‟t think it is 
unreasonable given he is leader of the party going into an election where he wants to 
keep options open at this point. (Interview 19, 2009). 
 
 
                                                                    
138  Interview 10, 2009.  
139
  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/nick-clegg-you-cant-promise-the-same-menu-of-goodies-its-
just-not-plausible-1755885.html (accessed 28.01.2011). 
140  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/sep/23/liberal-democrat-conference-tuition-fees (accessed  
28.01.2011). 
141  Interview 49,   2009. 
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Against the backdrop of recession Nick Clegg succeeded in persuading his parliamentary party to 
prioritise the economy and to play-down the policy on university tuition fees.   In spite of 
misreporting and misunderstanding, the policy, however,  remained in the party manifesto (Liberal-
Democrats 2010).
 142
    Some of those interviewed regarded this simply as a case of poor judgment 
by the leader, who should have sounded out and won over
143
 individual members of FPC before 
asking the party to commit to a particular policy
144
.  It is doubtful that he would have won sufficient 
support to have succeeded at conference, but most of those interviewed accept the differences of 
opinion were polarised by the mishandling of the topic.  Others argue that it marks a point in the 
party‟s history where the factionalisation of those calling themselves „social liberals‟ and others 
„economic liberals‟ came to the fore.145  This is, again, debatable; one insider explained that a 
number of those calling themselves „economic liberals‟ supported the policy particularly since it 
was such an effective vote-winner.  One interviewee explained it had little to do with the policy 
itself, and was simply a case of the new leader failing to understand that he needed to 
acknowledge that activists on party committees believe they are making policy, and his 
mishandling of the situation led to individuals being antagonised.
146
  These differences are 
important since they highlight that not only did the party demonstrate different views, the majority 
opposing fees, the minority including the leader supporting them, but that the party also 
demonstrated different priorities, some policy-maximising, some vote-maximising, some office-
maximising, and all came to the fore on this issue.  
 
The coalition document that was agreed and published on 12
th
 May 2010 reflected a significant 
number of Liberal Democrat policy commitments (Quinn, Bara et al. 2010),  but none to abolish 
university tuition fees. The text instead committed both parties to await the outcome of the Browne 
Report, and included a caveat to enable Lib Dems to abstain on any vote on this issue that they 
found unacceptable in a clear acknowledgement of the likelihood that legislation may conflict with 
their agreed policy.  The Browne Report concluded in October 2010 recommending universities 
charge fees on an individual basis, resulting in a significant rise of up to £9,000 per year per 
student – a measure then brought in by the government and in complete contradiction to the policy 
stated in the Lib Dem manifesto. Clegg had already been able to appoint 19 of his 62 
parliamentary colleagues to government posts, with an option to resign and vote against or 
abstain, and an equally uncomfortable set of options facing his backbenchers. Lib Dem Voice, the 
website for party bloggers conducted a poll to which 567 members replied, asking what they 
thought Lib Dem MP should do.
147
   51% believed the MPs should vote against, 41% thought they 
should abstain and 7% said they should vote in favour.   In the event of the vote the parliamentary 
party did the reverse of what its activists hoped for as 49% of the parliamentary party voted with 
the government,  37% voted against with 14% absent or abstaining.
148
 
                                                                    
142  http://www.libdemvoice.org/the-guardians-approving-verdict-on-the-lib-dems-manifesto-principles-is-    correct-but-
for-the-wrong-reasons-17525.html (accessed 28.01.2011). 
143  In the course of conducting interviews for this thesis the author was invited by senior parliamentarians to  
attend FPC meetings to observe ongoing discussions on the issue of tuition fees. The invitation was later 
withdrawn.  
144  Interview 49,   2009. 
145  Interview 24,   2009. 
146  Interview 63,   2009. 
147  http://www.libdemvoice.org/tution-fees-what-party-members-believe-lib-dem-mps-should-do-21647.html  
(accessed 28.01.2011). 
148  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11964669 (accessed 28.01.2011). 
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Clegg failed to win the argument within the party, and yet in coalition voted conclusively against 
party policy, against his election pledge and against the wishes of thousands of voters in university 
seats that had supported his party for precisely this reason.  This highlights that even though the 
leader is able to vote however he chooses, the party policy is not in his gift. It remains with the 
FPC and conference, and Clegg has failed to bring them with him on this issue. Whether that 
matters or not is a question for future research.    One former member of staff explained: “There‟s 
little FPC as a body can do about the  leadership not following policy other than saying that‟s not 
our policy”. (Interview 23, 2009).  
 
Conclusion 
 
These case-studies demonstrate the reality of the policy-making process.  On the Iraq war it 
demonstrates that the grassroots can bring pressure to bear on the leader to act as the party‟s 
figure-head, in this case leading to Kennedy‟s address to the Stop the War coalition. It also shows 
that the party only welcomes radical grassroots members to its Federal Executive if they share the 
party‟s primary goal of vote and seat-maximising.  It is hard to separate the policy-maximising and 
vote-maximising preferences of the party‟s stance on the abolition of university tuition fees, since it 
represents a combination of the two.  It is, however, conclusively one area where the  leadership 
has been unable to restrain internal party committees and that, where the party opposes the 
leader on specific issues it is not afraid to voice its concerns.  At the first opportunity to exercise a 
vote and reflect this,  the party elected Tim Farron its new President, an MP who voted against the 
government on this issue and described it as “the poll tax of our generation,”149 sending the strong 
message to the  leadership that the membership remain very strongly in favour of abolishing tuition 
fees. 
 
vi) Ideology and power – what they say and what they do 
 
As already discussed in this thesis (see p69), the parliamentary party has changed in three 
significant ways; increased in number; politically shifted from anti-Conservative to anti-Labour; and 
changed in character.  The role of the parliamentary party in the policy making process, however, 
remains ambiguous and undefined (Russell, Fieldhouse et al. 2007).  The parliamentary intake of 
the 1997 general election changed the parliamentary party, not only by more than doubling in 
numbers from 18 to 46, but that new intake included a significant number of former councillors
150
, 
and for the first time a number of individuals with former careers in finance.    By 2005 the 
percentage of Lib Dem MPs with former business careers had risen to 29%, close to the 
Conservatives (38%) and dramatically higher than Labour (7%) (Cracknell 2009).   Under the  
leadership of Charles Kennedy however, this new, enlarged, experienced and more city-orientated 
parliamentary party represented a significant change from that which faced his predecessor.   The 
parliamentary party was the least divided in Westminster, obeying the whip while at the same time 
during that period switching to voting consistently with Labour, to voting consistently against. 
                                                                    
149  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/11/tuition-fees-poll-tax-our-generation (accessed  
28.01.2011). 
150  A brief read of MPs biographies reveals that over 50% of Lib Dem MPs in the 2005 intake had previous 
experience as elected local councilors.  
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The data collected by Cowley and Stuart, reproduced earlier in Table 8 (p78),  is particularly 
interesting and demonstrates a trend by the party to gradually move away from the Labour party. 
Since 1999 when the party crossed over to vote more consistently against Labour, the trend has 
continued under Ming Campbell and intensified again under Nick Clegg. As they point out these 
voting records cannot explain causal factors but they do provide a useful contrast for this study 
between the behaviour of the parliamentary party, apparently shifting its voting pattern in 
parliament against Labour, and the behaviour of the wider party retaining a broadly centre-left 
policy bias.   There are some more revealing indications of the parliamentary party‟s collective 
thinking on issues where the whip is removed, where the party divides more consistently than its 
rivals in to two camps (Russell, Fieldhouse et al. 2007).  As one insider explained: 
 
The Parliamentary party wants a consensus position, so they discuss at Parliamentary 
party meeting and Shadow Cabinet to achieve a position that commands maximum 
support with very few rebels – we don‟t coerce through the lobbies – we have nothing to 
offer like to remove or give favours, not like the other parties  can . (Interview 59, 2009). 
 
This will, of course, have changed as the party entered government in May 2010, giving the  
leadership precisely this bargaining power.  Clegg‟s leadership over policy, however, did not begin 
particularly well with the parliamentary party and his decision in March 2008 to instruct his 
colleagues to abstain on the Lisbon Treaty led to the resignation of three of his front-bench 
spokesmen. He recovered well however, and was described in interview by one close colleague 
as “engaging”151, by his critics as “passionate and a fighter”152 and by another, with a general 
election approaching, as having the parliamentary party, “eating out of his hand”.153  The party‟s 
political centre of gravity, however, cannot be measured by parliamentary voting patterns, since 
opposing Labour does not equate to agreeing with Conservatives. It does, though, suggest that in 
the build-up to the general election Clegg led an ambitious, united and compliant parliamentary 
party, even though recent studies show a reverse in this trend. This is discussed further in Chapter 
9. 
 
vi)  Conclusions 
 
This chapter explains the party‟s policy-making process and demonstrates that although the 
constitution has not been changed, subtle shifts in emphasis and influence have occurred.  Firstly, 
conference has professionalised. It now serves as an important training, networking and 
fundraising event, as well as providing a platform upon which to debate and vote on policy. This 
honing of expertise represents one of the central characteristics of the definition of professionalism 
already set out.  The  conference platform is increasingly dominated by Q&A sessions or key-note 
speeches by parliamentarians and target-seat candidates in the build-up to a general election 
particularly, in a further indication of the use of expertise.   It would be wrong to suggest this 
                                                                    
151  Interview 5, 2010. 
152  Interview 19, 2009. 
153 Interview 29, 2009. 
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change has come directly from the  leadership, or even from the party elite, in a desire to quash 
potential critics or to stifle debate. This supports the case for professionalisation but not 
centralisation.  Instead it represents more effective management and a realistic awareness of the 
media opportunity the event provides. The conference office itself is one area where the party has 
shown willingness to employ professionals from outside its own ranks and where those employees 
are able to demonstrate autonomy and mobility.  Secondly, policy is increasingly generated by the 
parliamentary party, or at least combined with papers produced by the policy unit, in a coming 
together of efforts.  Small steps have been made to streamline the process in the abandoning of 
green papers and the increasingly professional fully-costed manifestos and alternative budgets.  
Once again this represents an increasing dependency on the expertise of spokesmen and 
specialist staff.  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, in spite of the   streamlining of the process to produce policy – the 
leader continues to be somewhat constrained. Even though the policy-making process has 
changed, it cannot be described as having centralized when a body elected by ordinary members, 
the Federal Policy Committee, continue to have the final say.  In response to this, the Clegg 
administration attempted to make use of the  significant autonomy the party leader enjoys over the 
production of the party manifesto. In the final analysis, however, it was the FPC that were able to 
insist on the policy to abolish tuition fees remaining in the  document in spite of the leader‟s open 
difference of opinion.  There is no evidence that the argument for economic liberalism was won, or 
that the grassroots have shifted to the right.   It is likely, particularly as the party experience the 
reality of government, that this constraint on the  leadership will cause tensions in future and the 
consequences of this are considered more thoroughly in Chapter 9.  
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that even though they began by representing a minority interest, 
The Orange Book contributors were almost all members of the Parliamentary party, and a group 
that have become dominant in recent years.  This has been met with some opposition, notably on 
FPC, which has become the focal point for opposition. One observer noted “It‟s one thing for the 
party to make policy – it‟s another to tell the  leadership how much to spend on each item. That‟s 
overstretching the constitution”.154 This shows the beginnings of a move to re-interpret the 
constitution and to make policy commitments on the one hand, and spending commitments on the 
other, in what appears to be a more aspiration status for the party‟s formal policy pronouncements, 
giving maximum flexibility to the leader.  For centralization to be apparent we would expect to see, 
for example, an amendment to the party constitution removing soverign policy-making power form 
FPC and the Conference, downgrading its role to „advisory‟ or „aspirational‟. While this would be 
seen as many to represent a fundamental and controversial shift in intra-party power, the 
leadership may be able to achieve something similar without constitutional change, and the gap 
between formal policy and the party‟s next general election manifesto will provide an indication of 
the extent to which this process is under way. These fundamental amendments to the constitution 
have not been made. 
 
                                                                    
154  Interview 4, 2010. 
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Overall then, this chapter fails to support H1, but supports H2. In terms of policy-making, the 
changes described represent a process of gradual professionalisation rather than centralisation, 
and crucially, that in spite of these modernising changes, the party‟s elected conference remain its 
sovereign policy-making body.   
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Chapter 6  Campaigns  
 
i) Introduction 
 
The Lib Dems have traditionally been heavily dependent on activity on the ground where ordinary 
members attend meetings, hold office, find candidates, raise funds and distribute campaign 
literature.   Combined with a democratic constitution giving the grassroots policy-making powers, 
and demonstrating a strong commitment to ideology, the party in this respect displays the 
characteristics of Duverger‟s „mass party‟ (Duverger 1954).155  During the mid-1990s when the 
party expanded in local government, party membership was in overall decline.  In spite of this, it 
has a „strong‟ membership (Scarrow 2002) with a high ratio of activists to ordinary members. One 
interviewee said that in his local party 1 in 14 members was an elected Councillor
156
 but that the 
„record‟ was held by the party in Liverpool which peaked at 1 in 3 members elected to a position in 
local government.
157
 This lies at the heart of party activity and has, since its inception, informed 
national campaign tactics. For a third party such as the Lib Dems, normally in opposition at 
Westminster and unable make a national breakthrough, the role of local campaigning is central to 
its survival and to an understanding of intra-party power. 
 
This chapter explores the development of thinking in the strategy and tactics of the Liberal 
Democrats and looks at how this may influence the overall balance of power within the 
organisation.  It is divided in to four sections. The first explores general election campaigning, 
looking at the evolution of targeting and the use of polling, taking each general election in turn and 
examining the ideas behind the strategy employed by the Liberal Democrats in their attempts to 
break the two party hegemony at Westminster. The second looks at the institution of the 
Campaigns Department and its reluctance to professionalise. It explains how the department has 
expanded, and centralised, and at the tactics it has employed, as well as looking at the ways in 
which private polling and the new media influence campaigning techniques.  We explore both the 
grassroots „Focus leaflet‟ culture that has dominated the „ground-war‟ and the increasingly 
presidentialised and leadership-led „air-war‟ in order to achieve an overall understanding of 
competing priorities.   Using the definition of professionalism from Webb and Fisher, it would be 
reasonable to expect to see an increase in the employment of individuals from with expertise 
outside the party, that these individuals be entrusted with autonomy, and that they are able to 
exercise mobility in the jobs market.  In addition the professionals might be able to demonstrate 
self-regulation, and an above-average level of commitment to each task. In a “soft” interpretation 
of professionalism we might expect to see the party self-consciously attempting to be more 
effective and a shift in workplace culture.   
 
The third section explores the process of approving and selecting party candidates.  This section 
also draws upon  a number of mini-case studies that look at individual seats and candidates to 
                                                                    
155 Priorities are party HQ are demonstrated most clearly in Chapter 7 „Resources‟. When the party suffered  
 mass redundancies it left the campaigns department with 1 member of staff, but membership services with  
 the largest number, totaling 4 staff.  
156 A ratio of 1-14 councillors to local members corresponds approximately with the ratio of councillors  
 nationally to national membership tables. In general terms 6% of members are councillors.   
157 Interview 18,   2010. 
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explore the extent to which autonomy is exercised in this important element of party life and to see 
which interests are best served.   The fourth section looks at the individuals that are important in 
arriving at these priorities. The Campaigns Department led by Chris Rennard, was able to eclipse 
and eventually replace the Chief Executive during a period in which he remained at the helm at 
Headquarters for nearly 20 years.  His significant alternative power-base has had important 
consequences for the party.  The chapter concludes that the party has adapted and modernised its 
campaigning operation, which has undergone a process of centralisation, and secondary to this a 
more reluctant and incomplete process of professionalisation. 
 
ii) Campaigns – strategy & tactics 
 
In 1988 the party‟s goal was to survive the merger, and during the 1992 general election it was to 
establish the party as a permanent and serious third force in British politics (Brack 2007). It 
employed a strategy that integrated three key elements; realignment, community politics and 
political co-operation (MacIver 1996).  MacIver devised a typology that set out the different party 
strategies at this stage, and which remain relevant to the party‟s more recent history. He argued 
that the party divided in to centrists and radicals, then again in to those taking a long or a short 
term view of how to achieve these ends.  The long-march centrists he says were a dwindling 
group, frustrated by slow-progress and paralysed by inactivity.  The long-march radicals by 
contrast were growing in strength and number, including the party‟s traditional left-wing activists 
such as Tony Greaves and Gordon Lishman, and were joined by the party‟s local councillor base.  
The less patient quick-fix centrists were those that viewed breakthrough as unlikely to come other 
than through co-operation with other parties . They are compared with the equally impatient quick-
fix radicals; ;  small in number, driven by radical ideas, and  prepared to work with other parties . 
He puts Simon Hughes and Paddy Ashdown in this category.   
 
In summary the long-march is the tactic employed by those who aimed to breakthrough without the 
help of another party, the quick-fix belongs to those that believed a hung-parliament was the 
party‟s best chance to have influence, and in readiness to do a deal needed to be willing to work 
with either one of the two major parties.   In a study of this kind these groupings provide a useful 
way in which to assess more recent developments and which of the two strategies has been in 
play.
158
  
 
1992 and 1997 
 
In 1992 strategy, in the long-march centrist mould, comprised three main elements. Firstly, there 
was the manifesto containing the „5 E‟s‟, and strongly associated with Paddy Ashdown as leader 
(see Chapter 3). Secondly, there was the targeting strategy devised by Chris Rennard, whose aim 
was to build support in areas where the party enjoyed local campaigning successes. Thirdly, Des 
                                                                    
158  It is also interesting to note that the Party Reform Commission („The Bones Commission‟) framed its report  
in to a set of „solutions‟ divided in to „Quick Wins‟ („to improve our chances at the next general election‟),  
and „Longer Term Changes‟ („to follow the next general election‟) with an additional solution „Urgent – to build the 
foundations for the MP goal‟.  The mixture of short, medium and long term strategy appears to take account of the 
different goals belonging to different party strata and are similar to those McIver has identified.  
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Wilson took over as Communications Director intent on dispelling the „wasted vote myth‟ with a 
campaign entitled “My Vote”, and operating a strategy to insist the party were given fair and equal 
media coverage.
159
  The party‟s targeting strategy began in 1992 and acted as a pilot scheme. The 
campaigns department aimed to hold the 22 seats it already had, focusing any additional 
resources in key marginals, with a maximum ambition of delivering 30 seats. It actually went down 
to 20 seats but the campaign was deemed a success, giving accurate predictions and making the 
best use of the party‟s limited resources. The party succeeded in its goal to re-establish itself as 
the third party, and Ashdown as a credible leader (Butler and Kavanagh 1992).   
 
Between 1992 and 1997 Ashdown persevered with his „project‟ of realignment on the left and co-
operation with Labour, in a switch that owed much to the „quick-fix‟ approach.   The parliamentary 
party grew from 20 to 26 following some sensational by-election victories and the party on the 
ground grew significantly as it pushed the Conservatives into third place between 1992 and 1996 
in local government elections.
160
  Between elections the party continued its strategy of building on 
the ground, seizing on local issues, nurturing a team of support and converting this into an activist 
base which delivered Focus leaflets to local households on a regular basis.
161
   The 1997 general 
election team was led by Richard Holme and Tim Clement-Jones with Jane Bonham-Carter as 
Director of Communications and Chris Rennard continuing in his role as Director of Campaigns.  
Rennard identified 50 target seats on top of the 18 it identified as its „incumbency‟, and to which 
the top 35 were assigned a full-time agent.    There were therefore three levels of targeting, the 18 
being defended, then the 50 target seats divided in to the top 35 Rennard believed it would win, 
and the remaining 15 which were not given priority but whose key personnel would be invited for 
training and sent target-seat mailings.  The remaining 582 seats in the UK were given minimal 
support and no financial assistance from the central party. As well as targeting resources the 
campaigns department also gave strict instructions to local parties that were not on the target list 
to campaign in their closest target seat and to all but ignore their own if was considered to be un-
winnable.   The party enjoyed some success in part due to this, and also benefiting from media 
coverage which it struggled to achieve under normal circumstances (Butler and Kavanagh 1997). 
In Parliament numbers leapt from 18 to 46 MPs, and while not the breakthrough in terms some 
had hoped for, represented a sufficiently significant increase in parliamentary numbers to have a 
serious impact on the organisation, as explained elsewhere in this thesis.   
 
After the general election Rennard drew up a set of basic principles setting out the „five most 
important steps to winning a constituency‟, which are summarised below: 
- campaigning all year round, not just during general elections 
- gear the campaign to the concerns of the voters in those seats 
- build the local organisation to deliver leaflets, knock on doors and raise funds 
- convince people that we can win 
- pursue tactical voting where it helps us.
162
 
  
                                                                    
159  The author of this thesis worked as a Press Officer with Des Wilson for the Lib Dems during the 1992  
general election campaign.  
160  http://www.research.plymouth.ac.uk/elections/elections/results%201996.htm#Changes (accessed  
10.02.2011). 
161  Appendix M contains a typical Focus leaflet, delivered in 2011 to households in the Lewes constituency. 
162 Details are set out in “The Campaign Manual” provided free to all PPCs. 
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In order to promote this message the Campaigns Department stepped up its training at 
conference, and conducted workshops in each of the party‟s regions, attended by over 1000 
activists in each round, while at the same time improving communications with candidates and 
local activists with the advent of email.  The party spent more on polling data in 1997 than in 2001 
or 2005, but embraced it again in 2010 making use of online polling in order to achieve a greater 
amount of data that could be collected at minimal cost.
163
   This certainly led to a more efficient 
and better organised campaigns effort but control over the targeting decision and the distribution of 
resources in support of those seats belonged to the Director of Campaigns. 
 
2001 and 2005 
 
In 2001 the party adopted a different strategy, moving away from Labour politically, entering the 
general election arguing that they could replace the Conservatives as the party of “effective 
opposition”.  The party continued to use private polling to assess the electorate‟s response to 
equidistance and conducted research on the views of floating voters to the party‟s proximity to 
either of the other two parties. Data obtained in marginal seats suggested that it was not beneficial 
for the Liberal Democrats to position themselves closer to Labour.
164
 This could be seen as 
belonging to the „quick-fix‟ strategy, (shifting in response to polling rather than in response to 
specific policies), but this time resulted in equidistance - a more centrist, less radical stance.  
Kennedy had around him a close-knit and small team, with pivotal roles played by Chris Rennard, 
and Tim Razzall. The press office was headed up by former BBC journalist David Walter and 
Kennedy relied heavily on his personal office run by Anna Werrin – a set-up one interviewee 
described as his „kitchen cabinet‟ – and one which was very much considered to be his close and 
somewhat closed group of advisors.
165
  The strategy on the ground was to continue to build in 
areas where the party found support, recruiting people on the doorstep, developing networks of 
supporters prepared to keep up the delivery of Focus leaflets, particularly between elections, in the 
knowledge that where the party employed this strategy it had proved successful at the local level 
and with the expectation that, combined with targeting resources, this would translate nationally as 
it had in 1997.   Rennard‟s thinking was in part guided by the success of a by-election in Romsey 
in the previous year, won by Liberal Democrat candidate Sandra Gidley. Private polling conducted 
for the party in Romsey showed that 81% preferred the policy on spending on health and 
education even if that meant tax increases, compared with 17% who preferred a policy to „save the 
pound‟ (a campaigning slogan adopted by the Conservatives) (Rennard 2001). However, what had 
worked in Romsey proved difficult to roll out on a national level.  
 
The strategy, sometimes referred to as „Rennardism‟, however, was for the first time, beginning to 
attract some criticism. The party‟s lack of ideological cohesion was exacerbated by these 
“constituency-based micro-contests” (Russell 2010). Genesis 500 was a consultation paper that 
challenged the thinking on party strategy, prepared by MEP Robin Teverson in May 2002, and 
argued that the existing targeting strategy made a significant breakthrough impossible. The paper 
                                                                    
163  Interview 67, 2011. 
164 Interview 67,   2011.  
165 Interview 32,   2009. 
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explained that the party‟s target seats programme was limiting, since the party‟s financial 
constraints and the number of seats deemed „winnable‟ implied an incredibly long-haul.  It aimed 
instead to “energise” 300 seats to 'winnable' status, while maintaining the current target seat 
strategy, but offering £1000 in incentives and support to those adopting a Genesis 500 status,  and 
aimed to produce a majority Lib Dem government in 2009.  
 
The paper detailed a series of annual goals for each Genesis seat together with an overall three 
year plan including aiming to make constituencies financially „self-sustainable”.  It appears to have 
been a direct challenge to Rennard‟s strategy of incremental growth.  His defence, in an FFAC 
away-day attended by the party elite, hinged on his belief that spreading the load across 300 
constituencies would result in fewer wins, particularly since the subsequent loss of by-election 
trophies won in Eastbourne in 1990 and Newbury and Christchurch in 1993, demonstrated that 
breakthroughs would not translate across the UK at the general election.  He also questioned the 
practicality of building at the local level in the terms set out in Genesis 500, and returned the party 
once more to his powerful, proven target-driven and formulaic „steps to success‟.  Rennard‟s 
overall approach was also criticised by fellow MEP Graham Watson, in particular over which 
policies were emphasised and the decision to play down the party‟s pro-European stance in the 
2004 European parliamentary elections but gathered little backing (Watson 2010). 
 
In 2005 the same strategy was employed, with a targeting calculation aimed to capitalise on areas 
where support was already strong and where a network of leaflet deliverers were in place and had 
been active throughout the electoral calendar.  The campaigning period now included local, 
mayoral, devolved and European elections between UK general elections, making it a constant 
part of party life.  The team continued with Chris Rennard and Tim Razzall at the helm, and with 
the addition of Sandy Walkington, former Director of Public Affairs for British Telecom, as Director 
of Communications.  Walkington undoubtedly brought a more professional edge to the operation, 
but was very much a committed activist at the same time, having been a member of the Liberals 
since 1973, a PPC and local councillor.  
 
This is the election in which more than previously, the targeting strategy and focus-leaflet „carpet-
bombing‟ appeared tired and out-dated.   Rennard, having overseen by-election wins in Brent-East 
and Leicester South, and making significant gains in Birmingham Hodge Hill and Hartlepool, was 
cautious in his own predictions, which were based on the strength of the party on the ground on a 
seat-by-seat basis.  This time the party had garnered support in traditional Labour areas, but found 
difficulty translating this strategy in to success at the national level (Whiteley, Seyd et al. 2006).   It 
was combined with an eye-catching strategy referred to as „decapitation‟ in which the Conservative 
party front-bench were targeted, including leader Michael Howard, Party Chairman Theresa May, 
Oliver Letwin and David Davies, but which failed completely.
166
  The results highlight the paradox 
of the party‟s strategy - while voting consistently against Labour in Parliament, and gaining 
popularity for opposing the Iraq War it adopted a strategy of focusing on areas where they were 
                                                                    
166  Tim Farron was successful in unseating Tim Collins, Shadow Secretary of State for Education and MP for  
 Westmorland and Lonsdale with a majority of 267 votes, which could be considered a small win for the  
decapitation strategy. 
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coming second, combined with „decapitation‟ and targeting Conservatives.   The campaign was 
more effective against Labour, winning Hornsey & Wood Green from the Labour minister Barbara 
Roche, and benefiting from student votes for opposing student tuition fees.
167
 Overall the party 
gained ten seats and a 3.7% rise in the vote. Despite a £2.4m last minute donation by Michael 
Brown, and a significant increase in spending on private polling and billboards, it was felt that the 
party should have targeted differently and done better (Butler and Kavanagh 2005).  Although 
there is evidence that its local support base is what insulates it from the traditional third-party 
squeeze (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005), the party has also benefited from adopting a single-issue 
style of campaigning, in response to the electorate associating it with one issue at a time, most 
obviously education or Iraq.   Arguably, the 2005 general election demonstrated that policy-
orientation rather than locally based campaigning, was most successful.     
 
The tactic was the subject of a significant challenge this time in a paper brought to the party‟s 
Federal Executive in April 2007
168
. This paper stressed that targeting had been a success, and 
had turned a 3% increase in the overall vote to an increase in seats in parliament. However, it also 
criticised the limits of Rennardism, and proposed an alternative strategy that aimed to take power 
by overtaking one of the party‟s two major rivals in a plan for majority government and third party 
breakthrough.   It constituted a direct challenge to those in the party whose strategy was based on 
aiming instead at playing a pivotal role in a future hung parliament as the party‟s best chance at 
power and electoral reform.   The paper was discussed and formed part of a longer submission to 
the Bones Commission, which rejected this view in favour of its stated goal, to target 200 seats 
and break the two party hegemony in two elections time.      
 
2010 
 
Between 2005 and 2010 the Liberal Democrats underwent some important changes at the elite 
level, with a new party leader, new CEO, new campaigns director, and various new strategies set 
out in the Bones Commission.  Regarding campaigns, the Commission aimed to address the 
complaint by ordinary members that joining the party was like “joining a leaflet delivery cult”. 169  At 
the same time, some senior figures in the party thought it was time to challenge the party‟s general 
election strategy of targeting and incremental growth.  There was a shift in emphasis, as it was 
acknowledged that Kennedy‟s realignment had failed and Labour were increasingly unpopular. 
Clegg, seeing the increasing potential for a hung parliament, made every effort to establish 
equidistance – leaving the door open to doing a deal with whichever party had the majority of 
seats. He appears to have seized an historic opportunity and rather than moving away from the 
long-term strategy adopted by Kennedy and Rennard, continued with targeting at the constituency 
level, while aiming for influence in government as a junior coalition partner.  This was very much 
the „quick-fix‟ strategy and can be seen here, and in the preceding chapter where negotiations 
over the party manifesto are discussed.   It also marks the shift from policy-maximising to office-
                                                                    
167 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/lib-dems-hold-inquest-after-their-decapitation-strategy-  
misses-targets-489833.html (accessed 10.02.2011). 
168 This paper was brought to FE by MEP Robin Teverson, who made a further similar contribution about the  
party‟s targeting strategy, to the Bones Commission. 
169
  The Bones Commission p14. 
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maximising, with the  leadership making every effort to avoid being tied to policies that might make 
future negotiation with either party, difficult. 
 
The campaign itself was conducted by a new team put together by Clegg including Chair of the 
General Election Campaign and former Managing Director at Saatchi and Saatchi, John Sharkey, 
with former local government leader and former chief whip, Andrew Stunnell as Vice-Chair.  Danny 
Alexander, Clegg‟s Chief of Staff, produced the manifesto, Chris Fox was in post as the Chief 
Executive, Hilary Stephenson as the Director of Campaigns and Jonny Oates as Director of 
Communications.
170
 The televised debates made this an atypical contest, resting heavily on these 
events, in which Clegg excelled, and his strategy of equidistance was put to the test with constant 
public overtures by Cameron (as well as Brown), repeatedly „agreeing with Nick‟.   The party 
surged in the polls with Clegg coming top out of the three leaders following the first debate.
171
  
Although performing strongly in the second, and again topping the poll in the third and final debate, 
Clegg‟s popularity failed to transfer into votes, and the party lost five seats overall.  What the 
television debates did, however, was put in to sharp focus the power of the individual leader over 
the party itself and almost certainly strengthened Clegg‟s hand in the negotiations that followed - 
something considered more closely in Chapter 9.  On the ground, the party had pursued the 
„Northern strategy‟, a targeting tactic aimed at making greater headway in to Labour heartlands, in 
a development of the party‟s success in areas such as Liverpool at the local level. The „northern 
offensive, southern defensive‟.172 campaign failed (Kavanagh and Cowley 2010) perhaps in part 
due to the fact that most tried and tested electioneering techniques were completely 
overshadowed by the TV debates, Clegg‟s success at which put the party and its policies under 
greater scrutiny. 
 
In each of the general elections described above the party, directed by the campaigns department 
and (with the exception of 2010), led by Chris Rennard, followed a carefully honed targeting 
strategy. Challenges to this have come from those that believed a national breakthrough was 
possible and preferable, but have consistently found little support. It is logical therefore to conclude 
that the alternative, that of the „quick-fix‟, of the smaller partner in a hung parliament, has been the 
party‟s most realistic chance at gaining power, and has recently become the basis for its strategy. 
 
iii) The Campaigns Department 
 
The Campaigns Department at Party Headquarters suffered the heaviest blow in the mass 
redundancies that followed merger in 1988.   Although the new party began with a full complement 
of staff the results of the 1989 European Parliamentary elections, in which the party polled 6% of 
the vote coming fourth to the Green Party and failed to win a single seat, confirmed a dip in 
support, resulting in falling membership figures and dwindling income, and prompted a severe cut 
                                                                    
170  http://www.libdemvoice.org/liberal-democrat-general-election-team-announced-15826.html (accessed  
17.11.2011). 
171  Leaving aside your own party preference, who do you think performed best overall in tonight's debate?    
Nick Clegg: 51%,  David Cameron: 29%,  Gordon Brown: 19%, Don't know: 2%.  
http://www.suite101.com/content/uk-general-election-2010-who-won-the-leadersdebate-a226259 (accessed 
31.03.2011).  
172  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/06/nick-clegg-liberal-democrats-election (accessed  
10.02.2011). 
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in staffing levels.   In 1989 a campaigns team of 13 staff, comprising 11 area agents and two staff 
at Headquarters had been reduced to just one, Chris Rennard, who became Director of 
Campaigns and Elections.
173
  In October 1990 the Department recruited one additional member of 
staff, and in 1992 a further member of staff specifically to deal with candidates.
174
 At that time the 
department was line-managed by the General Secretary Graham Elson, until the „Mid-Term 
Review‟, a wide-ranging review of party staffing arrangements conducted in 1997, which removed 
this responsibility from Elson, in order that the Director of Campaigns reported in to the Chair of 
the party‟s Campaigns and Communications Committee instead.   The Mid-Term Review was the 
point at which the party acknowledged the need to run a professional Headquarters, „topped-up” 
rather than run by volunteers, and that the integration of the „air-war‟ and „ground-war‟ would be 
the best way to blend the grassroots with professional campaigning.  A more thorough assessment 
of the Mid-Term Review is conducted in Chapter 7.  This shift in management structure does, 
however, indicate the significance of the role of Director of Campaigns following the 1997 general 
election.  In particular in recognition of the success of his targeting strategy, Chris Rennard 
became the „Chief Executive of Campaigns‟ and a new CEO was appointed to run the 
administration and human resources function.  The 1997 result was accompanied by an increase 
in funds, as Short Money alleviated some pressures on the party‟s research and press function, 
and allowed for an improvement in IT. 
 
In its day-to-day operation the campaigns team comprised two major strands, the first was staying 
abreast of election developments and information drawn from the local level using private polling.   
The second was devising a strategy based on this information, including 
 
- deciding  which would be target seats and how to build them 
- the literature for target seats, including „messaging‟ 
- agents for target seats 
- training, particularly of constituency agents 
- agreeing detail on the manifesto
175
 
 
In 1997, 2001 and 2005 the Campaigns Department had a very hands-on role in recommending 
items be removed if they had little or no campaigning potential, such as policy on Europe and 
electoral reform in 1997, and focusing instead on a penny on income tax to fund education, and 
then to fund the NHS, coming up with the „CHEESE‟, the acronym by which the 97 policy priorities 
became known.
176
  The Campaigns Department commissioned private polling to establish the 
popularity of policy positions and in 1997, then increasingly in 2001 and 2005, and this became the 
basis upon which the party message was based. Polling was met by Des Wilson in 1992 with 
some skepticism, but with the addition of polling advisor Julian Ingram in 1997, gradually began to 
inform the party‟s message (Grender and Parminter 2007).  Again this tactic, in spite of some 
reservations, particularly from Alan Beith in 1992, and some reticence from Richard Holme in 
                                                                    
173 Interview 44,   2009. 
174 The candidates officer worked in and with the campaigns department, but was appointed by and  
accountable to the Joint State Candidates Committee.  
175  Interview 44,   2011. 
176  See chapter 5 for more information on CHEESE and the party manifestos. 
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1997, shows the increasing authority of Chris Rennard and, in 2001 and 2005, Tim Razzall, both 
of whom were strong advocates of the polling-led strategy.     
 
Private Polling 
 
Julian Ingram, a long-term party member and advertising professional, was brought in to help the 
campaigns department understand voter priorities.  In the build-up to the 1997 general election 
Ingram, together with research company JSK, devised and conducted a series of polls in target 
seats and held seats that the party considered to be marginal.    The approach involved scrapping 
the use of focus groups to gather information and replacing them with polling data.    The polling 
strategy was aimed at vote maximising and followed a number of steps.  Firstly it aimed to 
establish respondents „propensity and intention‟, in order to establish a sample of floating voters.   
These were then asked a standard panel of voting intention questions, including whether they 
could name their MP, and tactical voting intentions. Polling data was collected from a sample of 
voters derived from the party‟s centrally held database known as EARS (Election Agent Record 
System), which was developed in the mid 1980s.  This data is taken from the electoral register and 
amended by individual parties using their own canvass returns.
177
   A usual sample comprised 
1000-1200 voters, and with the advent of the internet has become increasingly sophisticated, and 
in 2010 the polling data was collected entirely online.   Respondents were also asked to respond 
on the importance of specific issues, in 1997 for instance, on the “1 penny for education” policy. 
Polling in this instance revealed that the majority of voters thought this meant they would pay an 
extra penny for education, rather than that it represented an overall increase of 1% on income 
tax.
178
   The party were therefore able to make use of the data in a number of ways including how 
best to communicate policy, and to understand the electorate‟s preferences in more detail. 
 
Between elections, the campaign department advocated building local campaigns with the use of 
easy-to-read tabloid-style „Focus‟ leaflets, that should be put through as many letter boxes as 
possible, as often as possible.  Estimates from the party in 2011 were that locally produced Focus 
leaflets reached approximately 10 million UK households.  The Candidates Officer would oversee 
the selection and training of parliamentary candidates and to produce a directory for the press of 
all PPCs in the run-up to the general election.   During by-elections the entire operation would stop 
and focus on that, often closing down at Cowley Street in London and decamping to a makeshift 
Headquarters in the constituency.  
 
The „air-war‟ was activity concerned with communicating the party‟s message at the national level, 
and began in earnest in 1992 under Des Wilson.  It involved producing a grid of media interviews, 
coordinating this with a campaigns-based set of press-briefings each morning, press releases and 
overseeing party political broadcasts.   These would often focus on themes chosen from the 
manifesto although often press briefings would revert to asking for the Lib Dem‟s reaction to a 
story or event introduced by the other parties.. Here Chris Rennard also had an input, scripting 
some broadcasts and producing information based on his own research about the popularity of 
                                                                    
177  Interview 68,  2011. 
178  Interview 67,   2011.  
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certain issues and how they should be communicated. The „air-war‟ was, however, largely the 
responsibility of the party‟s Director of Communications and Director of the General Election 
campaign.   In common with its rivals, the party adopted a strategy of increasingly „market 
orientated‟ Party Election Broadcasts, using personalities, music, short clips and in particular an 
emphasis on issues with which it was positively associated (Gunter, Saltzis et al. 2006).   The 
increased use of the party leader in political marketing is in keeping with a common strategy 
toward presidentialisation and party adaptation (Farrell and Webb 2000). 
 
New Media 
 
Opinions over the impact of new media on the party vary from those that believe it has been 
minimal to those that believe the party has failed to maximise its potential.  Discussion sites such 
as CIX, Lib Dem Voice and others provide a place for members to exchange opinions, or to let off 
steam.  The party, however, are clear that “within an era of the permanent campaign …the prime 
purpose of communication is to help win elections, or to acquire resources (money, helpers) which 
will in turn be used to gain votes” (Lilleker, Pack et al. 2010).  While it is clear the party is ahead in 
terms of using email to communicate with members, and has embraced new technology with 
website updates and a useful intranet, party strategists believe that overall the new media has had 
little impact on the vote.  The central party began systematic electronic communication with 
members in 2000.
179
 Following the 2001 general election the party saw 180,000 hits on its website, 
and concluded this was a small number compared to the overall electorate, and probably 
represented journalists and party members.
180
  The internet has been included in overall party 
strategy largely as a tool for communications internally, with candidates and members, via its intra-
net, to provide briefings and information.  The party has brought its blogging community together 
under one banner, „Lib Dem Voice‟ which launched in August 2006.  Thus far 573 people have 
written a blog post for the site although the majority have only written one, while its two most 
regular contributors write daily.
181
  Obtaining an overall picture of the impact of blogging is difficult, 
since mentions of the Liberal Democrats in non-party blogging sites are numerous. This is also the 
same for social networking cites such as Facebook, and Twitter, although the party supposedly 
tops its rivals with 23 of its MPs using Twitter, representing 37% of the parliamentary party.
182
  The 
advent of social networking is significant in enabling the party to customise its message at election 
times, particularly in order to make best use of polling data, which is immediate, compared with 
printed media that requires a three week lead time.
183
   The party were, for instance, able to make 
immediate use of online feedback to Nick Clegg‟s performance in the 2010 live TV  leadership 
debates. 
 
The Party Reform („Bones‟) Commission dedicated a section to „technology, databases and 
innovation‟ and throughout the report refers to the use of new media to help the party realise its 
goals.   EARs was criticised and thought to be incapable of supporting its goal towards more 
                                                                    
179  Interview 66,   2011. 
180  Interview 44,   2011. 
181  Mark Pack (2722) and Stephen Tall (2292) are Lib Dem Voice‟s most regular contributors (February 2011) 
182  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8479000.stm (accessed 15.02.2011) 
183  Interview 67,  2011. 
118 
 
 
MPs.
184
  The Commission recommended the party‟s use of technology be better integrated, to 
increase the party‟s use of phone-banks for canvassing, and that FE appoint at „technology board‟ 
to report in to COG and review these provisions further.  The Bones Commission recommended 
the party appeal to its members for those with professional expertise in this area, and meetings 
were convened, led by Lynne Featherstone, as Chair of the Technology Board.  It was, according 
to one member of staff “completely useless. They brought them all together, and thought they‟d 
meet and agree. I can‟t think of a worse strategy for getting anything done”.185  The Technology 
Board appears to have been largely dormant since 2009. 
 
A number of interviewees acknowledged that new media has enabled them to access information 
more easily, however, particularly parliamentary candidates making use of the PCA (Parliamentary 
Candidates Association) website, Huddle, and the main party website intranet.  Here activists are 
able to access a wealth of information on policy, campaign messages derived from polling, tactics 
and methods, although some have complained that it is difficult to navigate.
186
   The use of 
centrally generated press-releases, with minor alterations aimed at „localising‟ the campaign have 
also recently come under criticism accused of „churnalism‟. 187  ALDC have a separate website 
specifically dedicated to attracting potential local candidates which is thought to be a very useful 
tool in local campaigning and in the activity of council work.
188
   In conclusion, then, the new media 
has opened up opportunities for party activists, providing campaign tools and information from 
central sources.  Its impact on the electorate is thought, by them, to be of less significance.  
 
iv)   Candidates 
 
One key area in which the interests of ordinary party members is recognised is through the 
selection of party candidates.  It is an important area where autonomy can be exercised and intra-
party power assessed.  Appendix I sets out the party‟s process for people wishing to become 
candidates which is open to any party member, who then has to satisfy a series of approval 
procedures before going forward to a selection panel.  There are three areas in which the selection 
of party candidates is interesting to this study. The first is that changes have been made to the 
process by which candidates are approved which represent a professionalizing of the party 
machine.  Secondly, the rules governing the selection process change when a parliamentary by-
election is called giving significantly more central control.  Thirdly, while this research reveals little 
or no interference from the top in the selection of candidates, it does reveal involvement of a 
different nature in the pursuit of diversity by the party‟s Committee for Gender Balance.  
 
Potential candidates are required to satisfy a process of approval and selection before becoming a 
PPC.  This is the responsibility of the state parties, for instance in the case of candidates in 
England, the English Candidates Committee. All parliamentary candidates are invited to join the 
                                                                    
184  In July 2011 the party announced the decision to replace using EARS with the more up-to-date VAN  
database package used by the Democratic Party in the USA. 
http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=4761a1f83089fd89eba4fef19&id=804ef22f9b&e=d58ae78154 (accessed 
05.07.2011) 
185   Interview 54, 2010. 
186  Interview 41, 2011. 
187  http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/feb/23/churnalism-pr-media-trust (accessed 24.02.2011). 
188  http://www.bealibdemcouncillor.org.uk/ (accessed 24.02.2011). 
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Parliamentary Candidates Association which offers support to those already selected.  The 
process devised by the party at the outset was lengthy and slow, requiring candidates to complete 
a 64 page form and assess themselves on the basis of 52 difference „competencies‟. This process 
was conducted before potential candidates had undergone any kind of training but was used to 
assess their suitability, which was then tested further before a selection panel which comprised 
eight people, including some from outside the constituency, and on average took a whole day to 
approve four candidates. The process was reviewed as part of the Bones Commission and 
streamlined, with new rules coming in to force in 2008 whereby candidates would offered pre-
assessment training. Its overall goal was to „improve the pool of candidates who…come from a 
range of backgrounds”. It specifically noted “..rather than those who have „proved themselves‟ 
through delivering millions of leaflets or serving for years as a local councillor” (Bones Commission 
p58).  The process was accelerated, and aims to approve eight candidates in a day, with a 
streamlined panel of four individuals.  The number of „competencies‟ a candidate is required to 
possess was reduced to six, now comprising: 
 
- Communication Skills 
- Leadership 
- Strategic Thinking and Judgment 
- Representing People 
- Resilience 
- Values in Action 
 
The conference also passed a motion to reduce the length of time a candidate had to have been a 
party member, from one year to nine months.  One interviewee suggested that there is a move 
within the party to reduce this further in order to encourage party sympathisers to put themselves 
forward and to drop the membership requirement altogether.
189
   Once the local party have 
selected their PPC, the candidate is then encouraged to attend a number of training events 
organised through the various party regions, and also conducted and at the party‟s twice yearly 
federal conferences.  The party has devised a website „Lib Dems 4 Parliament‟ that operates an 
intranet for those involved in the approval and selection of Parliamentary and Welsh Assembly 
candidates (http://www.libdems4parliament.org.uk/), which is only accessible to party members 
and includes a download site where PPCs can obtain campaigning material and advice.    Those 
wishing to become candidates are offered training, free to all candidates at the party‟s twice yearly 
federal conference and membership of the PCA (Parliamentary Candidates Association) which 
provides members with an intranet for “campaigning information, constituency profiles, the swing 
seat database, and a steadily growing body of expertise on all things candidate related”.190  
Similarly ALDC provides members with an intranet for both local candidates and councilors, 
including campaigning material, news feeds, election results and advice for those in office.  In 
2009 an alternative website „ACT‟ was set up by the party, and run from Cowley Street, to 
encourage members, candidates, councillors and importantly non-members, to join in with specific 
campaigns. Local campaigners, including sitting MPs, and interest groups are urged to join and 
encourage campaigning activity through discussion and membership, similarly to „Flock Together‟ 
                                                                    
189  Interview 15,  2009. 
190  http://www.parliamentary.org.uk/tikiwiki/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=1 (accessed 24.02.2011). 
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described in Chapter 3. Both are linked to Facebook and Twitter, as well as the party‟s own intra-
net and sharing site „Huddle‟.   
 
Further reforms proposed by the Bones Commission included raising the morale of PPCs by 
encouraging meetings with members of the Shadow Cabinet (p59) and “implementing a cultural 
shift” to demonstrate the value of candidates‟ professional achievements “as well as any previous 
role they may or may not have had as a local activist  of party official” (p60).   The Commission 
also proposed a „ leadership Academy‟ to improve on and formalise the training of MPs, PPC, staff 
and volunteers, to be led by a „Capability Board‟ and to be accountable to COG.  With regard to 
campaigning the Commission is clear in its tone, moving explicitly away from the volunteer-activist 
culture toward a more professional party, indeed it refers to the „volunteer party‟ and the 
„professional party‟ as two separate entities and arguably gives preference to the latter. It is also 
ambitious in introducing a significant number of new processes that have, early indications 
suggest, enjoyed varying degrees of success. The approval process has undoubtedly been 
accelerated although proposals to achieve greater diversity in the candidate pool is a more long-
term goal and dependent on other factors, such as overall levels of party support, to be successful.  
 
When a parliamentary by-election is called the approval and selection process changes under a 
special „protocol‟. Due to the nature of by-elections, which puts the media spotlight on an individual 
constituency, the party has devised a different process for the selection of candidates. If a 
candidate already exists in the given constituency they are effectively stood-down and made to 
reapply together with other approved candidates, and go through a two-step selection process. 
The first step is for approved candidates to go before a local selection panel, and a specially 
appointed Returning Officer, who draw up a short-list based upon “the by-election selection 
criteria”.191   The short listed candidates are interviewed by a by-election panel at Party HQ that 
comprises: 
 
 
- Chair or Vice Chair of ECC 
- An MP (preferably one that has fought a by-election) 
- Regional Candidates Co-ordinator (or nominee) 
- Director of Campaigns (or nominee). 
 
The panel vote, giving the Chair a casting vote in the event of a tie.  Successful candidates are 
then invited to attend a local hustings at which all local party members will be entitled to vote, 
where proxy and postal votes are not provided, and the outcome of which cannot be subject to 
appeal.  This process enables a short-list to be agreed by the party elite and is open to 
interference as the mini case-studies below demonstrate. 
 
 
In common with other parties the Liberal Democrats have a male-dominated parliamentary party, 
                                                                    
191  See „Protocol for selection a Parliamentary by-election candidate” English Parliamentary Candidates  
 Office, No 8. 
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and have made various attempts to reverse this trend, including heated conference debates which 
rejected all-women short-lists,  „zipping‟ in the 1999 European parliamentary elections and other 
gender-balance strategies
192
.  
 
Table 12.    Women Liberal Democrat MPs in general elections since 1992.
193
 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Women n 2 3  5 10 7 
Men n 18 43 47 52 50 
Women % 11 7 11 19 14 
Men % 89 93 89 81 86 
 
This reflects a male-dominated list of approved candidates, (in 2007 the party‟s approved list of 
candidates comprised a total of 24.59% women), and a bias in selection that appears to favour 
male candidates (Evans 2008).  The party set up the CGB – the Campaign for Gender Balance 
(formerly the Gender Balance Task Force) at the federal conference in 2001.  This works towards 
improving the representation of women by “seeking out, training, mentoring and providing practical 
support to women candidates”.194 Its progress means the party has more women coming forward 
as candidates, and that these are selected in greater numbers, but the ratio of women to men 
reduces upon closer scrutiny of the party‟s target seats, resulting in ongoing gender bias in the 
parliamentary party.  The Bones Commission made recommendations to increase the diversity of 
the candidates pool, particularly by offering financial support to parties adopting candidates from 
ethnic minorities but made no specific mention of addressing gender balance. 
 
What follows is a series of mini-case studies based upon candidate selection in seats which 
interviewees believed were worthy of special mention. They help to build a picture of the party‟s 
approach to certain issues that arise in candidate selection, particularly with regard to by-elections: 
 
Constituency case-studies 
 
Tatton 1997 
 
The decision by Liberal Democrats and Labour to stand down candidates in Neil Hamilton‟s former 
constituency of Tatton demonstrates a further way in which influence can be brought to bear on 
decisions that formally rest with the local party.  According to interviewees the Liberal Democrat 
and Labour senior staff had come up with a plan that would show them in the best possible light, 
uniting behind a single candidate designed to highlight Hamilton‟s alleged corruption.  Martin Bell 
read about this, and contacted the parties, putting himself forward. The PPC was already in place 
and the local party were unhappy at being asked to stand down their popular local man (Ashdown 
2000).  Senior party staff drove to the constituency with Martin Bell in an attempt to sell the 
                                                                    
192 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/the-big-question-are-allwomen-shortlists-the-best-way-to-achieve-
equality-in-parliament-412987.html (accessed 11.07.11) 
193  http://www.ukpolitical.info/FemaleMPs.htm (accessed 11.02.2011). 
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proposal, and explained that since Labour would only co-operate with the plans with a candidate 
like Bell, and without him would revert back to a regular fight, which they were more likely to win, 
the Lib Dem candidate capitulated.  The Executive voted 5-4 in favour of stepping aside, under 
pressure from the central party.
195
  
 
Yeovil 2001 
 
Paddy Ashdown‟s decision to stand down as Liberal Democrat Leader and MP in 1999 triggered 
an interesting search for a PPC in a seat which was considered one of the party‟s safest.  The 
party‟s decision to select David Laws was met with consternation among pro-gender balance 
activists, who considered it a prime opportunity to field a female candidate.
196
 Some in the party 
pointed to the circumstances that favoured a personally wealthy man, without family commitments, 
such as Laws,  who was able to move to the constituency and campaign from the start compared 
with, for instance, a working woman with a family, who would be unable to offer the party such 
resources.
197
  
 
Hartlepool 2004 
 
Frustrated at the slow progress of CGB progress there is evidence from interviews that suggests 
CGB began to exercise more radical behind-the-scenes methods to ensure women were put 
forward for winnable seats.  When Peter Mandelson became the UK‟s European Commissioner in 
September 2004 the by-election of his Parliamentary constituency of Hartlepool was called. The 
Liberal Democrats followed their agreed procedure and began inviting approved candidates to put 
themselves forward for approval.   Previous PPC, local boy and the party‟s Federal Treasurer, Reg 
Clark, put himself forward and together with five other candidates went through the party‟s 
screening process by a panel convened at party Headquarters. The panel agreed that only two of 
the prospective six approved candidates passed the protocol, and Clark was rejected on the 
grounds of having insufficient knowledge of party policy, thought by some to be an extraordinary 
situation given his prominent position as elected federal treasurer.
198
 The candidates that went 
before the local party hustings were a less well known local candidate and a dynamic, educated, 
media-friendly mother of four from Surrey, Jody Dunn, who was selected. The decision to reject 
Clark came as a surprise to many and was described as a „coup‟ by the CGB. More conspiratorial 
accounts suggest the decision represented a personal attack on Clark who was a controversial 
figure in the party (see p146), but the preparations to launch his candidacy outside his family home 
in the constituency the following day by the party‟s senior press team, suggest the decision came 
as a genuine shock.   
Richmond Park 2005 
                                                                    
195  Interview 44,   2009. 
196  Interview 15,   2009. 
197   In 2010, just 22 days after agreeing the coalition and taking his place in government, Laws‟ long-term  
relationship with Jamie Lundie was revealed, and called in to the question whether some of his  expense  
claims were permissible. Laws then resigned. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/7780642/MPs-Expenses-Treasury-chief-David-Laws-his-secret-lover-and-a-40000-claim.html 
(accessed 31.03.2011). Until this point his sexuality and private life had been kept outside of the public domain 
since the beginning of his political career in 1999. 
198  Interview 13, 2009. 
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There is evidence of interference in the process involving the timing of a by-election, for instance 
ensuring that Jenny Tongue‟s decision to stand-down from her parliamentary seat in Richmond 
Park was timed to coincide with the end of Susan Kramer‟s campaign in the London Mayoral 
contest, in order to give her an opportunity to put herself forward. Kramer won the nomination and 
the seat in 2005.
199
  
 
Cardiff Central 2005 
 
With two suitable candidates dividing the local party in the target seat of Cardiff Central, a third 
„uniting‟ candidate was actively sought out, and Jenny Willott was encouraged by senior figures in 
the party, to put herself forward.   Although living in London at the time, Willott was encouraged by 
senior party figures, to move to Cardiff in 2000 where she then secured the nomination and won 
the seat in 2005.
200
  
 
Each of these mini case-studies indicates that pressure can be brought to bear on the local party, 
the selection process, the timetable, the approvals process and the hustings, by those with a 
particular interest.  It was not possible to find one example of direct interference in candidate 
selection by the party elite, but there is plenty of evidence that communication, political skill, party 
resources and expertise can be utilised order to manipulate the outcome.  
 
v)  The rise and fall of Chris Rennard 
 
Chris Rennard is synonymous with Liberal Democrat campaigns.  He has known no other 
employer but the party, and worked as Director of Campaigns from 1988 to 2003 then Chief 
Executive at party HQ in Cowley Street, until his resignation in 2009.
201
   Despite the fact that the 
campaign strategy worked well in 1992 and 1997, it achieved less success in 2001 and 2005, yet 
Rennard himself, almost single-handedly responsible for campaign strategy between 1988 and 
2009, was able to reach a position within the organisation that at times eclipsed even the party 
leader.  An assessment of his individual contribution to the party is worthy of special mention, 
since it appears his role has been somewhat underestimated in the literature to date.  Rennard‟s 
rise to prominence is one that reflects the party‟s twin-track approach to the modernising of party 
activity; attempting to bring about success and efficiency, while maintaining an active grassroots 
base. It may also be in part responsible for triggering a counter-tactic funded by those closely 
associated with The Orange Book, whom, it is argued, formed the dominant coalition in recent 
years (see Chapter 9). 
 
Rennard‟s significant power in the organisation was recognised by Russell & Fieldhouse in 2005, 
whose series of interviews with party officials revealed that strategic strength had been 
accumulated by the Director of Campaigns, since between 1988 and 2001 it appeared that party 
                                                                    
199  Interview 44,   2009. 
200  Interview 44,   2009. 
201  Chris Rennard is now a Lib Dem working peer. 
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owed its survival, through by-election victories, significant growth at the local level and incremental 
growth at Westminster, to him (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005 p74-75).  This is all the more 
important when seen together with a number of examples that demonstrate how over the years the 
party to some extent sacrificed the importance of policy to the importance of campaigns (see 
Chapter 5). 
 
Rennard began working for the party in 1982 as an election agent and pioneered the party‟s tactic 
of local issue campaigning through Focus leaflets, a method that began at the local level, involving 
close co-operation with ALC, then ALDC, involving workshops and the production of campaign 
manuals.   The tactic involved producing tabloid-style leaflets that focused on issues drawn from 
comments from local people, which were turned in to campaigning points for party candidates.  His 
steadying hand in the immediate post-merger years in the one-man Campaigns Department, 
bought him much respect and gratitude, and with the sensational by-election victories of the early 
1990s that he was able to both predict and deliver, led him to become the trusted advisor and 
confidante of the party elite. He is renowned for his ability to recall election facts, demonstrating 
political insight and an ability to conduct successful campaigns.  The dominant image of Rennard 
was of a committed party activist, with an unswerving self-belief, to whom the party owed a debt of 
gratitude, but interviewees were also critical of his failure to see a bigger picture for the party 
beyond that of incremental wins.   Ashdown recalls that Rennard was opposed to his project with 
Labour in 1998, fearing that it could split the party, damaging his preferred strategy of gradual 
growth and of consistently ruling out co-operation with political opponents (Ashdown 2000; 
Ashdown 2001).  He also recalls, for instance, Rennard sending him a fax prior to the Eastbourne 
by-election, where Ashdown preferred not to stand a candidate out of respect to murdered Tory 
MP Ian Gow,   in which he was reprimanded by the Campaigns Director for not discussing the 
decision with him (Ashdown 2001). The tone of the fax, Ashdown recalled, “could have got him 
sacked”, but Rennard won the argument, and the Lib Dems won the by-election. 
 
Following the chaotic period immediately post-merger, when overall responsibility for 
Headquarters was shared between Andy Ellis and Archy Kirkwood, the first long-term General 
Secretary, Graham Elson, was appointed. Elson was invited to take up the post, which was not 
advertised, was first suggested as a result of friendship with other senior people in the party, and 
involved facing an interview panel of over 20 individuals convened at very short notice.
202
 He was 
appointed in July 1989 and was said to have enjoyed a relatively straightforward relationship with 
others at Cowley Street overseeing the formalisation of various departments and procedures. His 
successor Elizabeth Pamplin was appointed, again without the post being formally advertised, 
and, as a human resources specialist, was said to have been selected in order to take a more 
hands-on approach to the party‟s recruitment procedures.  Pamplin‟s was an unsuccessful and 
short-term appointment and was shortly followed by Hugh Rickard, whose hire was the culmination 
of a more professional process, involving external recruitment specialists. Rickard had 
management and personnel experience as Rear Admiral in the Navy, and was also a committed 
long-term party sympathiser. His term at the helm is described by insiders as „fraught‟, eclipsed by 
                                                                    
202  Interview 17,   2010. 
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the Director of Campaigns whose independent power-base was now highly significant. One insider 
explained that as Rennard‟s reputation for being able to deliver success to the party grew, so his 
control over resources grew also.  In particular Rennard was the person with whom the final 
decisions associated with resources to target seats rested, and those target seats would then be in 
receipt of a greater support than that afforded non-target seats.  He was able to hire and fire 
campaigns personnel, which was done without an overall human resources strategy, building up 
staff in regional bases, then laying them all off after a general election.  Power within the party at 
HQ therefore centralised around the distribution of resources to target seats, giving significant 
influence to the Director of Campaigns. Rickard was replaced by Rennard - in part an 
acknowledgement of the fact that it was impossible for anybody else to run Headquarters and 
expect him and his Department to fall in to line.
203
    
 
The potential difficulties over the appointment of Rennard to CEO were discussed at a meeting of 
the FE in September 2003, and the decision was voted upon.  Some 20 were in favour, four 
abstained and five voted against, citing a potential a lack of management experience and narrow 
skill base.  Although incomparably knowledgeable about the party, Rennard had no experience 
outside the Lib Dems. Despite his vast knowledge of Lib Dem campaigning and election results, 
his appointment was the championing of the grassroots campaigner.  The appointment was largely 
popular, and the party then appointed a new Director of Campaigns, Paul Rainger, and created a 
new post „HQ Director‟, taken up by Ben Stoneham, in order to carry out the day-to-day 
management of party business, leaving Chris Rennard as CEO to concentrate on bigger picture 
political and campaigning priorities. A number of interviewees spoke of the need to win Rennard 
over, or ensure his support before they could realistically expect to have the support of others in 
the party elite, including the leader.
204
 One senior politician explained: 
 
I found it amazing that this character, Rennard, had this influence…..in a party that was 
the most democratic in Western Europe.  So there was the paradox of somebody 
spending money without accountability and campaigning, who was completely 
uncontrolled. (Interview 29, 2009). 
 
The 2005 general election is described by a number of interviewees as the moment when it 
became apparent that the role of CEO was less well suited to Rennard, whose strategy and style 
were beginning to be out of step with the rest of the party.  This is a reflection of a number of 
factors.  Firstly, his approach to campaigning was thought to be becoming over- zealous.  One 
described a heated discussion over putting certain policy items in the 2005 manifesto which 
Rennard opposed on the grounds they were not good campaigning points; upon being bound by 
the decision of FPC, he reproduced the draft document with the new item included, but in 
indecipherably small print.
205
 Secondly, the role of the CEO was improperly defined.  Kennedy was 
unprepared and unwilling to remove Rennard from his post, although some insiders pointed to 
difficulty finding the formal means by which to do this.  Ming Campbell attempted to rectify this with 
                                                                    
203  Interview 27,   2010. 
204  Interview 49,   2009 and Interview 24, 2009. 
205  Interview 10,   2009. 
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an exchange of letters that attempted to „contract‟ Rennard to oversee campaigning at the 
forthcoming general election. Even though it was in the position he wanted, the move represented 
restraint and the formalising of his position through a binding employment contract, and was never 
signed.
206
 One parliamentarian described how they were unsure how to “bell the cat” 207, and it 
was, according to one source, this, that Nick Clegg had in mind when commissioning Chris Bones 
to conduct a thorough review of the party‟s internal workings.208  
 
He [Rennard] was an independent power-base which was not something the constitution 
had envisaged.  (Interview 25, 2009).
  
 
 
Thirdly, there is some evidence that HQ was resistant to the advice of professionals and 
consultants. This is considered more fully in Chapter 7 on Resources, however, it is interesting to 
note that contrary to common perceptions, it appears to be Rennard‟s commitment to „believers‟ 
and party bureaucrats, and his suspicion of „careerists‟, that characterise a lack of 
professionalisation.  Rennard was described as a „specialist‟ and someone that understood a 
formula that worked and refused to be flexible about campaigning methods or listen to the ideas of 
others. Having never been employed other than by the party he would not be considered a 
professional in the widely deployed sense of the term regarding party organisation.   Fourthly, the 
party put too much faith and too much power in the hands of one individual. Some interviewees 
criticised the decision to ring-fence campaign budgets in theory to “keep the sticky hands of the 
party activists off the brass” 209 but which removed accountability for its spending outside of the 
usual channels, including FFAC, and giving yet more control to the Director of Campaigns.  Finally, 
the CEO‟s own assessments of the 2001 and 2005 elections are that they were both success 
stories of which the party could be proud (Rennard 2001; Rennard 2005), putting his ambitions at 
odds with some of his parliamentary colleagues.  Those critical of Cowley Street describe a 
“pervading culture of martyrdom” 210, although others blame the Kennedy  leadership for allowing a 
strong dual power-base to develop in the first place.
211
   
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was swelling criticism of the impact which the now 
entrenched targeting strategy began to have on grassroots members. One activist explained: 
 
Conference training sessions explain the „winning formula‟. Ordinary members now don‟t 
want to be as proactive as they were. They‟re becoming de-skilled….they‟re just asked for 
money. Campaigns control the money and candidates have to do as they‟re told. 
(Interview 15, 2009). 
 
 
This suggests that even though party HQ was very much championed by an activist-led 
                                                                    
206  Interview 29,  2009. 
207  Interview 5,   2009 – an expression taken to mean to reign someone in that was acting without sufficient  
 accountability. 
208  Interview 15,   2009. 
209  Interview 64,   2009.  
210  Interivew 25,   2010.  In this context „martyrdom‟ would mean one of working long and sometimes  
unreasonable hours, for relatively low-pay in support of the party or „cause‟. In addition this could also  
mean a closing of ranks against anyone that challenged these conditions.  
211  Interview 40,   2009. 
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campaigns department, resisting the excesses of „careerist‟ or professionalising tendencies,  
control over strategy and the party purse-strings led to it becoming inevitably more centralised.    
 
vi) Conclusion 
  
This chapter has examined the main ideas that inform the Lib Dem‟s campaigning strategy. 
Campaigning is the activity that connects ordinary members to the party machine, in the case of 
the Liberal Democrats, in significant numbers. It is fair to say that the party has, until holding 
national office in 2010, seen itself as primarily a campaigning organisation.  With regard to this the 
party has experienced change at three levels of the party hierarchy.    Firstly, on the ground the 
party‟s campaigning methods have become more systematic and while not directly centrally 
controlled, increasingly based on a standardising template designed at Headquarters.  Local 
parties are now offered extensive campaigns training in how to produce appropriate campaign 
literature. The growth of the internet, and the party intranet has connected local and regional 
parties to centralise resources such as the PCA website and Huddle, which provide information, a 
consistent message and a coherent campaigning method to grassroots members. Once in place, 
this overall connectedness has an impact on the work done by ordinary members and party 
candidates are now able to access a wealth of centrally designed resources.  There is no evidence 
of direct interference in the selection of candidates, although undoubtedly the party elite were able 
to encourage, discourage, train, support and in general influence outcomes, if it so wished. 
Examples, however, are far and few between. 
 
Secondly, the party at Headquarters, in particular the Campaigns Department has modernised and 
adapted to new technologies.  It has, however, until recently resisted moves toward 
professionalism, largely due to a pervasive amateur culture and grassroots-orientated leadership 
by Chris Rennard.   Although it is too small in size to conform to the operational practices of a 
professional campaigning department by hiring individuals through specialist agencies to conduct 
some of its work, it has at times employed expertise in research and polling, which has in turn 
informed its targeting strategy.  This has, however, been piecemeal, and the use of outside 
expertise has until recently been treated with suspicion.  Chris Rennard was able to control the 
targeting strategy, campaigning tactics and financial priorities, developing a formidable power-
base at party HQ. The detailed analysis of each general election demonstrates the success of this 
targeting strategy in delivering an increased number of seats in spite of a decrease in the popular 
vote, while also acknowledging its limitations.  The key components of the definition of 
professionalism, particularly the employment of outside expertise, the freedom to exercise 
autonomy in this field and mobility in the jobs market, are not evident.  There is evidence that 
decisions about candidate selection afford significant autonomy to the constituency parties, and 
that the new „competencies‟ provide a list of characteristics that would broadly fit with that of so-
called  “soft” professionalism.  Overall, however, the process has, for the period studied, been 
incomplete.   
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Thirdly, Kennedy‟s somewhat loose grip on power as Leader allowed for a vacuum to develop at 
the top of the party that enabled Rennard, with the consent of the wider party, to build a significant 
parallel power-base at Party Headquarters.   This is uncommon and highlights the tensions within 
the third party that has typically aimed to be both a campaigning organisation, while at the same 
time increase in numbers and power at Westminster.   
 
Rennard‟s iron grip on party HQ can perhaps best be seen by the change in culture at Cowley 
Street since his departure.  His successor, Chris Fox, former Director of Corporate Relations at 
Tate and Lyle plc, has introduced a much more business-like approach. Although Fox‟s 
appointment (informally by Nick Clegg and Ros Scott but later rubber-stamped by FE), its timing (5 
months before a general election), and the coalition that followed, make for a very untypical period 
in office, his impact on HQ is already clear:  
 
Its more focused in its thinking. The business objectives are sharper. There‟s more focus 
on outcomes, rather than the process, and people are being held to account more. 
(Interview 26 (2), 2011). 
 
 
 
Senior Executive Teams have been set up, adhering closely to a 5 year strategic plan, introducing 
a level of professionalism and a workplace culture that more closely resembles those indicators 
set out in Webb & Fisher‟s 2003 study. The campaigns department in particular has been radically 
overhauled, and is described in Chapter 9.  Fox was closely associated with Mark Oaten‟s centre-
right „Liberal Future‟ in 2001, and the „Orange Bookers‟ that followed, and is thought to be close to 
the leader.   
  
In conclusion then and in contrast to the party‟s policy-making processes described in the previous 
chapter, this examination of campaigns supports H1, but fails to fully support H2. The campaigns 
department has, at least until 2009, demonstrated a process of centralisation around party HQ, or 
more specifically, Chris Rennard, while at the same resisting certain key elements of the 
professionalisation process.  This process appears to have begun after 2009. 
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Chapter 7 – RESOURCES 212  
 
i) Introduction 
 
The complexities of intra-party power are demonstrated nowhere better than through a study of the 
distribution of resources, where we also draw together themes developed in previous chapters. 
This chapter looks at what resources the third party has, how these have changed over a period of 
time and what can be deduced from this with regard to the three levels of party activity set out by 
Katz & Mair in their 1994 study of political parties; the parliamentary party, the central party and 
the party on the ground (Katz and Mair 1994). It also looks at what the party has within its gift and 
focuses on patronage and peerages in particular. Panebianco says that the „dominant coalition‟ 
comes about by negotiating control of the „zones of uncertainty‟ which comprise competency, 
environmental relations, communication, formal rules, financing and recruitment (Panebianco 
1988).   With this in mind what follows is the detailed examination of party resources. 
 
Without the reliable backing of the corporate or trades union community, the Liberal Democrats 
have convincingly argued that their development is constrained by a lack of resources.  It is true 
that it‟s income is dwarfed by those of its competitors, but this study suggests this has presented 
no barrier to professionalisation. The party appears to have reformed in all but one of 
Panebianco‟s six „zones of uncertainty‟ in spite of its somewhat unreliable income. Upon closer 
examination of local party finance it is clear that, although local parties have autonomy over their 
own finances, they are increasingly dictated to by the federal party, who control the all-important 
targeting strategy and are therefore able to exercise some indirect control over these resources 
and would like to exercise significantly more (p253).   These „zones of uncertainty‟ are identified as 
areas where it is possible to see change in the organisational activity of a party, and whoever 
controls these areas “holds a trump card” (Panebianco p33). In particular he identifies competency 
as the „power of the expert‟, particularly powerful when an individual holding such competency is 
indispensable to the organisation.  The second „zone of uncertainty‟ is environmental relations, by 
which he means the area where the party interface with the world outside, and who may have 
responsibility for decisions in response to events outside the party‟s control.  Communication is a 
third vital area for examination, and control over relations between the party and media is clearly 
important in an understanding of intra-party power. Fourthly he explains that the formal rules, 
which in the case of the Liberal Democrats would include the constitution and standing orders that 
govern its various committees and bodies.  The enforcing or manipulating of these formal rules is a 
strong indication of power relations.   Clearly financing, his fifth zone of uncertainty, is important 
since political parties are heavily dependent upon funds in order to run their operation and employ 
staff. Having control of this clearly impacts on the party organisation and can tell us a great deal 
about who is in control.  Finally the sixth „zone‟ is that of recruitment, where Panebianco looks at 
involvement in the organisation, from membership, to candidates, „careerists‟ and „believers‟.  
Control over who can do what is clearly significant.  
 
                                                                    
212 Parts of this chapter exists in  “Sandals to Suits – Professionalisation, coalition and the Liberals  
Democrats”, Elizabeth Evans and Emma Sanderson-Nash, BJPIR (Volume 13, Issue 4, November 2011). 
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 It is possible to see two different stages in the process of professionalisation, since it appears to 
have been embraced first by the Parliamentary party and at a much slower pace, (indeed at times 
resisted), at Headquarters where a more amateur-volunteer culture has been the order of the day. 
This is an interesting observation and one not untypical in political parties but perhaps of greater 
significance in one which, as in every other aspect of party life, experiences tension between the 
grassroots and the elite (see Frankland, Lucardie et al. 2008 for an assessment of Green parties). 
The term „professional‟, as set out on p31, is defined in terms of party work as displaying five 
specific characteristics: expertise, autonomy, mobility, self-regulation and commitment (Webb and 
Fisher 2003; Webb 2008) . This definition is useful and is employed in this context, and is distinct 
and different from any other definition that might, refer simply to “standards of delivery and 
competence”  (Negrine 2005).  There are inevitably those employees for whom these ideal types 
do not fit, particularly recently, including some senior appointments of individuals who fit the 
description of „professional‟ in the context of party employment, but who also demonstrate a long 
history of party activity and commitment (see for example Chris Fox and Sandy Walkington), 
although in the broadest sense these definitions and their characteristics offer a useful template for 
this study.  In keeping with the definition of professional we would expect to see party resources 
used in the employment of experts from outside party ranks, an education and training of a 
particular standard, and that such individuals are able to exercise autonomy and career mobility.  
 
Analysis of party finance is difficult for a number of reasons. In the first place parties are required 
under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, Electoral Admission Act 2006 
and the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009, to ensure donations above £500 are from a 
permissible source
213
, to declare donations to the central party of over £5000 and to declare 
donations to individual accounting units of over £1000 to the Electoral Commission. The 
legislation, which is relatively new, has come into force to encourage transparency and scrutiny in 
an area of party life hitherto surrounded with secrecy. It is therefore relatively recent and makes 
comparisons with party finance prior to the legislation somewhat uneven. Before this the Liberal 
Democrats published an annual budget and accounts in the report section of the party conference 
literature, and in 2002 the Electoral Commission began to publish party income, in more detail and 
including the identity of individual donors, on a quarterly basis. The impact of the 2006 Act was to 
ensure that loans were subject to the same regulation as donations, since the use of loans instead 
of donations in order to keep donors' identities anonymous was revealed to be widespread during 
the build up to the 2005 general election.   It should be noted therefore that the figures held 
centrally, particularly prior to 2006, either by the federal party or the Electoral Commission, can 
create a false impression of overall income.    
 
In simplest terms the federal party derives its income from three sources: the state, individual 
donations and membership subscriptions. The former comes to the party as Short and Cranborne 
money, while other income is generated through party activism and fundraising appeals. The 
proceeds are then divided between three recipients.  Short and Cranborne money pays for POLD 
(Parliamentary Office of the Liberal Democrats) staff, membership subscriptions pay for the 
                                                                    
213  Permissible sources for party donations are individuals that are eligible to vote in the UK, or from trades  
unions or companies that are registered in the UK. 
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running of Headquarters through the „general fund‟, and one-off donations are specifically ring-
fenced in the 'campaign fund' to finance the general election.   This chapter takes each of these 
sources of income and looks at how the party raises and spends it, first the Parliamentary party, 
then the party centrally and finally at the local party level.  Prior to the merger of 1988, the Liberal 
Party and the SDP were separately functioning bureaucracies, each with a central headquarters, 
parliamentary organisation and (although far less well developed in the SDP) an organisation on 
the ground. 
214
 This section looks at what emerged from this process in greater detail and in 
particular at two periods of reform: The Medium-Term Review (1997) and The Bones Commission 
(2008).  These internal reviews demonstrate the desire of the party  leadership who set up both, to 
move towards what we might recognise as an electoral-professional model at key moments in its 
history. Finally in a party that until 2010 was unable to wield power at the national level, it 
examines patronage, in particular the recommendation of peerages. The link between party 
funding and peerages is generally well documented (Fisher 2008; Fisher 2010) but very little 
scrutiny has focused on the Liberal Democrats in this regard.   The Liberal Democrats 
Parliamentary party has, since its inception, contained more peers than MPs, and traditionally a 
number of „heavyweights.
215
 The scramble for a place on the red benches is one of the more 
interesting features among a party of grassroots origins. In spite of passing motions at conference 
to produce an elected „interim peers list‟, candidates for which far outnumber any other elected 
party committee,  leaders have consistently recommended peerages for individuals that do not 
appear on the list and, it is argued, may, on occasion, reflect interests other than those of the party 
grassroots.  
 
ii) The Parliamentary party
 
 
The Parliamentary party of the Liberal Democrats (POLD) has undergone two significant shifts 
since its creation in 1988.  Firstly it has benefited from Short and Cranbourne money, and in 1997 
when its number of MPs more than doubled this had a significant effect on its income. What it 
decided to do with that money also gives us an indication of its priorities, in particular the rise in 
importance of the press office.  Secondly, and following on from this, was a parallel increase in the 
research support paid for by POLD (rather than MPs own personal research assistants paid for by 
their office costs allowance), and the development of the party‟s „Shadow Cabinet‟.  In 
organisational terms this is important since it signifies a cultural shift within the parliamentary party 
toward a party aspiring to government.   Here we examine each of these changes in greater detail. 
 
                                                                    
214  Interview 64.2009 
215  The Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords have included  Shirley Williams, Roy Jenkins and others who  
held ministerial posts in previous Labour governments.   
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Short and Cranborne Money 
 
MPs are paid an annual salary of £65,738 with a choice of contributory pension schemes. In 
addition to this MP‟s may claim: 
 
- £14,582 if chair of a Select Committee 
- £19.900 for accommodation to non-London MPs 
- £10,663 for the rental of constituency offices outside London and £12,761 in London 
- £ 10,394 for office equipment 
- £109,549 for staff 
 
In total therefore an ordinary back-bench MP, with a constituency outside London (irrespective of 
its location) is able to claim a maximum of almost £150k in allowances, with travel for themselves 
and their immediate family on top.
216
 Although these offices are run in order to support the MP‟s 
parliamentary activities, they often double up as a campaign centre for local party activity.  There 
is sometimes tension between the local party and MP over the use of these resources, and MPs 
guard the division between their parliamentary work and the local party jealously. 
217
 However if 
the income so derived were to be included in the overall pot perceived as party money it would for 
the Liberal Democrats in 2010 have exceeded an additional £8.5m. While the division between 
party work and constituency work is quite clear, there exists an informal „tithe‟ which recommends 
that MPs pay back 10% of the total derived from their income and allowances to their local party 
for campaign purposes. This is a system that has been in place among the party‟s Councillors for 
many years and in 2010 was adopted by the party‟s Ministers. 
218
  The Parliamentary Office of the 
Liberal Democrats (POLD), however, derives its income, above that which is given to MPs for their 
own individual offices, from Short and Cranborne money, introduced during the Wilson 
government (1974-76), to support the parliamentary activities of opposition parties.  
 
This income is to fund the party in its opposition activity.  There are further funds available to the 
Leader of the Opposition‟s office for which the Liberal Democrats, as the second opposition party, 
have not previously qualified.  In May 2010 to the dismay of many in POLD, the party, having 
entered a coalition government, lost its right to both Short and Cranborne money, the 
consequences of which are described later in this chapter.   First, however, we look at the party 
prior to merger to see how it has changed since the mid-1980s to the present day in its 
parliamentary staffing arrangements.    
 
                                                                    
216  House of Commons Information Office Factsheet M5 Members Series „Members‟ pay, pensions and  
allowances‟.  Revised May 2010.  
217  Interview 5.2010 
218  http://www.libdemvoice.org/lib-dem-ministers-follow-advice-for-councillors-and-give-10-to-the-party- 
22329.html (accessed 09.03.2011). 
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Table 13. Short and Cranborne money 1997-2011 
 
Parliamentary 
session 
Short money 
£ 
Cranbroune money 
£ 
Total 
1997/1998 405, 311 33,310 438,621 
1998/1999 419,559 28,250 447,809 
1999/2000 1,084,895 31,857 1,116,752 
2000/2001 1,112,906 65,052 1,177,958 
2001/2002 1,155,583 66,743 1,222,326 
2002/2003 1,174,410 68,278 1,242,688 
2003/2004 1,210,901 195,000
219
 1,405,901 
2004/2005 1,244,855 201,045 1,445,900 
2005/2006 1,536,220 206,272 1,742,492 
2006/2007 1,596,867 212,873 1,809,740 
2007/2008 1,667,009 217,982 1,884,991 
2008/2009 1,733,771 228,445 1,962,216 
2009/2010 1,749,385 237,136 1,986,521 
2010/2011 167,565 27,808 195,373 
 
Source: (Kelly 2010, p17-20)
 220
 
 
Parliamentary staff 1986-2011 
 
In 1986 all members of the Parliamentary Liberal Party staff were invited to come together in a 
new staff-led organisation, to be run following the election of an elected Chair, Vice-Chair and 
Secretary.
221
 This is interesting since it enables an understanding of the kind of work undertaken 
by political staff prior to the merger, and the way in which the party relied on amateurs.  In addition 
to regular meetings to discuss the business of the Parliamentary party and to represent their 
interests, this body was to “help introduce new members of staff to the offices and other staff”. A 
staff guide was produced by Duncan Brack in his role as Assistant to Archy Kirkwood 
222
, then 
Chief Whip, and in order to help secretaries and research assistants in their day to day duties it 
explained party structure, parliamentary procedure, committee work, press releases, computers 
and how staff could find their way around the parliamentary estate.  In 1986 the Liberal Party had 
22 seats largely in central Wales and the Scottish highlands, few of whom had full-time staff in 
London, preferring instead to use their office-costs allowance to pay for an office in the 
constituency, in some of the remotest parts of the UK.   By 1991 this had started to change
223
. The 
                                                                    
219  In 2002 the House of Lords passed a resolution increasing funds to opposition parties which is responsible  
for the large increase on previous years.  
220 This table is low since the party‟s right to Short & Cranbourne money ceased after the May 2010 general  
election. 
221 Interview 37 2009, and internal memo dated 28th August 1986 to Parliamentary Liberal Party Staff.  
222 Archy Kirkwood himself started out as an MPs Researcher, working for David Steel prior to winning his  
own seat of Roxburgh and Berwickshire in 1983. 
223 In 1990 the author of this thesis was employed by Simon Hughes, MP for Bermondsey as his  
Parliamentary Assistant, and between 1991 and 1992 by Ray Michie, then MP for Argyll and Bute as her  
Parliamentary Researcher.  The first job followed an advert placed in The Guardian newspaper, and the second 
was from word of mouth and included responsibility for the „Women‟s Issues‟ portfolio. 
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party had 21 MPs. Excluding the Chief Whip and Leader, who had their own teams and larger 
premises, the other 19 employed on average one secretary each, usually paid and full-time, and 
11 employed Research Assistants at the same time, often part-time or on a voluntary basis. The 
Parliamentary Staff organised „skills development‟ days where MPs' London based staff would be 
trained in the research and presentation of information, parliamentary procedure, and dealing with 
the press (particularly local and regional) leaving national press to the Press Office separately run 
and located in the Whips Office.   The merged party continued with this staffing arrangement 
throughout the period 1988-1992, while the remaining three SDP MPs who had refused to merge 
continued their own, much reduced, independent organisation.   
 
At this time in addition to MPs' own staff, POLD employed staff in the Whips Office, which included 
two press officers, one senior researcher who worked with any MP asked to serve on a Standing 
Committee, and an information officer or volunteer to assist with administration.  The Chief Whip 
had two staff to help with legislative business and to produce the weekly „whip‟ ..
224
  Staff were 
almost all committed party members, often with close personal or family ties to the MP, and 
positions were filled by word of mouth, often coordinated by Ewan Cameron, the party‟s Senior 
Researcher.  Requirements for employment by an MP would usually include a commitment to the 
party‟s values, secretarial experience and/or a degree, but primarily strong ties with the 
constituency, an understanding of local issues and the local press.  It would not be uncommon for 
an MP to recruit a secretary in the constituency who would then move to London to fulfill the post. 
 
In the build-up to the 1992 general election the party began employing more specialist 
researchers, initially on those aspects of policy and portfolios that were prioritised including 
constitutional reform, economics, trade and industry and the environment
225.
  This is the first 
evidence of a move toward issue expertise taking precedence over constituency-based 
knowledge, since these researchers were connected to the portfolio, regardless of which MP held 
the spokesmanship at the time. Based on a forecast of income from Short Money the 
parliamentary party agreed to take on a total of seven full time staff in the Whips office; mostly 
press officers, in preference to research assistants.
226
   In addition at this time the Lords Whips 
Office was organised in a similar fashion, overseen for over two decades by Celia Thomas, 
227
 with 
three research staff and at times an intern helping with administration.  The Leader‟s Office also 
operated a similar sised and somewhat independent office, and in 1991 consisted of four 
secretarial posts including a caseworker and receptionist, and five research staff including a press 
assistant and senior speechwriter.   The June 1992 Parliamentary party Staff Handbook describes 
each of these roles, together with explanations of the responsibilities of individual press officers, 
organised according to broadcast, print or regional media.     
 
In 1997 the parliamentary party more than doubled in size, and changed in character with an 
intake of professionals and experienced local councillors (Evans and Sanderson-Nash 2010).   
                                                                    
224 Each Thursday a fax would be sent to each MP in their private or constituency office informing them of the  
week ahead‟s legislation, together with a one, two or three-line whip indicated by underscoring.  
225 This data is taken from internal phone lists of POLD staff in 1991. 
226  POLD internal memo dated 18th June 1993. 
227  Since 2006, Baroness Thomas of Winchester. 
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The Short and Cranborne money that accompanied this meant a significant increase in the funds 
available, which prompted The Medium Term Review (detailed below) and in simple terms was 
spent recruiting a team of specialist researchers to shadow government portfolios, as well as 
expanding the party‟s research and press operations.   Party staff also expanded following 
devolution and by 2002 had evolved into an organisation with a quite different and more 
professional feel.  The internal phone directory lists a Whips Office staff comprising two support 
staff to the Whip, a parliamentary press team of nine, and a parliamentary resource centre (dealing 
with research portfolios) of 15.  It also lists 53 MPs with 61 secretarial and research staff in London 
and 113 secretarial and casework staff in their constituencies. This varies from MPs with one 
member of staff in total, based in London (David Laws), to one member of staff in London and 4 in 
the constituency (David Heath), but averages at one in London and one in the constituency. 
Payment for staff would have come from the MP‟s individual office-costs allowance, and could be 
supplemented by the MP putting a share of their own salary into the overall fund (Simon Hughes) 
to encouraging charities, individual donors or the local party to supplement staff (Norman Baker).   
In 2002 the Leader Charles Kennedy continued to employ a team of staff including two in 
communications, five secretarial and administrative support with two further people in his 
constituency of Ross Cromarty and Skye (one of the furthest away in the UK), a chief of staff and a 
research assistant.  The House of Lords had four staff, similar in size to the operation run in 
Brussels and Strasbourg for Liberal Democrat MEPs. The party also employed staff to support the 
various devolved governments; five staff to support its 17 Members of the Scottish Parliament, four 
to support its six Assembly Members in Wales, and four to support the Alliance Party of Northern 
Ireland who had five assembly members – all of whom employed their own secretarial, research 
and casework staff in a similar style to that of their Westminster counterparts.  
 
In summary, the most noticeable change that followed the 1997 increase in the number of MPs 
and Short money that accompanied it was the growth of professional support to the MPs in a 
newly centralised Policy/Research and Policy/Communications operation.  Charles Kennedy 
developed the „shadow cabinet‟ system, with MPs shadowing government portfolios. Specialist 
researchers worked on a „client-basis‟ for the Shadow Cabinet in a much more business-like style, 
and without a formal connection to the individual MP or their parliamentary constituency. 
228
 The 
Policy Unit divided in order to support both the press office and the resource centre, splitting into 
two new departments, the Policy and Research Unit (formerly Parliamentary Resource Unit), and 
the Policy and Communications Department (formerly the Press Office).  This merged staff 
previously divided between Cowley Street and Parliamentary Staff now came under one umbrella, 
POLD (Parliamentary Office of the Liberal Democrats) and under one roof (Cowley Street). 
229
   
Although Short money was specifically for the purposes of parliamentary opposition work it 
undoubtedly helped the party at HQ to have this additional money spent on its premises.  The 
move may have been an attempt to break through the amateur culture at Cowley Street but was 
met with limited success and an „us‟ and „them‟ dynamic soon developed with POLD staff and 
                                                                    
228 Interview 59, 2009. 
229 Some policy staff were situated at 2 Abbey Gardens, part way between Cowley Street and the  
Parliamentary Estate, but the majority were at HQ. 
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federal party staff in two distinct and different camps.
230
 The Whips Office was then without the 
press or research staff, and dedicated solely to the work of the party‟s parliamentary business.  
When Kennedy resigned and Campbell became leader he intended to make the party “sharper 
and slicker“, but his short period in office prevented progress despite clear intention. This came 
instead with Nick Clegg‟s setting up of the Bones Commission described in greater detail below. 
 
iii) Cowley Street 
 
The Liberal Party had its UK Headquarters at the National Liberal Club, a grand and historic 
building in the centre of Whitehall, London. 
231
 By contrast the SDP had offices at 4 Cowley Street, 
in the heart of Westminster, close to the Millbank television studios and near Conservative Party 
Headquarters in Smith Square. The merged party agreed upon the more suitable premises at 
Cowley Street in what was seen by some as a symbolic shift toward the Westminster professional 
political scene and away from the more old-fashioned liberal party base at the NLC. More than one 
interviewee recounts that during merger negotiations the size of party membership (and 
consequent reliable income stream derived from subscriptions), had been exaggerated. Less than 
a year into merger the new party, with a very much reduced income, faced a significant tax bill and 
potential bankruptcy, resulting in the decision to more than halve the number of party employees. 
232
 The party was then left with approximately 15 full time staff at Headquarters, and a handful of 
MPs staff coordinated through the Staff Association (described above).  
 
Federal Party finance 
 
The federal party is financed in two ways. The first combines income derived from membership 
subscription fees, newspaper revenue, affinity schemes, grants, and profits made on the twice 
yearly federal conferences which makes up the „general fund‟ and is used to finance the running of 
party Headquarters.  The second combines income from individual donations and investment on 
this income which makes up the „campaign fund‟ and is ring-fenced to finance general elections. 
This has always been the case although in recent years greater flexibility over its use has been 
demonstrated, and the federal party are able to step in for a campaign it considers to be important, 
other than the general election, such as during the 2008 London Mayoral contest.
233
 The campaign 
fund can therefore be treated as a „bail-out‟ fund, although the sums involved are usually in the 
region of £50-80k and of a much smaller magnitude than those concerning the UK general 
election.  
 
                                                                    
230 Interview 61. 
231 The National Liberal Club (NLC) was opened in 1882 by William Gladstone as a meeting place for party  
members and campaigners.   
232 Interview 64, 2010. 
233  Interview 25.2010 
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Table 14. Declared party income 2003-2009 
234
 
 
 
Tables 14 adds income from the general fund and the campaign fund together as income, and 
adds all campaigns and staff costs together as expenditure.  As we would expect, income and 
expenditure are relatively constant and both peak significantly during a general election year.  As a 
more detailed breakdown demonstrates, the campaign fund in particular peaks at this time and 
general fund income remains constant. 
 
Table 15. General fund and campaign fund income 2002-2009.
235
 
 
Year end 31 December General fund total £ Campaign fund total £ 
2002 3,383,147 301,378 
2003 3,450,749 645,531 
2004 3,759,361 1,300,760 
2005 3,621,197 4,960,838 
2006 3,949,960 1,831,435 
2007 3,866,813 1,653,686 
2008 4,382,908 1,090,348 
2009 4,342,355 2,154,658 
 
                                                                    
234  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/party-finance/party-finance-analysis/party-finance-analysis-accounts-
2009#LD (accessed 03.03.2011). 
235  Source: Electoral Commission.  
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Headquarters staffing arrangements 
 
The arrangements at Party HQ have changed little since 1988 and the departments can be divided 
into three broad categories, according to size and permanence. What follows is a description of 
each department, its main responsibilities and any significant changes in personnel.   This is 
intended to demonstrate the strength of party bureaucracy. It draws on Panebianco‟s distinction 
between political and bureaucratic professionalism and suggests that the party has operated under 
a relatively strong bureaucracy at Headquarters. He offers a classification of party staff: managers; 
notables; representative bureaucrats; executive bureaucrats; staff professionals; hidden 
professionals and semi-professionals. With regard to the Lib Dems, whose staff is relatively small, 
these distinctions provide only limited explanations. We can, however, draw from them a 
distinction between bureaucrats and professionals, the former being concerned with administrative 
systems and stability, the latter with expertise and adaptation. This is in contrast with, (and can at 
times be in competition with), professional party staff, whose incentives are different: for instance, 
they can usually find work outside the organisation if the need arises (Panebianco 1988).  The five 
main departments comprise: 
 
- Chief Executive 
- Policy and Research 
- Policy and Communications 
- Marketing, Fundraising and Membership Services 
- Campaigns 
 
The Office of the Chief Executive began as that of the General Secretary, an administrative role 
overseen by the Party President and included one or two full time administrative staff.  By 2002 
this had grown to seven in total, and included an HQ Operations Director responsible for the day-
to-day running of the building and staff, and a Political Assistant keeping the CEO abreast of 
developments within the party.   The Policy and Communications Department and Policy and 
Research Department are described in greater detail with regard to the Parliamentary party and 
has in recent years expanded and gone through a number of changes in management and 
structure (see above).  The Chief Executive would have complete control therefore of the 
Campaigns and Marketing department. During Chris Rennard‟s period in the job, he had a very 
clear claim to experience as former Director of one of these departments, and worked very closely 
with David Loxton, whose employment with the party also began at its inception. Party 
Headquarters at this time employed a number of „lifers‟ and had a reputation for resisting 
change.
236
   This can be demonstrated by looking at attempts by federal party treasurer, Reg 
Clark, to establish his own unit at party HQ.  
 
Encouraged by the Kennedy office, and on the advice of external fundraising consultants „tree‟
 237
, 
Clark set up a „Treasurer‟s Unit‟ within Cowley Street to run the party‟s Business Forum, annual 
fundraising ball, high net-worth donors club „Liberty Network‟ and legacy programme. The Unit 
                                                                    
236  Interview 29, 2010. 
237  http://www.treelondon.com/ (accessed 07.03.2011). 
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employed three full-time staff, whose salary was paid directly out of the funds it raised, acting 
outside the formal structure at HQ, were excluded from its Investors in People assessment, and 
seen by many at Cowley Street as „outsiders‟.
238
 Liberty Network was controversial, hosting 
expensive dinners and giving members who contributed a minimum of £1000 a year, a series of 
events attended by the leader and other senior parliamentarians. It launched with a series of 
lectures where „tree‟ explained to a select audience of prominent party supporters, celebrities and 
donors, what the party needed to „break through‟ and what they believed stood in the way.  
Membership of Liberty Network peaked at approximately 150 and while considered to be a 
success by some, that it unearthed a small number of new and significant donors, was criticised by 
others, accused of elitism and exclusivety, and of having simply switched existing donations from 
one source to another.
239
 This led to a head-on collision between the Treasurer and Chief 
Executive (Clark 2006). A number of interviewees noted the reluctance of the Chief Executive to 
make use of outside consultants or advisors  and once Clark had resigned over an unrelated 
matter, he was quick to bring the Treasurer‟s Unit in to line. „Membership Services‟ took over 
responsibility for much of its work and became „Marketing, Fundraising and Membership Services‟ 
with a staff totalling ten by 2009.
 240
   Chris Fox, CEO since 2009, has employed fundraising 
professionals to revitalise the party‟s fundraising effort, with some degree of success. 
 
The Campaigns Department was the biggest loser in the post-merger redundancies, losing all its 
Area Agents in 1989, but growing since then from a staff of one to a staff of typically five, including 
the Candidates Officer.  In addition the party regained its Area Agents taking this total, although 
not situated inside HQ itself, to 21
241
. In addition to these main five departments there were others 
with typically one Director and three staff:  
 
- The International Office 
- Conference and Events 
- Finance 
 
The International Office manages the party‟s work with the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy. 
242
  The Foreign Office began this initiative in 1992, designed to connect UK parties  
to sister parties in fledgling democracies in Europe and throughout the world and involves setting 
up a number of short-term projects in which overseas politicians and staff come to the UK or vice-
versa for training purposes. The Liberal Democrats receive an income in support of this work 
which pays for this department and which separated it from the body of work done elsewhere in 
the building. The Conference and Events Department organise the party‟s twice yearly federal 
conference with a support staff of three or four and the annual fundraising ball. The Finance 
Department deals with all matters concerning the party‟s banking arrangements, including 
producing annual accounts and is typically supported by two members of staff. Since the 
                                                                    
238  Interview 72, 2011 
239  In particular Chris Rennard‟s submission to the Bones Commission makes this point. 
240  Interview 27, 2009. 
241  This has been the subject of recent reform – see Chapter 9. 
242 The author of this thesis ran the International Office for a period of 4 months during the 1992 general  
election.  
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introduction of PPERA legislation the party has employed a Head of Compliance and 
Constitutional Support, with two staff overseeing business relating to the English Party and the 
London Regional Party.  Finally the party employs individuals on behalf of the English Party 
including Candidates officer and Training Co-ordinator, and one staff member to run Liberal Youth, 
one to run Women Liberal Democrats, one to oversee the Campaign for Gender Balance and one 
on Diversity.   The party declares its total head-count of staff employed by the federal party to the 
Electoral Commission and has since 2001 this has ranged from 41 to 48. The party had 
increasingly outsourced certain operations, most of which represent one-off tasks such as the 
banking of income following appeals, which is done by the Royal Bank of Scotland in Doncaster, 
and IT support which is brought in as and when necessary. 
243
 It does, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
employ pollsters, advertising agents and other specialists at the time of the general election, and 
this is funded by the campaign fund rather than the general fund. 
 
The Medium Term Review 
 
The arrangements at Cowley Street have undergone two important changes since the new party 
was launched in 1998:  in 1997 following The Medium Term Review and in 2008 following The 
Bones Commission. Before turning to these it is important to note, however, that at general 
elections Lib Dem HQ becomes the party‟s federal campaign centre and any internal changes that 
are likely to take place as a result of election outcomes will be brought in immediately afterwards.   
The Medium Term Review was undertaken following a meeting of the party‟s Federal Executive 
immediately following the 1997 general election in order to review “the party‟s activities and the 
resources necessary to undertake them”.  It aimed to review the party‟s activities over the following 
three to five years in response to increased numbers at Westminster, the re-emergence of a 
strong Labour party, forthcoming elections, a shortage of funds and the reduction in party activity 
on the ground in non-target areas.  The remit for the review explicitly states that it should aim to 
make changes that did not necessitate changes to the party constitution which “would result in a 
degree of internal argument that would be disproportionate to any likely advantage and provide 
unnecessary distraction and delay”.
244 
It noted that in 1999 the party would face an increased 
campaigning task including elections of half its councillors, a referendum on London government, 
elections to Scottish and Welsh devolved governments, the first UK wide European elections by 
PR and a referendum on PR for Westminster.
245
   Its main recommendations were: 
 
i) To step up the party‟s fundraising effort.  The party acknowledged the decline in overall 
party membership, particularly in non-target areas and the problems associated with its 
financial dependence on subscription levies.   It recommended developing long-term 
strategies based on regular standing order payments rather than one-off responses to election 
appeals, to encourage legacies, and to develop an „in-house telephone team‟ for a variety of 
membership, research and fundraising purposes. It also noted the need for a coherent policy 
                                                                    
243 Interview 54.2009 
244  Report of The Medium Term Review Group, 27
th
 November 1997, p9. 
245  The referendum on PR for Westminster did not materialize but was widely expected to follow from the  
Cook-Maclennan Report. 
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on „promotional services‟ such encouraging members to use Visa and National Breakdown, 
with whom it had developed an agreed division of income. 
ii) To promote the interests of ethnic minority candidates. 
iii) To improve training by strengthening the role of the Training Task Group and providing 
certification for training undertaken. 
iv) To improve the party‟s IT “using an outside consultant”. 
v) To clarify the role of the Chief Executive and the Campaigns Department, in particular 
integrating the General Election Unit into Campaigns and making it accountable to the 
Campaigns and Communications Committee rather than the Chief Executive. 
vi) To integrate the Policy Unit into a new Policy and Research Department.  
  
This demonstrates a clear shift in the party‟s thinking in favour of a more professional, expert-
driven, electorally-focused headquarters. It also shows tensions between the Campaigns 
Department and the Chief Executive, the closure of the Policy Unit as a stand-alone Department 
and the beginnings of outsourcing.
246
 To a large extent, the Medium-Term Review 
recommendations were implemented, aided in part by the rearrangement of Policy, Research and 
Communications described above, thereby enabling the party at Headquarters to benefit from the 
increase in Short money.  The structural changes were undertaken, but an overall shift toward 
professionalising the party, did not proceed at the same pace.  The significant power around Chris 
Rennard, as both Director of Campaigns and then as Chief Executive is detailed in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. One interviewee explained: “One of the problems was that Chris was the sort of boss 
who wasn‟t about to appoint anybody that was half as bright as he was and that might just give 
him some grief”.
247
  IT and fundraising were not outsourced, and the work of „Lib Dems Calling‟ 
was brought more closely under the control of the Campaigns Department. Before stepping aside 
as Chief Executive Chris Rennard proposed that the job description change once more making the 
CEO accountable directly and jointly to the Leader and President,
248
 rather than the Campaigns 
and Communications Committee, arguably a further centralisation of authority.  
 
The Bones Commission 
 
The party‟s next major review of the party‟s internal affairs did not take place until 2008 when 
leader Nick Clegg, president Simon Hughes and chief-executive Chris Rennard jointly 
commissioned Chris Bones to undertake a wide-ranging review of the party‟s operations. This is 
discussed in previous chapters, particularly on campaigns where it had an impact, although its 
main recommendations were on the question of party resources, and it is examined more 
thoroughly here.  Aimed at „creating the conditions for continued and increasing success at the 
next general election and beyond‟ (Bones Commission 2008), the Bones Commission was a 
review carried out in early 2008 by Professor Chris Bones (former Dean of Henley Business 
School),  Duncan Greenland (Chair of FFAC), Kate Parminter (charity professional) and Paul 
Burstow MP (Chief Whip).  
                                                                    
246  Interview 61.2010 
247  Interview 25. 2010 
248  Interview 41. 2010 
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Bones was an interesting choice to chair this review, since his experience in the party was limited 
to having chaired his local party (Oxford East) in 2005, and although a long standing party member 
who joined the SDP in 1981, he had a low profile in the organisation. At the time of the review we 
was Dean of the Henley Business School, and his website there lists his areas of interest as 
„strategic human resources management, organisation change, communication and engagement”. 
249
  The remit of the Commission,  as described by the authors, was „not to criticise what exists 
today‟ but to „think forward and to describe the organisation we need to campaign effectively such 
that we double the number of MPs we have in two elections‟ (Bones Commission, p1).  It was 
seen by the press, however, as a direct challenge to Rennard‟s authority, to the constitution that 
gives power to the party grassroots and represented significant centralisation.
250
  The intention of 
the committee, its recommendations and their legacy remain the subject of some disagreement 
within the party. It is, however, fair to say that the Commission attempted to create some clarity of 
organisation, and that such clarity could make influence over the organisation easier for  some of 
those wishing to exercise it.    The use of language and terminology within the report confirms that 
the party is committed to the establishment of a more professional party, indeed the introductory 
notes to the report highlight that “we have used the term 'voluntary party' to refer to members of 
the party who perform various roles and functions, and the term 'professional party' to refer to both 
those employed by the federal party, national, state, regional and local parties and also the 
Parliamentary Office of the Liberal Democrats (POLD).” (Bones Commission p3).  Whilst this 
terminology may appear semantic or simply axiomatic, for a party with a tradition of devolving 
power to its members this use of the professional/voluntary dichotomy tells us something about the 
image the party wishes to convey, not only externally, but crucially also internally.   The party‟s 
staffing arrangements and structure is summarised in an organigram, (attached in Appendix G), 
from October 2009, which combines paid staff with unpaid party officials but which nonetheless 
helps to provide an overall idea of the departments, their size, complexity and hierarchy.  An 
updated version from October 2010 is contained in Appendix H, and is discussed in Chapter 9. It 
demonstrates the significant loss of staffing numbers since entering coalition, and where these 
losses have been suffered.  
 
One of the concrete proposals to come out of the Bones report was that the Federal Executive 
establish a Chief Officers Group (COG) “delegating to it responsibility for developing and ensuring 
the execution of Party Strategy” (Bones Commission, p.31). Essentially this means that the FE  will 
cede power to COG, an unelected body led by the leader, described by one interviewee as FE the 
“non-executive board” and COG the “executive board”.
251
   The report notes some recent 
successful decisions that have helped streamline the party‟s strategy for conveying their 
messages to the public. In particular the report notes that combining the role of Leader‟s Press 
Secretary and Director of Media has created a more coherent and ultimately less confused media 
strategy. Of course this also means that the Press Secretary of the leader now also speaks for the 
party and vice versa. Additionally, the development of phone bank capacity and increased 
                                                                    
249  http://www.henley.reading.ac.uk/about/staff/christopher-bones.aspx (accessed 01.04.2011). 
250  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4340213.ece (accessed 10.03.2011). 
251  Interview 14 2009. 
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fundraising capabilities highlights that the party recognises the need to professionalise these 
operations in order to compete with the other two main parties. In the very simplest terms, the 
professionalisation of the party can be seen with an increase in the trend to recruit senior staff 
from outside the party ranks, the use of headhunters and professional search and selection 
companies.  The party has historically recruited from its activist base, largely depending on party 
loyalty to supplement low salaries.  In more recent years the party has hired professionals, who 
may also be party sympathisers but experience of the world outside Westminster is now 
considered a distinct advantage.
252
  This strategy was boosted in 2007 when the party appointed a 
raft of new media advisers to specialise in specific policy areas and recruited the former political 
director of Bell Pottinger Public Affairs, Jonathan Oates to head up the party‟s communication 
department.  Clegg is particularly noted for employing personally chosen individuals, including 
Lena Pietsch and Polly Mackenzie, rather than relying on long-term party bureaucrats. 
The report also noted a need for the party to be both centralised in some areas and decentralised 
in others, thus achieving a coherent strategic vision whilst also allowing for „individual initiatives‟. 
The tension between a coherent centrally led strategy whilst also allowing party members to feel 
involved is a leitmotif throughout the report. Whilst fears of those who had submitted feedback to 
the report highlighted a lack of transparency and accountability with regards to resource allocation 
and decision-making, the report appears to stress that greater centralisation is inevitable in order 
to maximise electoral support. Indeed the report noted that “Generally speaking, small 
organisations work best when they are simple, have few layers and ruthlessly exclude duplication.” 
(Bones Commission, 2008, p10)   In sum, the Bones Commission represented  a significant 
development for the party. Whilst it did not change the policy making process, the report has 
important structural implications and is evidence of the drive to professionalise. Moreover, it self-
consciously aimed at „vote-maximising‟. The heart of the report is in its desire to see power shift 
from the grassroots to the leader.  
The Review‟s recommendations were brought in to effect throughout 2008 and 2009 on a trial 
basis, with progress to be assessed after two years. Early indications are, however, quite mixed.  
One insider put it bluntly: “You don‟t just get change because you publish a report”.
253
  Another 
described it as a “huge disappointment”, 254 while others welcomed its streamlining and 
professionalising shift.
255
 In particular the proposed Capability Board and Technology Board have 
both already become defunct. Proposals on fundraising, candidate selection and merging 
compliance with the party‟s Board of Trustees, have been successful.  There has been noted 
success in bringing outside professionals to the party‟s fundraising, candidates and conference 
departments.  Most importantly COG has been met with some resistance and criticism, but 
appears to have survived. The Leader‟s attendance at COG meetings is somewhat sporadic, but 
the structure is there should he need it, and is expected to be constituted at some stage.
256
  It is 
perhaps the general election of 2010 that has had the greatest impact on the party‟s 
                                                                    
252 Interview 44, 2009. 
253 Interview 9, 2009. 
254  Interview 54, 2010. 
255  Interview 25, 2010. 
256  Interview 54, 2010. 
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implementation of the Bones Commission‟s recommendations, and these are considered in the 
final chapter.  
iv) The party on the ground  
Local parties  are able to raise their own funds and each party which raises in excess of £25k must 
report this annually in keeping with PPERA legislation. Typically this involves approximately 100 
local parties , which suggests an income overall at the local level in excess of £2.5m.  Interviewees 
often cited a direct correlation between those parties  able to fundraise in excess of £25K and 
those able to mount a sufficient campaign to get an MP elected.  
Firstly membership subscriptions are paid to the various state parties , from which the federal party 
raises a levy. The size of this levy is the subject of debate and a vote at federal conference and is 
usually in the region of 40%.   This provides the „general fund‟ (see above) which pays for the day 
to day running of Cowley Street.  The remainder is divided between the state party (for instance 
the English Party – which also houses staff in Cowley Street to take care of membership and 
candidates), the regional party and the local party. This division is agreed upon following a 
complex series of incentives that are agreed between the various layers of the party and may 
include incentives, for instance, returning a greater proportion of income subscription that comes 
from new members in order to incentivise local parties  to recruit rather than just renew 
membership.   The Bones Commission considered this in its 2008 review, but would have been 
unable to change this without a full conference debate in order to make the constitutional changes 
necessary. Since constitutional change requires the support of two thirds of conference delegates 
the Commission dropped this, although there remains a view held among some within the party 
that all funds should come into the federal party and remain there to be distributed in a more 
centralised and needs-based system.
257
   
In theory then, local parties  have significant funds at their own disposal.   In addition they may 
receive grants from ALDC and other party bodies but it would be false to say they are able to 
exercise absolute autonomy. Firstly local parties are required to pay a levy to their Regional party, 
usually about 15%.   Regional parties  also receive income from bi-annual lotteries and the central 
party, and play an important role in carrying out the strategy of targeting, described in Chapter 6. 
This strategy in turn guides decisions that govern which local parties the regional party will 
financially support, often by paying for Regional Media Coordinators and Area Agents, for 
example, rather than in the direct giving of cash.  These staff are trained, if not seconded directly, 
from the central party.  One local party activist summed it up “They bring in national campaigners 
and they decide how its run”. 
258
     
                                                                    
257 Interview 25 2010. 
258  Interview 70 2011. 
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v) Patronage and peerages 
 
Until May 2010 the Leader of the Liberal Democrats had been unable to distribute positions in 
government to his team. He had, however, enjoyed the power to recommend peerages, and has 
done so in significant numbers.  One interviewee described this as „influence, not power‟ since the 
power lay with the Prime Minister who was able to increase or reduce the number of peerages 
offered to each party, and so force the party leader to drop a few from his list, or  
 
Table 16. Number of Liberal Democrat MPs and Peers 1988-2011 
 
Year (January) Total MPs Total Peers Total  Peers as % 
1988 20 57* 77 74 
1989 20 54* 74 73 
1990 20 53* 73 73 
1991 22 55* 77 71 
1992 20 56* 76 74 
1993 20 58* 78 74 
1994 20 54* 74 73 
1995 20 52* 72 72 
1996 20 56* 76 74 
1997 46 57* 103 55 
1998 46 68 114 59 
1999 46 69 115 60 
2000 46 54 100 54 
2001 46 62 108 57 
2002 52 65 117 55 
2003 52 65 117 55 
2004 52 64 116 55 
2005 51 68 119 57 
2006 62 74 136 54 
2007 62 78 140 58 
2008 62 78 140 56 
2009 62 72 134 53 
2010 62 72 134 55 
2011 57 83 140 59 
 
increase it, at relatively short notice.
259
 In 2009 of the 102 individuals that had held parliamentary 
seats for the party since 1988, 31% had stood down, lost their seats or retired, 42% of the total 
were made Peers, 13% died, 8% were elected MEPs or MSPs and 5% continued to fight to regain 
their parliamentary seat.
260
 Table 16 shows that Peers have continually outnumbered MPs since 
1988, reducing from just over three-quarters of the parliamentary party to just over one half with 
                                                                    
259  Interview 30, 2010. 
260  This data is triangulated by House of Lords Whips Office staff. 
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the post 1997 general election intake.  
 
In 1999 the party introduced a system for electing an „Interim Peers Panel‟, (interim because it was 
party policy to replace the House of Lords with an elected chamber).  The Peers Panel is open to 
anyone that had been a party member for over a year providing they meet the qualification criteria 
for being a Parliamentary candidate. In 1999 a total of 180 members put themselves forward.   
Election publicity material is then circulated to the electorate which comprises autumn federal 
conference delegates. In 1999 the votes were redistributed using the single transferable vote 
which required 140 „rounds‟ to elect 50 members to the Panel.  The rules governing the Interim 
Peers Panel were changed following a decision taken by the Federal Executive in May 2004, 
which introduced an Advisory Panel
261
 which would make recommendations to the Leader from the 
list, but also clarified that the Leader was under no obligation and would have the final say.   By 
2006 the realisation struck that the list bore little resemblance to the Peers actually appointed; 
those putting themselves forward had dropped to 47, from which 30 were elected to the list, and 
dropped further to 45 prospects in 2008 and 41 in 2010.
262
  Since becoming leader in 1988, Nick 
Clegg has appointed 24 new peers of which only eight were from the Interim Peers List.
263
 They 
were appointed in two tranches, in May 2010, when nine new peers were created, none of whom 
came from the interim list.
264
 Clegg‟s 2008 list comprised: 
 
Floella Benjamin television presenter and children‟s campaigner 
Mike German  former Deputy First Minister (Wales) 
Meral Hussein Ece councillor, Islington 
Kenneth MacDonald former Director of Public Prosecutions 
Kate Parminter former chief executive of CPRE and member of internal Lib Dem 
inquiry „The Bones Commission‟ 
John Shipley  councillor, Newcastle upon Tyne 
Richard Allan  former MP 
Matthew Taylor  former MP 
Phil Willis  former MP 
 
Mike German, Meral Hussein Ece and John Shipley have long and distinguished history as Liberal 
Democrat Councillors and their appointment will have been widely in keeping with the party‟s 
history of bringing experienced local politicians to the House of Lords. Richard Allan, Matthew 
Owen and Phil Willis similarly reflect the tradition of bringing former MPs to the second chamber.  
Experienced campaigners and prominent individuals from the charity  sector, such as Kate 
Parminter and Kenneth MacDonald are likely to be broadly welcomed by the party membership, 
although Parminter‟s role as one of three members of the Bones Commission raised a few 
eyebrows.  There was, however, disquiet in the party‟s activist and blogging community that none 
                                                                    
261 The Interim Peers Advisory Panel would consist of the President, the Vice Presidents, the Leader of the  
Lords Party (or his/her nominee), the Chief Whip in the Lords (or his/her nominee) and one representative  
from the Commons Party. 
262 The 2010 Interim Peers List was a „top-up‟ to the existing list due to traditional creation of more peers after  
a general election. 
263  http://www.libdemvoice.org/15-new-liberal-democrat-peers-appointed-22130.html (accessed 01.03.2011). 
264  http://www.libdemvoice.org/nine-new-lib-dem-peers-appointed-19722.html (accessed 07.03.2011). 
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of the new intake were from the Interim Peers List.
265
  This is explained by some in the party elite 
as a consequence of difficulties that arise from political disbarment among individuals with 
distinguished careers, who are about to retire, for example.
266
 In November 2010 the second 
tranche were appointed of whom eight were from the list and are noted by italics:
 267
 
 
Dee Doocey  2006 peers list – Chair of the London Assembly 
Jonathon Marks   2008 peers list - QC 
Monroe Palmer  2008 peers list – Chair of Lib Dem Friends of Israel 
Ben Stoneham  2008 peers list –  HQ Operations Director 
Sal Brinton 2010 peers list – Executive Director  of Association of Universities, in the 
East of England 
Nicol Stephen  ex MP 
Susan Kramer  ex MP 
Jenny Randerson ex AM 
Claire Tyler  chief executive of relate 
Paul Strasburger businessman and philanthropist 
Mike Storey  former leader of Liverpool City Council 
John Sharkey  chairman of 2010 general election campaign 
Raj Loomba  businessman and campaigner for widow‟s rights 
Judith Jolly  campaigner, activist and Chair of Devon & Cornwall LDs 
Qurban Hussain  deputy group leader on Luton Borough Council 
 
This represents an even bolder decision to select some but not others from the list. The inclusion 
of Paul Strasburger has attracted some attention, having joined the party relatively recently and 
also making a series of sizeable one-off donations to the campaign fund. 
268
   The „Cash for 
Honours‟ inquiry of 2007 cleared the party of any wrong-doing, although questions continually 
arise in the media, about the link between donors and peerages. It is argued by some in the party 
that such questions have become so frequent that the appointment of people that have made 
donations may be in part designed to demonstrate transparency.   It is, therefore, difficult to draw 
clear conclusions about the nominations of peerages. What is clear is that the party appoints a 
significant number in proportion to its MPs, that former MPs and Councillors continue to make up 
the majority, and that the Interim Peers List agreed upon by the grassroots members in a full ballot 
of conference representatives, is largely overlooked by the  leadership.  
 
To simply „follow the money‟ would be to miss a good deal of the subtle changes that have taken 
place within the parliamentary and central party over a period of 22 years.  Big donations are 
headline-grabbing, particularly the £2.4m donation, eventually ruled permissible, from Michael 
Brown‟s company Fifth Avenue Partners, but was a one-off.   It is the regular income from 
membership subscriptions and Short money upon which the party relies, bases its annual budget 
                                                                    
265  Interview 36.2009 
266  Interview 30.2010 
267  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11797202 (accessed 07.03.2011). 
268  http://www.thisisbath.co.uk/news/Big-Lib-Dem-donor-Paul-Strasburger-peer/article-2916099-      detail/article.html 
(accessed 07.03.2011). 
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and where trends can be observed.  Outside of these usual channels the decision by hedge-funder 
and Orange Book co-editor, Paul Marshall, to give £1m to rekindle Centre Forum, a think-tank 
closely associated with the party, is worthy of note. While the organisation is in no way financially 
connected to the party and it would be wrong to suggest there is any financial incentive to making 
such a donation, it does appear to represent a change in thinking about the best way to see the 
party do well, giving preference to a think-tank over the usual campaign fund spent at party 
Headquarters.  
 
v) Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlights two specific moments when the party aimed to change its organisation; 
1997 and 2008.  The ambitions set out in both the Medium Term Review and the Bones 
Commission give us an insight into the priorities of the  leadership.  In summary their proposals 
demonstrate shifts in emphasis toward: 
 
- an increase in media and communications resourcing and coordination; 
- an increase in portfolio-specific research in preference to general party policy staff; 
- the desire to use outside consultants and outsourcing; 
- the use of expert search and selection recruitment companies in the hiring of staff. 
 
These reflect a greater degree of control over what Panebianco refers to as the „zones of 
uncertainty‟ and are a strong indication of moves toward the more „electoral-professional‟ model he 
describes.  Specifically the dominant coalition has emerged through increasing control over five of 
the six resources at its disposal (Panebianco 1988):  
 
i) Competency – the increasing use of specialists in the party‟s research operation seen 
through the development of a shadow cabinet and the prioritising of expertise over party 
loyalty. 
ii) Environmental relations – it is reasonable to expect that together with the increase in 
hiring people from outside the party, particularly those with corporate experience, will 
involve closer working with external bodies, such as charities, NGOs and think tanks.  
iii) Communication – there is strong evidence that the party has prioritised its press office 
and when faced with staffing decisions has put this above research support, in an attempt 
to be seen as a credible electoral force. It controls the output of literature by local parties  
by situating HQ campaign staff in target seats at election times. 
iv) Financing – there is no evidence of the party extending its authority over areas of finance 
previously outside its control, although the PPERA legislation has necessitated 
centralised compliance, and there has been a concerted effort to improve the party‟s 
fundraising from an operation at the centre.  
v) Recruitment – the party has increasingly relied upon outside consultants for advice, 
making greater use of outsourcing and recruitment specialists in the appointment of 
professional staff. 
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In this aspect of party life then, it is possible to infer that the party has professionalized according 
to our earlier definition.  The only area where the party is unable to demonstrate control is over the 
formal rules, that is to say the federal constitution that continues to restrain the  leadership over 
policy (see Chapter 5).  As has already been explained the federal party itself does not have 
control of all monies coming in to the party, with local parties  declaring income over £25k, but 
exercising a large degree of autonomy over how this is spent, and smaller less active parties  
raising smaller sums which bear little relevance to the overall picture. Interviews suggest that the 
party elite would prefer to have greater control over these funds but are unwilling to propose the 
constitutional changes that this would necessitate in a clear acknowledgement of the hostility this 
would provoke among the grassroots.   Instead the party operates a complex system of levies and 
grants, up and down its hierarchy. In summary membership subscriptions are paid to the state 
parties , a large proportion of which ends up with the federal party, who return a proportion of it to 
the regions, but keep control through training, targeting and staffing, of how that is spent. Local 
parties  can fundraise separately through events, raffles and dinners but it needs the support of the 
central party if it is to mount a credible local campaign, and is therefore inclined to trade some 
autonomy in return.  In spite of this, in order to conclude that the party has centralized we would 
expect it to have complete control over monies coming in at every level, and this is not the case. 
 
Much of the literature about party resources focuses on the timing and likely causes of change 
(Harmel and Janda 1994) and it is clear from the evidence set out in this chapter that the Lib Dems 
have made their most significant changes post-election (1997), and post  leadership-change 
(2008).   In 1997 the party in parliament had more than doubled and the Short money that followed 
brought more staff and more professional staff in Westminster at least.  In an attempt to share this 
benefit with the party in central office some reorganisation followed, but this highlighted the „us‟ 
(Cowley Street) and „them‟ (Parliamentary staff) culture that pervaded the party.   At the same time 
Kennedy made his mark in establishing the „Shadow Cabinet‟, which benefited from centrally 
financed research support, while the parliamentary party also experienced some division within its 
ranks in creating „backbenchers‟ for the first time.
269
  When Kennedy resigned and Campbell 
became leader, resolving these tensions became a top priority and one that was continued with 
renewed rigour by Clegg in the setting up of COG.  
When the party‟s resources are reduced it makes redundancies, and when the party‟s resources 
are increased its hires more people.  Money may indicate the extent to which the party can put into 
practice the ambitions it sets out in papers such as the Medium Term Review and the Bones 
Commission, although it is not a crucial factor with regard to the organisational dynamics to which 
the party aspires.   Chapter 6 has shown how the dominant culture at Cowley Street was not one 
that embraced professionalism, but did become increasingly centralised in response to the growth 
of the party bureaucracy. In addition we should note that  there is little doubt that across all parties  
the legal requirements to comply with the PPERA legislation in 2000, has contributed to 
centralisation.  A change in personnel and the overhaul of party business represented by the 
Bones Commission shows the inclination toward an increasingly top-down organisation. The party 
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increasingly values professional expertise over party loyalty in a process of adaptation that reflects 
the superiority of the party elite over the grassroots by controlling the zones of uncertainty. If any 
further proof were needed this can be seen in the Leader‟s choice of nominations for peerages, 
which has rendered the much debated and sought-after Interim Peers List of little worth.  
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, however, is the best evidence yet that the party in 
public office is able to subordinate the party elsewhere.  While the resources it has at its disposal 
include Special Advisors and the might of the civil service, the party elsewhere has lost short 
money and lost a significant proportion of its staff through subsequent redundancies.
270
 Although 
the party  leadership can point to the policy making process as emblematic of the party‟s 
commitment to devolving power, being in coalition inevitably challenges this goal.  Clegg has 
demonstrated commitment to centralising the party‟s organisational structures, putting an 
inevitable squeeze on the ability of the party‟s grassroots to exert any real or significant influence.  
The consequences of the coalition on party finances are discussed in Chapter 9.   
 
In conclusion then, this chapter suggests that the distribution of party resources, both human and 
financial, is something the elite wish to control.  The evidence in this chapter supports H2, that 
professionalisation has taken place, but is less clear on H1 and fails to demonstrate centralisation, 
largely because local parties  are still able to raise and spend funds autonomously.  The 
distribution of the „air-war‟ element of the campaigns budget, described earlier, is evidence of 
centralisation but this is only one element of spending.  It is, however, clear, that recent moves by 
the  leadership point to an ongoing process combining professionalisation with centralisation, and 
the aim is to secure greater control over this area of party life.  
                                                                    
270 Early reports of the coalition recommend an increase in Special Advisors and a significant increase in the  
resources made available to the Lib-Dems – see „United We Stand‟, Akash Pawn, Institute for Government  
report, 2010. 
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Chapter 8 – Findings and Conclusions  
 
i) Introduction 
 
The Liberal Democrats are not like their Westminster rivals.   Firstly the party was created from the 
merger of two distinctly separate political parties , with separate ideologies and organisations.  
Secondly, it was designed with a federal structure, with devolution at its core, and gave significant 
powers to the grassroots members, particularly over policy-making.  Finally, it has, until 2010, 
spent its entire Westminster life in opposition. These three factors are a constant refrain in this 
thesis, and appear to have shaped the party at every level and at every phase of its development.   
This background is important: if it is possible to see the evolution of the party from infancy through 
adolescence, it is possible to predict how it might mature, in this case, when confronted with the 
opportunity to take part in government. 
 
This thesis demonstrates three clear phases of development between 1988 and 2010. Firstly, the 
period from 1988 to 1997, when the party at Westminster was small and maverick, the party at 
Headquarters was almost bankrupt and reliant on amateurs and volunteers, and the party 
grassroots were radical, unpredictable and policy-motivated.  Secondly, the period from 1997-
2006, when the party at Westminster grew and professionalised, the party at Headquarters also 
grew and centralised, and the party on the ground gained significant experience running local 
councils, sharing the elite‟s vote and seat-maximising goals.  Thirdly, during the period from 2006 
to 2010, the party began to experience the effects of electoral success. The party at Westminster 
was hit by a series of shocks that resulted in three  leaders in as many years. The party at 
Headquarters also lost its „leader‟ and the Bones Commission recommended the reorganisation of 
the party so that grassroots committees were superseded by the  leadership-run Chief Officers 
Group.
271
  
 
Although these factors cannot be considered to be causes of the 2010 coalition government, the 
power that they delivered to the  leadership, arguably gave Nick Clegg the freedom to negotiate a 
coalition agreement that would have previously been inconceivable. The  leadership still leads a 
party that is bound by a constitution designed to give power to the grassroots, that votes on policy 
at the twice-yearly federal conference, that elects the leader, president and numerous committees 
directly, and that continues to give autonomy to the party at the local level.  The political reality that 
has grown up around that constitution, however, has produced a party that has adapted to the 
needs of modern electoral competition and evolved into a professional vote-maximising and office-
seeking organisation at the same time.  The years 1997 and 2008 were pivotal moments in this 
process.  
 
This chapter sums up the evidence provided in previous chapters in order to support these 
conclusions.   To begin with there is a re-cap of the findings set out in Chapters 5 (policy), Chapter 
6 (campaigns) and Chapter 7 (resources).   Next we examine these findings in more detail and 
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draw a number of conclusions from them in order to test the hypotheses set out at the introduction.  
Finally we return to the theoretical context in which the work was designed and examine factors 
that may contribute to causation.    
 
ii) Findings 
 
Parties  born & raised in opposition……have been able to exploit the only resource at 
their disposal: the organisation. (Panebianco 1988). 
 
The organisation of the Liberal Democrats demonstrates a party that has evolved while in 
opposition, with two separate power-bases, one in Parliament and one at party Headquarters, one 
representing the party elite, the other the grassroots.   The analysis of three key areas of activity - 
policy, campaigns and the distribution of resources - clearly demonstrates that the party has 
experienced organisational change, with centralisation at Headquarters and professionalisation at 
Westminster.  As previously mentioned, the difference between these two processes is that the 
first is concerned with organisational power, the second with organisational complexity.   Thus 
there are different phases, types and causes of party organisational change. Here 1997 represents 
the moment when the party began to professionalise in Parliament and centralise at Headquarters. 
2008 represents the beginning of process of greater centralisation in both of these party arenas, 
drawing power closer to the leader. 
 
Policy 
  
Chapter 5 explores the policy-making process which, formally speaking, has undergone very little 
change in the past 20 years and continues to be in the hands of the federal conference.  The 
control of this, however, is the FCC, an elected party committee, the 2003 review of which 
demonstrated an awareness of the need to balance this formal purpose with the media opportunity 
and fundraising potential of the event itself.  This represents a clear shift toward a more 
professional output from the federal conference, and emphasises the event as one in which the 
party aims to present a united front. It may not always be successful in doing so but the intention is 
to maximise the opportunities the event offers, particularly in the build up to a general election.   
The case-study on tuition fees demonstrates that the Leader continues to be restrained on issues 
of policy, and the case-study on Iraq demonstrates that the Leader can be bounced in to action by 
the grassroots. The leader has traditionally written the party manifesto, and continues to do so, 
assisted by various professionals, colleagues and committees. It may be that in this area – one in 
which he is clearly able to exercise power – the status of policy made at conference will continue 
to be downgraded and made „aspirational‟. It is clear, particularly from the greater attention paid to 
elections to its Federal Policy Committee,  that the grassroots have the final say in matters of 
policy and take this role seriously, but the status of that policy may be shifting, and will be one area 
worthy of closer scrutiny in future. 
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Campaigns 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the party‟s campaigning tradition, and in particular on the targeting strategy 
pioneered by Chris Rennard.  As the 1997 general election and numerous by-election wins 
demonstrate, the strategy was successful, popular and coherent.  The party  focused heavily on 
this strategy, which combined with PPERA legislation, private polling and the growth in electronic 
media, led to the centralising of party operations at Cowley Street. With a more volunteer-based 
culture, however, there is evidence that professionalisation was met with some resistance here.  
There is no doubt that Chris Rennard was held in high esteem for having delivered a strategy that 
worked and brought the party, at Westminster and at the local level, closer to power.  While his 
legacy is important in teaching the party the primacy of this targeting strategy, the appointment of 
Chris Fox, with corporate experience and a greater focus on professionalism, resources and 
delivery, has signalled  a significant culture change at party HQ.  
 
Activists and campaigners remain important to the party, and are encouraged to make use of the 
online community that enjoys lively and un-moderated discussion, first through CIX and now 
through blogging.  There is no evidence that the party  leadership interferes with candidate 
selection, although there is some evidence that the process could be centrally controlled during 
by-elections, and that, as the mini-case studies testify, a more subtle and discrete pressure could 
be brought to bear on outcomes in the selection of candidates for target seats.   Overall, then, with 
regard to campaigns, the party has controlled the flow of money and of information from 
Headquarters, but appears to have done so with the consent, willingness and encouragment by a 
membership who share the spoils in local government. 
 
Resources 
 
Chapter 7 examined the use of resources, both human and financial. The party has for a long time 
claimed that it is a lack of financial resources is one of the greatest barriers to success.  This may 
have been what led the party to its targeting strategy in the first place, but there is little evidence to 
support claims that it is this alone that has prevented significant breakthrough.  Local parties  are 
given a degree of autonomy over their own finances, while the federal party claims a percentage of 
income and then returns this to local parties  that do as they are told.   At the same time, the party 
at Westminster has been able to make good use of its income from Short money to professionalise 
its efforts and develop a „shadow cabinet‟. Prior to 1997 the formalising of portfolios in this way 
was ridiculed by the other parties, but this plucky move when combined with a doubling of seats, 
enabled the Liberal Democrats to insist on being taken seriously. Indeed this aping of government, 
in a move to be seen as a government in waiting, is significant in the party‟s incremental progress 
toward the eventual sharing of power in 2010.  
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iii) Hypotheses 
 
Returning to the original research questions raised in this thesis, Hypothesis 1 states that the 
Liberal Democrats, as a party interested in maximising seats in order to gain executive power, 
underwent a process of centralisation. This hypothesis can be confirmed with regard to the party‟s 
campaigns department, based on the research conducted.  The second hypothesis posits that the 
Lib Dems, as a party interested in maximising seats in order to gain executive power, underwent a 
process of professionalisation, which is supported in all aspects of party life; policy-making, 
campaigns and resource distribution.  The party then, is succumbing to the „iron-law of oligarchy‟.  
The process of professionalisation has been clear, although the process of centralisation is less 
straightforward: the leader has come closer to, but in the end is still a little way from having, free-
reign over his party.    
 
These conclusions present scholars with something of a paradox.  The process described above 
suggests the subordination of the grassroots by the  leadership, although in the Liberal Democrats 
this is not necessarily the case: at any rate,  the membership appear to have been willing and 
compliant and to welcome a strengthened  leadership.  This is in part due to the factors explained 
at the beginning.  Being a party that originated from the merger of two separate parties, its 
members are skilled in the art of compromise.  Secondly being a federal and devolved party has 
given it experience in government at the state and local level.    Finally the experience of being 
permanently in opposition has made the party weary, and prepared to take a gamble.  It has, 
simply, had less to lose and has been willing therefore to trade some internal democracy for 
stronger and more ambitious  leadership. Given that much of the analysis pointed to the „credibility 
gap‟ as its greatest barrier to power, the risk appears to have been cautiously calculated (see 
Russell & Fieldhouse, 2005).  In return the  leadership have, thus far, left the sacred party 
constitution intact.  It needs the membership, particularly local activists, and particularly if its 
electoral fortunes begin to reverse.  Whether these activists are as skilled in the art of survival as 
their predecessors is hard to predict, particularly with the more professional and ambitious culture 
the party elite have encouraged. This would make a return to the 1988-1997 phase unlikely, 
although that might attract a new and enlivened activist base.  More interesting, perhaps is the 
impact of government on the party elite itself and the extent to which it begins to fashion the party 
as a small but significant permanent feature at the centre of British politics and one that, providing 
it remains above a critical mass at Westminster, may be able to continue in the role of kingmaker. 
This is considered in more detail in the Epilogue (Chapter 9). 
 
Table 17 represents a summary of conclusions in order to simply and effectively demonstrate the 
three phases described, and the impact of each on the three areas of party arenas this study has 
focused on.  
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Table 17.  Summary of conclusions 
 
 1988-1997 1997-2006 2006-2011 
Westminster 20 MPs 
Maverick  
Rebellious 
52-62 MPs 
Professionalising 
United 
57 MPs 
Dominant 
Factionalizing 
Headquarters Nearly bankrupt 
Amateur 
Chaotic 
 Increased funds 
Centralising 
Stable 
Professionalising 
Subordinated 
Stable 
Grassroots Radical 
Rebellious 
Suspicious 
Office holders 
Compliant 
Wary 
Professionalising 
Ambitious 
Ambivalent 
 
The period between 1988 and 1997 is a party with very few MPs, mostly from the celtic fringes, 
and renowned for colourful characters. At the same time Cowley Street faced bankruptcy and 
survived following mass redundancies, reliance on volunteers and a somewhat ill defined but 
evolving operational strategy.  Grassroots members were radical and rebellious, using the federal 
conference as a way to put the leader in his place and where defeats over policy were more 
frequent.  Between 1997 and 2006 the party experienced a period of professionalisation, 
particularly in Westminster where numbers and corresponding funds significantly increased and 
the „Shadow Cabinet‟ was developed. At the same time the targeting strategy coming from Cowley 
Street had paid off, and where a more centralised, focused and stable operation began to emerge, 
culminating in the promotion to Chief Executive of the Campaigns Director. The party‟s grassroots 
benefited from a phase of improved training and the success at local government continued, 
matched by some success in the new devolved state parliaments.  Between 2006 and 2010 the 
party experienced a further stage of change in which it suffered from a number of shocks and 
scandals resulting in three  leaders in as many years. The  leadership candidates that came 
forward, Clegg and Huhne, both represented a modernising tendency within the party. The 
targeting strategy that had served the party so well appeared to be floundering.  Shortly after 
Clegg‟s success a new CEO was appointed, embracing professionalism at Headquarters, and 
coupled with the Bones Commission‟s streamlining proposals to party committees, gave the new 
leader the platform from which to launch an ambitious and successful campaign for executive 
office.  
 
With regard to the hypotheses posed by this study, we are able to summarise that with regard to 
policy-making and the distribution of resources, the party has experienced a phase of 
professionalisation in support of H2. With regard to campaigns this has been preceded by a period 
of centralisation, supporting H1.    These findings are summarized below : 
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Table 18. Summary of findings 
 
 Policy Campaigns Resources 
Hypothesis 1 No Yes No 
Hypothesis 2 Yes No Yes 
 
iv) Causes of party organisational change 
 
Since the party merger in 1988 two key moments that prompted phases of transition can be 
pinpointed and are summarised in Table 17; 1997 and 2008.  The first is when the party doubled 
its numbers at Westminster. The second is a more gradual process that began with the 2005 
lacklustre general election and resignation of Charles Kennedy in 2006, and then entailed the 
turbulent  leadership battle that followed, the short tenure of Menzies Campbell, and the  
leadership of Nick Clegg. In response to each of these, the  leadership reacted with a review of its 
affairs, in 1997 the Medium Term Review and in 2008 the Bones Commission.   Party 
organisational change theory, turning increasingly to studies of individual parties, provides a 
number of competing options by way of explanation.   Panebianco sets out three questions in 
order to arrive at a conclusion about causation, beginning with the „direction of change‟, and asks 
whether parties evolve or whether change is driven by political development. The second question 
asks if change is intentional or not, and the third asks if the origins are exogenous or endogenous, 
in other words are the drivers external or internal to the party (Panebianco 1988).   This study 
suggests that while traces of the party‟s origins remain, and could be said to affect elements of 
change, it has been political development that has been the more influential factor.  It also strongly 
supports the theory of intentional change, since reviews and their recommendations are an 
empirical factor here.  We turn finally to the question of where the drivers or causes for change 
originate.    
 
Harmel and Janda develop this theme, and offer a number of possible explanations based on 
internal factors such as  leadership change and dominant faction displacement, and external 
factors including constitutional reform, public funding, the emergence of new parties, but most 
significantly a „shock‟ that relates to the party‟s primary goal (Harmel and Janda 1994).   The 
change in 1997 was clearly not triggered by  leadership change or dominant faction displacement.   
Even if it is accepted that Ashdown‟s  leadership, and in particular his „project‟ of closer co-
operation with Labour was dealt a fatal blow by the1997 result, it does not follow that the 
organisational changes that occurred at that time would have been caused by this – indeed 
Ashdown‟s resignation came a full two years later.   The result did indeed have an impact on the 
party, but by the time the Medium Term Review was drafted the party had already put in place the 
beginnings of a shadow cabinet, and party headquarters had already developed a sophisticated 
targeting strategy.   What changed was having the injection of funds to formalise and expand on 
these existing operations.  Electoral defeat, or „shock‟  as the „mother of all party change‟ lacks 
resonance in a third and smaller party, whose definition of „success‟ and „failure‟ will be different 
from those of its rivals, for whom executive office is the primary goal.  For the Lib-Dems, a vote-
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maximising and increasingly office-seeking party, success could be defined as one in which their 
target number of MPs was met or exceeded (1997) or not (2005). In 1997 it was electoral success 
that drove organisational change.    The series of events that triggered the 2008 Bones 
Commission are different.  The resignation of Charles Kennedy accompanied by his confession of 
alcoholism, an investigation in to the £2.4m donation by Michael Brown,   and a series of salacious 
tabloid headlines involving the private lives of potential  leadership candidates Simon Hughes and 
Mark Oaten, shook the party. Menzies Campbell‟s short period in office failed to restore 
confidence and stability, and the need for a change in  leadership both in Parliament and at 
Headquarters became more urgent.  It was therefore a change in  leadership, and particularly the 
events that led to Nick Clegg becoming leader, that signalled  the 2008 Party Reform „Bones‟ 
Commission, and the organisational change it prompted. There is no doubt Nick Clegg‟s ambitions 
were a game-changer for the party, and he was well aware of the potential difficulties its 
fragmented organisation could create. Moves toward a more streamlined and efficient party 
strengthened his hand and gave him the freedom to negotiate the coalition of 2010.  This theory is 
supported by evidence in Chapter 9, that explains the change in the dominant faction, in this case 
those behind The Orange Book.  
 
The Liberal Democrats have experienced two key periods of change, one that appears to have 
been primarily caused by external factors, that is the general election of 1997, the other that 
appears to have been driven by internal factors, specifically the  leadership of Nick Clegg.  
Although there is broad support for a developmental view of change it seems these specific events 
triggered reforms that would not have „just happened‟ otherwise.  This also supports a more 
integrated theory that combines these causal factors (Harmel, Tan et al. 1995; Harmel 2002).   
This thesis also demonstrates that the party has experienced two types of change, one that is best 
described as professionalisation and the other as centralisation.  Chapter 9 argues that Clegg‟s  
leadership is drawing these together and that the period studied is transitional.  
 
v) Individuals, interests, institutions and ideas 
 
Clearly the individuals that have played significant roles in the phases of organisational change set 
out above have been crucial, in particular Paddy Ashdown, Charles Kennedy, Nick Clegg, and 
Chris Rennard. Chapter 9 offers reflections on the coalition and in particular the crucial roles 
played by those behind the scenes, for example Paul Marshall and David Laws.   At the same time 
the interests that have been important to the party have taken a side-ways shift. In particular the 
role of local councillors in the central phase of professionalisation have been less evident in the 
third stage of party development.  It is unclear whether new interests are coming to the fore.   This 
may be simply a function of size, since the party has as many, at times more, officers at the local 
level, leaving few non-councillors to go around.   The institution, represented in party terms by the 
constitution, remains unchanged.   Interviewees, particularly those on the modernising wing of the 
party have hinted that its reform is inevitable since the document itself is no longer „fit for 
purpose‟.272   Such a self-conscious move toward reform would be to break the intra-party tensions 
                                                                    
272  Interview 33, 2010. 
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described in this thesis wide-open, and many interviewees have described the  leaders reluctance 
to do so.   There has in any event, been significant change without it.   This leads to the final area, 
that of ideas, where there is scope for considerably more research.  The party has reached a kind 
of organisational maturity that is evident from the emergence of ideological factions. The centre-
right  leadership by Nick Clegg of a centre-left party itself suggests a centralised organisation. The 
party has always avoided left-right labels, and appears more keen than ever to resist them, in a 
further demonstration of political expediency, enabling potential coalition with partners on either 
side.  
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Chapter 9 – Reflections on the 2010 Conservative Liberal-Democrat coalition.273 
 
 
i) Introduction 
 
 
The Liberal Democrats that Nick Clegg led in to coalition with the Conservatives in May 2010, this 
thesis has demonstrated, were a very different party from the one Paddy Ashdown attempted to 
cosy up to Labour in 1997, and different again from the one Charles Kennedy led in opposition to 
Blair‟s war on Iraq in 2003.  The role of the parliamentary party has increased while the role of 
grassroots activists has diminished. Indeed the character of the activists has shifted away from the 
„beards and sandals‟, pouring over the minutiae of policy, to one more sympathetic toward the 
ambitions of an office-seeking leadership. The party has become more professional since 
benefiting from an increase in Short money after the 1997 general election, and a significant 
structural change following a wide-ranging review of all its activities in the 2008 Bones 
Commission.  Upon entering the 2010 general election the party appeared to display all three of 
the characteristics its 22 years showed worked in its favour (see Chapter 3): charismatic  
leadership in Nick Clegg; a motivated and strong grassroots base acting as the „glue‟ that 
traditionally holds the party together; and claims to equidistance or at least distance from both of 
the parties that it challenged and would ultimately need to negotiate with.  
 
This thesis has explored party activity and intra-party organisational changes between 1988 and 
2010, stopping just short of the general election in May that year. The majority of interviews were 
conducted in 2009 and early 2010, although a small number were conducted post-election.  But 
the events that followed are significant and deserve some reflection. This epilogue aims to do two 
things: to reflect, briefly, upon what the party in coalition has done with regard to policy, 
campaigning and resources and secondly to see what this might mean for the party in public 
office, in central office and on the ground.   The ascendancy of the party in public office is well 
documented (Katz and Mair 2002) but the impact on a smaller party, a junior coalition partner with 
over a third of its parliamentary party currently holding office in government, and having lost almost 
half its staff in post-election redundancies, may be of greater significance than had been 
anticipated (Bale and Sanderson-Nash 2011).  
 
ii) Five days in May   
 
Early accounts of coalition negotiations give an interesting insight in to the Liberal Democrats' 
preparedness for this eventuality.   In particular David Laws provides a diary of events in May 2010 
that admits that the negotiation team had been meeting in secret since 2009. Although he is of the 
view that Nick Clegg was genuinely equidistant, he describes how predictions of a hung parliament 
with the Conservatives having the most seats grew in credibility and dominated discussions (Laws 
2010).  He explains that to do nothing in the event of a hung parliament was not an option, and 
that Chris Huhne argued convincingly against a „confidence and supply‟ arrangement, which he 
                                                                    
273  An earlier version of sections of this chapter appear in Bale, T. and E. Sanderson-Nash (2011). A leap of  
faith and a leap in the dark: the impact of the coalition on the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The  
Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity. M. Beech and S. Lee. , Palgrave Macmillan. 
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said would be indecisive, lead to weak government and potentially damage the recovery.  Laws 
describes his genuine surprise at the number of concessions on policy the Conservatives were 
prepared to give, and at the willingness of the party in Parliament and on the Federal Executive, to 
accept the agreement.   Experienced campaigners call this naiveté on the part of those in the party 
that did not cut their teeth in council chambers, and blame this for Law‟s bullish approach to the 
tuition fees policy (Breton 2011). His account does, however, describe how the personal chemistry 
shared by the leaders was evident, and a deal was immediately on the table. In addition nearly two 
thirds of 57 the Liberal Democrats who won seats in the 2010 general election were challenging 
Conservatives, which helps explain why they would have wanted to avoid a second election at 
which a rise in Tory support could be expected (see Appendix F). It also makes clear that whether 
the coalition proves to be delivering a Liberal Democrat agenda or not, the document offered to the 
parliamentary party was clearly perceived as doing so.  
 
Clegg was well prepared, and surrounded by a burgeoning group of MPs with either experience of 
coalition, or what could be interpreted as an ideological slant toward the Conservatives. Jim 
Wallace negotiated and participated in Scotland‟s first government in which Scottish Liberal 
Democrats were the junior partners in coalition with Labour between 1999 and 2007.   Andrew 
Stunnell was formerly the Leader of Cheshire County Council, in coalition with Labour between 
1985 and 1990. Chris Huhne (Nick Clegg‟s leadership rival) Danny Alexander (also new in the 
2005 intake and an ambitious MP very close to Nick Clegg and effective go-between with the 
Leader's office and the parliamentary party) and David Laws (co-author of The Orange Book and 
regarded as an intellectual heavy-weight within the party) completed the team. Those that were left 
out of the team included former leaders, Lord Ashdown and Charles Kennedy, both of whom urged 
caution over coalition, Kennedy finally opposing the move, Shirley Williams, while supporting the 
decision to enter coalition, described it as the „passing away‟ of a generation driven by ideology. 
Indeed, a brief glance at the „top 50 most influential Lib Dems‟ compiled annually by the Daily 
Telegraph, most recently in September 2010, is revealing.  Of the top 25, 10 hold posts in 
government, and the return of David Laws is much hoped for by the party leadership.  Other senior 
office holders include the Chief Whip, Alistair Carmichael MP, Special Advisors Lena Pietsch, 
Alison Suttie and Polly Mackenzie, the Leader in Scotland, Tavish Scott, and two party staff, the 
Chief Executive Officer Chris Fox and Director of Communications Jonathan Oates.  Other than 
the former leaders already mentioned, Ros Scott has resigned as Party President, Evan Harris lost 
his seat in 2010 and Lord Oakeshott resigned his position as Treasury Spokesman in the Lords 
following an attack on the coalition over what he saw as its toothless banking reforms.  The only 
person in the list that can be considered powerful in his own right and not a natural ally of the 
coalition is Simon Hughes, MP for Bermondsey, who was elected Deputy Leader in a vote of the 
parliamentary party. Hughes beat Tim Farron, who went on to become President, by 38 votes to 
18 (68% to 32%). Hughes has since been appointed the Government‟s Advocate for Access to 
Education after abstaining on the tuition fees vote, something that appears to represent a 
softening of his position.
274
   
 
                                                                    
274  http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23905910-simon-hughes-why-i-abstained-in-tuition-fees-vote.do 
(accessed 21.05.2011). 
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In a further move to shore-up the legitimacy of the decision to enter coalition, Clegg was able to 
demonstrate the support of his party during a „special conference‟ convened in Birmingham in 
order to operate the constitutional „triple-lock‟ mechanism. This is a safeguard in place to protect 
the party‟s grassroots against a change in strategy or direction in an amendment passed at the 
party‟s Federal Conference at Southport in 1998 (Pack 2011). It was introduced at a time when 
many within the party feared a loss of independence for the party amidst rumours of Paddy 
Ashdown‟s secret meetings with Tony Blair. The version eventually passed replaced a less 
specific proposal, and states that „changes in strategy require consultation with party membership‟, 
and brought about a rule that requires 75 percent of both the Federal Executive and 75 percent of 
the Parliamentary party to support such moves. In 2010 despite securing 75 percent of both 
bodies and being technically unnecessary, the party president (then Baroness Ros Scott) sought 
to reaffirm the party‟s support for coalition by instituting the second part of the triple lock and 
convening a special conference of members. The conference held in Birmingham on 16 May 2010, 
provided Clegg with a public demonstration of this support.  At the time the motion was considered 
to be something of a triumph by the party‟s activists, setting out guidelines to protect the party from 
sacrificing its independence on the short-term whim of an individual leader.  Despite this triple lock 
mechanism, the recent transition within the party, and in particular policy development and 
organisational structures described elsewhere, has arguably changed the strategy and direction of 
the party.  It was, when seen in light of the fact that Clegg had already signed the coalition deal, an 
exercise in good relations, giving the party an opportunity to voice support and to demonstrate 
unity.   One interviewee described the leadership‟s seductive pitch: 
 
They were able to move from a position of „this is the only game in town and we‟re holding 
our nose and doing it‟ to „this is the first time in 100 years Liberal Democrat manifesto 
commitment will become law. (Interview 25, 2010). 
iii) Policy 
Since entering in to coalition the party have had to grapple with the reality of closing the credibility 
gap and the growth of factional politics in its ranks. Many of those interviewed post-election 
rejected an assessment of the 2010 coalition being a triumph for the authors of The Orange Book. 
It is easy to see why, since this would be to admit factionalism and the growing gulf between 
economic and social liberals.  There is clearly a difference in opinion over the role of the state, set 
out in The Orange Book, its follow-up Britain After Blair and some counter arguments put forward 
in Reinventing the State (Marshall and Laws 2004; Astle, Laws et al. 2006; Brack, Grayson et al. 
2007).   Discussions over ideology were far and few between during the Kennedy leadership 
(Brack 2007) but reignited with the publication of The Orange Book and the Huhne-Clegg contest 
of  2008 (Francis 2010). The sacrificing of „ideological cohesion‟ is one consequence of the 
electoral necessity faced by the third party (Russell 2010) and this thesis suggests that precisely 
this motivated Paul Marshall and others to turn away from the leaflet-delivering culture to back a 
more ideologically based debate by funding The Orange Book and the Centre-Forum think-tank.  
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The coalition agreement and the Liberal Democrat manifesto of 2010 appeared to resemble one 
another sufficiently closely for the grassroots to almost unanimously support it at the „special 
conference‟ held in Birmingham, where they were given an opportunity to show support.   Non-
affiliated radical magazine „Liberator‟ said „Father Christmas appeared to come early down the 
Cowley Street chimney‟ (Breton 2011), and some word-count based assessments of the two 
documents suggest the coalition document was closer to the Lib Dem manifesto than it was the 
Conservatives (Quinn, Bara et al. 2010). This may have been so for those supporters of The 
Orange Book whose aspirations were captured in the party manifesto, but created a problem both 
in terms of policies such as the abolition of tuition fees where the leadership voted against party 
policy, and by creating a new landscape in which distinctive campaigning priorities may also put 
the party at odds with itself.  The federal party conference held in the spring of 2011 gave Clegg a 
standing ovation while at the same time voting for an amendment to policy on reform of the NHS, 
in an attempt to tie the leader‟s hands on this potentially divisive issue.  Assessments of the 
campaign in 2010 suggest that the party was held back from winning up to 15 seats because its 
immigration policy was unpopular.  Without the policy for an amnesty for illegal immigrants these 
15 seats could have enabled it to have done a deal with Labour, and may drive the party ever 
closer to reliance on polling in target seats in order to drive its preferred future partnerships.
275
 
Changes to policy, then, may have as much to do with a future deal with Labour, as with guiding 
the Liberal Democratic-Conservative coalition.      
The 2010 general election saw Nick Clegg triumph in the first televised leadership debate, 
enabling him to make his appeal more directly to the voters in a move towards the 
presidentialisation of the position never experienced by his predecessors. The party, however, 
continues to need its centrally run campaigns operation, particularly if it is to keep control of party 
communications while also running devolved operations in Scotland, Wales, the party regions, 
Europe and at the local level. It will, however, need to resolve growing tension around its branding. 
The „untarnished and untried‟ reputation of the Lib-Dems benefited Clegg on television, but will be 
impossible to pitch in future campaigns, and will be incompatible with the image of a party that 
hoped to benefit from a more professional and serious governmental style.  His tactic has been to 
promote instead the „radical centre‟ from which he will hope to be in a position to influence either 
Labour or the Conservatives at future elections.
276
 The party has been traditionally difficult to lead 
but appears to have welcomed the strong leadership of Nick Clegg, who led from the front in his 
first few months in the post, losing three front benchers over a parliamentary vote on the Lisbon 
treaty.
277
   Readiness to embrace alternative leadership within the parliamentary party remains 
unlikely, particularly while the party has half its MPs in government posts. Early criticism of the 
coalition has come instead from council leaders
278
 and prospective parliamentary candidates
279
. 
                                                                    
275  Interview 67, 2011.  
276  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/mar/13/nick-clegg-lib-dems-centre (accessed 21.05.2011). 
277  http://www.libdemvoice.org/three-lib-dems-quit-front-bench-over-lisbon-treaty-referendum-2284.html  
(accessed 21.05.2011). 
278  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12413101 (accessed 21.05.2011). 
279  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nick-clegg/8166996/Liberal-Democrat-candidates-call-on-Nick-
 Clegg-to-oppose-tuition-fee-rise.html (accessed 21.05.2011). 
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There is, however, also growing rebellion among the party‟s back-benchers.280 Clegg has 
appointed 23 Ministers (see Appendix K
281
) and there is some discussion about increasing this so 
that the party has representation in every government department and a larger team of Special 
Advisors (see Pawn 2010).
282
   In a party with just 57 MPs he could theoretically ensure that every 
one experienced, or at least aspired to experience, a government post – giving him significantly 
greater powers as a function of size, than leaders of other parties or his predecessors.    
iv) Campaigns and grassroots 
The Liberal Democrats owe their survival in part to the loyalty of support and organisation at the 
local level, particularly at the Celtic fringes.   Marginalising the party on the ground seems perilous 
while its future in government is insecure.  The party, however, reported a significant increase in 
membership in the first few months of coalition. For every 1 member leaving 8 were joining, which 
slowed in the months post election to 5 before reducing to 2.
283
 The Welsh party, for whom figures 
are available, report a 12% increase in membership overall, a figure supported by anecdotal 
evidence from individual constituency parties.  This is important not only as an indicator of the 
party‟s overall support, but will if it continues have an impact on the character of the party, with the 
disaffected former Labour supporters it picked up in the mid-2000s leaving, replaced instead with 
soft Conservatives.   The party has a fluctuating support base and it is difficult to imagine it not 
suffering from a mid-term slump but it will be in rural Scotland and the south west of England that 
the consequences can be most sharply measured.  In spite of popularity veering from 6% to 25% 
nationally the party has always been able to rely on a strong base in these old Liberal heartlands. 
At the same time boundary changes and reducing the numbers of MPs are not expected to work in 
the party‟s favour.284  As Chapter 5 explains, some members already feel their role has been 
reduced to primarily that of fundraiser and leaflet deliverer,  although there is no doubt they are still 
a necessary, and for the Liberal Democrats, critical part of the party.  They owe this, according to 
the model, to the legacy of the past, but may try to wrest greater power from it, particularly in the 
Lib-Dems over the constitution that gives policy-making powers to the membership, or over 
candidate-selection where the local parties also exercise autonomy.   While this makes sense for 
one of the big parties in a two-party system it is less clear how such a strategy will work for the 
third party, whose future in office is far from guaranteed in the round.   They are more likely to 
adopt a „division of labour‟ tactic that continues to encourage local parties to grow in size, and to in 
turn be able to exercise control over sub-national politics.  
                                                                    
280 In April 2011, almost a year in to the coalition, the number of non-government Lib Dem MPs that had not rebelled 
stood at just 2, the others all having voted against the government at some point. See www.revolts.com. 
(accessed 04.05.2011). 
281  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democrat_Frontbench_Team#Liberal_Democrat_Frontbench_Team  
 (accessed 21.05.2011). 
282  This has so far been rejected by the Public Administration Committee  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/530/53007.htm (accessed  
21.05.2011). 
283  Interview 61, party staff, 2010. 
284  http://www.libdemvoice.org/lord-chris-rennard-av-referendum-22119.html (accessed 17.01.2011). 
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iv) Resources 
The acquisition of government status is itself, part of a socialisation process and one likely to be 
impacting heavily on a party that has existed on the political fringe since its creation in 1988, and 
its predecessor parties , long before that  (Katz and Mair 2002).  Katz & Mair emphasise a number 
of ways in which the subordination of the party headquarters to the parliamentary party is 
demonstrated: firstly the use of state subventions, that is the distribution of financial resources, in 
this case from Short money and secondly the allocation of staff.   As already described, the party 
has lost its right to Short money with consequent redundancies and the decision to leave 
Headquarters at Cowley Street.
285
 In the days that followed the coalition agreement the party was 
forced to take immediate action to make more than half its staff at Headquarters redundant, 
reducing from 14 to 5 in the press office and from 22 to 5 in the research office.  One source 
reported this as being appropriate to reflect the different role for party staff in office as opposed to 
in opposition. “There‟s nothing for them to do, other than circulate government announcements, 
which the civil servants do anyway”.286  The downsizing of the party operation at Cowley Street 
has all the more significance when combined with the impact of a large growth in professional 
support offered to the party in office through Special Advisors.   At present the party has a total of 
10 Special Advisors, professionals from within the party‟s own ranks, earning between £67,000 
and £80,000 a year
287
 as well as support from the civil service for government research and press 
within each individual ministry.   One insider explained: 
With the move in to government the top tier of Nick‟s office, they‟ve all become Special 
Advisors, and the party in a way has….well senior party staff from POLD, HQ or Nick‟s 
team, 75-80% have been taken in to government. There‟s a gap and we hadn‟t thought of 
that. We‟re a small organisation. (Interview 26, 2011).  
Two further new developments are worthy of note since the party entered government. The first is 
that, perhaps in combination with the departure of Chris Rennard and entering government, the 
party has introduced a significant reorganisation to its Campaigns Department in July 2011.   The 
party has announced three key areas of expertise; Campaigns Development Team, Ground 
Communications Team and Strategic Seat Operations Team, including 9 new posts to be centrally 
employed, while at the same time ceasing to employ its current campaigns staff, totalling 20 
across the UK.  These previous posts are thought to now be the responsibility of the Regional 
parties, in a move that appears to create a centralised hub of decision-making specialists at HQ, 
while grass-roots campaigners are kept at the local level, and are to be recruited and funded 
locally too. 
288
   
Secondly, the party has created a new post, Chief of Staff (HQ) and Political Secretary to the 
Deputy Prime Minister, filled by Tim Snowball, close colleague of Nick Clegg, who was appointed 
                                                                    
285  the party announced in March 2011 that it was ceasing its rental of offices at 4 Cowley Street and seeking  
more „appropriate‟ premises: http://www.politicshome.com/uk/story/14920/ (accessed 21.03.2011). 
286  Interview 5, politician, 2009. 
287  http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/statements/wms-special-advisers.aspx (accessed 12.11.11). 
288  http://www.markpack.org.uk/major-restructuring-in-the-campaigns-department/ (accessed 29.06.2011) 
165 
 
 
a Civil Service post immediately after the election, but preferred the party-based work at 
Headquarters.  As well as taking over responsibility for the day-to-day operation at Cowley Street, 
a job previously undertaken by Ben Stoneham, now Lord Stoneham, who left early in 2011, he 
additionally acts as the bridge between this and the leader – effectively a bridge between the party 
in office and the party at HQ.   
There have been some interesting shifts in personnel, in particular Duncan Brack, long-term 
activist, former Policy Director, and latterly Chairman of the Federal Campaigns Committee, 
resigning in order to take up a Special Advisor role with Chris Huhne, and Alison Suttie shifting 
from party employment as Deputy Chief of Staff to Nick Clegg to take up a Special Advisor role 
with Danny Alexander.  A number of senior personnel from the Clegg office have also taken up 
posts in government including Lena Pietsch and Polly Mackenzie. Katz and Mair describe the 
orientation of the party toward office, which they argue influences the intra-party balance of power. 
In the case of the Liberal Democrats the power of the Federal Executive had already been 
circumscribed by the Bones Commission giving a number of its key responsibilities to the 
unelected Chief Officers' Group. However, the Federal Policy Committee, elected by members at 
the party conference, also demonstrates the beginning of factionalisation and increasingly appears 
be the focal point for those critical of the coalition.  In addition to watching this development, the 
process of parliamentarisation impacts on both the party at headquarters and the party on the 
ground, and might be measured by an assessment of whether there is reversion to an amateur-
volunteer culture at HQ or attempts to de-politicise the party organisation by employing more 
specialists and consultants on short-term contracts.  A summary of staffing is contained in the 
organigram in Appendix H. This snapshot of party organisation taken in October 2010 shows a 
streamlining and simplification of the hierarchy, which was accompanied by an overall drop in 
numbers employed by the party across the board from 110 to 84.  The party is in part as a 
consequence of this, and in part in reflection of its ongoing professionalism, leaving Cowley Street 
in search of more suitable premises for party HQ. 
289
   One former member of staff explained that 
the party was being given support by having staff seconded from companies such as Price 
Waterhouse Coopers and KPMG
290
, providing specialist consultancy for example, a recent review 
of Human Resources.  
There is no doubt the Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg has taken a huge gamble entering into 
coalition with the Conservatives.  He has gambled that he will gain more by bridging the credibility 
gap than he has to lose by fighting a second election. He has taken a leap of faith that the public 
will forgive him for cuts in public services and reward him with voting reform. The disastrous results 
of the May 2010 local elections, in which the party saw its local government base decimated, and 
the loss of the AV referendum held on the same day, have far-reaching consequences for the 
ongoing success of the coalition and the Clegg leadership.  He has calculated that the party can 
afford to lose the support it built up under Charles Kennedy in urban areas of the North of England 
and replace it with support in traditionally Conservative areas.  Whatever the coming months and 
years bring the party has proved itself extremely robust. The party emerged from a deeply 
                                                                    
289 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12691946 (accessed 09.05.2011). 
290
  Neil Sherlock, partner at KPMG in charge of public and regulatory affairs, is a long-term Lib Dem activist,  
senior advisor to the Leader, listed as in the party‟s top 50 most influential people.   
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damaging and divisive alliance as a new entity that within 3 years was making the headlines with 
sensational by-election wins. It bounced back from polling just 6% in the European parliamentary 
elections, coming fourth to the Green party in 1990, and again from having its vote massively 
reduced in 2005. It benefited at the local level when the Conservatives were at their least popular, 
and conversely when Labour were least popular, arguably able to compete for any seat in the 
country.  It has been beset by its fair share of scandals and personal difficulties but has thus far 
brought its leadership-loyal grassroots alongside.    
Clegg continues to enjoy a strong hand – secure in the knowledge of a fixed-term parliament - 
having promoted currently 23 of his 57 MPs to government office. Cracks are beginning to show, 
however, with criticism from defeated council leaders, the defeat of the party‟s position on the AV 
referendum held in May 2011, a growing trend of rebellion among back-benchers against the 
government and the inevitable whisperings of a potential challenge. Naturally the reality of office 
means he is likely to experience greater unrest than his predecessors, and of a different kind. The 
party‟s impressive history of survival and those factors that contribute to it however, remain intact. 
Where the party lack experience and are most likely to feel the deepest blows are not with 
tensions within, but simply in the deterioration of its relationship with the electorate, whose protest-
vote they look set to decisively lose.  
vi) Conclusion 
 
In summary, the parliamentary operation of the Liberal Democrats has become one that befits a 
party of office, and as such the party has divided in to backbenchers and government ministers. 
This is made all the more poignant when seen in terms of the support each of these has at its 
disposal.  The backbenchers have a dwindling operation at headquarters and a much-reduced 
research and press staff; the ministers having seconded most of the party‟s senior staff, and has 
these on high incomes and the civil service at its disposal too.   Whether the new headquarters is 
one that relies on amateurs and volunteers or continues with professionalisation albeit with 
reduced numbers, will be an indication of the impact that public office has in the long term on 
relations between these two sections of the party.  The grassroots have changed over the years, 
and although they are arguably more instrumental and prepared to take a leap in the dark, it 
remains to be seen – particularly if their numbers at the local level are radically reduced by poor 
showings at local elections – whether they will consider it a price worth paying.  The potential to 
obstruct the leader remains through the elected committees and constitution of the party, but these 
are relics, and represent the pre-government party.  The final stage of the party‟s transition would 
be marked by constitutional change to alter the arrangements under which it makes policy, and 
whether it were to accept moves to give the leader greater flexibility, downgrading the role of FPC 
and conference to something akin to „advisory‟ or „aspirational‟.  Whether the English decide to 
start loving coalitions will be tested in coming years and along with it whether the Liberal 
Democrats love being in office. This will be seen by their willingness to tackle the constitution and 
policy-making process, whether local parties  retain some autonomy over locally-raised funds, and 
the extent to which experts are increasingly employed at Headquarters.  
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In the three areas of party life studied here, policy-making, campaigning and resource-distribution, 
it is possible to identify the processes of centralisation and professionalisation, and so in the party 
overall both processes are under-way, and both hypotheses supported. It is also possible to see 
how these developments are advantageous to the leadership, and are likely to be pursued. 
Furthermore in explaining the combination of factors that describe the party‟s transition in to an 
electoral professional party, it is possible to see how these have helped the transition in to 
government. It demonstrates that the grassroots were almost an irrelevance in the triumph of The 
Orange Book, whose supporters formed a small but powerful cabal and were able to fully exploit 
opportunities that came their way in the leadership contest of 2008, and subsequent demise of the 
Labour government (Quinn and Clements 2010; see also Crabtree 2010).  The outcome of  
Clegg‟s experiment depends upon two things: whether the electorate decide to punish the party at 
the polls, as they have in the first significant contest since the coalition in May 2010, and whether 
the party is robust enough to avoid being gobbled up by its larger partner in the process (Bale 
2011). If successful it will re-shape political competition in such a way that opens up possibilities 
for smaller parties and for factions within those that are well established.   If it loses and splits, or 
returns to the wilderness at Westminster, it will have demonstrated the endurance of the two-party 
system.  
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Appendix A – Interview schedule* 
 
Surname First name Capacity for interview 2011 
Beith Alan MP   
Leaman Alan Former Chief of Staff, Leaders office 
Stunell Andrew MP, former CEO ALDC, Former Chief Whip 
Kirkwood Archy Former Chief Whip 
Stoneham Ben Former staff – Director of HQ 
Williams Ben Staff – secretary to POLD 
Woodthorpe Brown Former Chair Candidates Cttee 
Thomas Celia Former staff - Head of Lords Whips Office 
Kennedy Charles Former Leader 
Bones Chris Senior party advisor 
Rennard Chris Former CEO, Former staff - Dir of Campaigns 
Moon Christian Staff - Head of Policy 
Alexander Danny MP & Chief of Staff, Leaders Office 
Allworthy David Head of Compliance, HQ 
Boyle David Activist, FPC member, Former Editor „Lib Dem News‟ 
Loxton David Head of Membership, HQ 
Steel David Former Leader, Liberal Party 
Davidson Dawn Former Chair, English Party 
Barrie Derek Former CEO Scottish Liberal Democrats 
McCarthy Donna Former activist 
Brack Duncan Former Chair FCC, former Director of Policy 
Greenland Duncan Chair FFAC 
Davey Ed MP, former Chair CCC 
Epps Gareth Member FE 
Vernon-Jackson Gerald Activist and long-term FE member  
Cheesman Gill Chair, Parliamentary Staff Association 
Lishman Gordon FE member 
Elson Graham Former General Secretary 
Simpson Greg Former Director of Policy 
Jardine-Brown Helen Former Head of Treasurers Unit, HQ 
Wrigglesworth Iain Former President  
Walton Ian Activist and party staff HQ and Welsh party 
Connor Jane EARS 
Sharkey John Staff - Director of communications 
Astle Julian Director, Centre Forum (think-tank) 
Ingram Julian Senior party advisor 
McGuiness Justine Activist and founder „Reformer‟ magazine 
Heywood Kate Assistant to the CEO, HQ 
Murphy Laura Activist 
Opik Lembit Former MP  
Featherstone Lynne MP   
McGavin Margaret Former party staff 
Littlewood Mark Former Director of Media 
Oaten Mark Former MP 
Pack Mark Former staff -  Head of Innovations 
Smullian Mark Organizer - Liberator magazine 
Sowemimo Matthew Founder, Social Liberal Forum and former staff,  
Campbell Menzies Former Leader 
Dholakia Navnit Former President  
South Nick Former staff – Research Assistant to Paddy Ashdown 
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Surname First name Capacity for interview 2011 
Bliss Nigel Head of Finance, HQ 
Baker Norman MP  
Ashdown Paddy Former Leader 
Clark Reg PCC, Hartlepool, former Federal Treasurer 
Byrne Richard Lewes Constituency Organizer 
Grayson Richard Former head of Policy Unit, HQ 
Scott Ros Former President 
Walkington Sandy Former staff -  Dir of Communications 
Morris Sarah Staff - Head of Training 
Williams Shirley Former Leader House of Lords 
Hughes Simon MP  
James Simon Former staff, LDYS, HQ 
Gauge Steve Activist 
Scott Tavish Leader, Scottish Liberal Democrats 
Clement-Jones Tim Treasurer, former FE member 
Razzall Tim Former Chair GEC,  Former Treasurer 
Pickstone Tom CEO, ALDC 
Greaves Tony Former FE member 
Mason Trevor Parliamentary Editor, Press Association 
Goodhart Willy Former Chair FPC   
 
*the numbers used as a key for interviews are for personal use only. Interviews were conducted on a strictly non-attributable 
basis and the numbers used in the thesis text therefore do not correspond numerically to the names in this list. 
 
Interviews were declined for this thesis, by Lord Anthony Lester (Peer), Jackie Ballard (former MP) and Chris Fox (Chief 
Executive Officer). 
 
Interviews were cancelled by either side with Evan Harris (former MP), Robert Maclennan (Peer & former leader SDP), John 
Hemming (MP), Neil Stockley (former head of policy unit), Rob Blackie (former director of research) and Liam McArthur 
(MSP).   
 
No response was received to email requests for interviews by Paul Marshall (Co-author „The Orange Book‟), Ramesh Dewan 
(long term FE member) and Peter Yeldon (donor). 
 
Total approached  81 
Total conducted  70 
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Appendix C – Elected Members of FE 1988-2009 
 
Surname First name TOT 2009 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 
Anglin Charles 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Afzal Quassim 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bailey Helen 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Barker Liz 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bellotti David 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Bingham Viv 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Borrowman Duncan 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Bowles Sharon 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bracey Dexter 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Burstow Paul 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Clein Richard 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clement-Jones Tim 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Conway Clare 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Cox Val 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dewan Ramesh 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Dholakia Navnit 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Doocey Dee 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Elizabeth Sidney 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Ellis Peter 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Elson Graham 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Epps Gareth 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Farthing Paul 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Featherstone Lynne 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Fawcett Neil 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Fish Louise 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Foote-Wood Francis 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Gallagher Jock 4 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Garden Tim 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gifford Zerbanoo 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Surname First name TOT 2009 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 
Glover Mark 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Gordon Rosalyn 5 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Graham James 4 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greaves Tony 6 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Greenland Duncan 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Granshaw Lindsay 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Gurling James 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hayes Josephine 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Heath David 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Hodgson Dave 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Johnson Elizabeth 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jones Trevor 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kennedy Charles 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Kramer Susan 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Le Breton Bill 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Lishman Gordon 9 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Lloyd Stephen 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maines Chris 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Martin Polly 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
McCarthy Donnachadh 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
McGivan Alec 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
McNally Tom 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Munt Tessa 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Northover Lindsay 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Opik Lembit 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pardy Gillian 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Parminter Kate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Piercy Candy 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rendel David 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rickard Hugh 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Surname First name TOT 2009 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 
Rossi Marie-Louise 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Scott Ros 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Simpson Mike 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Smith Iain 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Smithard Jane 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Swinson Jo 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Teverson Robin 6 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tod Martin 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trevor Jones 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Tustin Sara 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Vernon-
Jackson Gerald 10 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Vitelli Siobhan 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Walmsley Joan 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Walter David 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Walton Ian 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Watson Eriend 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Whitehouse Jon 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Whyte Monica 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Williams David 5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Willott Alison 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Winch Phoebe 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wrigglesworth Ian 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wright Simon 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D – Former Lib Dem MPs  – Where are they now? (1988-2009) 
 
Surname First name 
Became 
MP 
Ceased MP Present 
Richard  Allan 1997 2005 
Stood down - now Cisco Head of 
Public Affairs 
David Alton 1988 1997 Peer  
Paddy Ashdown 1988 2001 Peer 
Jackie Ballard 1997 2001 Lost - now Dir. RSPCA 
David Bellotti *1990 1992 Lost - now Chairman of Bath Council 
Peter Brand 1997 2001 Lost - retired GP   
John Burnett 1997 2005 n/a   
Patsy Calton 2001 2005 Deceased   
Alex Carlile 1988 1997 Peer    
Michael Carr *1991 1992 Lost    
David Chidgey *1994 2005 Peer     
Brian Cotter 1997 2005 Peer     
Chris Davies 1995 1997 MEP    
Sue Doughty 2001 2005 PPC    
Parmjit Singh Gill *2004 2005 Lost - now Councillor  
Donald Gorrie 1997 2001 Stood down   
Matthew Green 2001 2005 Stood down   
Geraint Howells 1988 1992 Deceased/Peer   
Russell Johnston 1988 1997 Deceased/Peer   
Nigel Jones 1992 2005 Peer     
Archy Kirkwood 1988 2005 Peer     
Liz Lynne 1992 1997 MEP    
Robert Maclennan 1988 2001 Peer     
Diana Maddock *1993 1997 Peer     
Paul Marsden 2001 2005 Stood down   
Ray Michie 1988 2001 Deceased/Peer   
Emma Nicholson **1995 1997 Peer     
David Rendel *1993 2005 PPC    
Brian Sedgemore ***2001 2005 Stood down   
Cyril Smith 1988 1992 Stood down   
David Steel 1988 1997 Peer     
Nicol Stephen *1991 1992 MSP    
Peter Thurnham **1996 1997 Deceased   
Jenny Tonge 1997 2005 Peer    
Paul Tyler 1992 2005 Peer    
Jim Wallace 1988 2001 Peer    
 
*       won in a by-election 
**     defected from Conservative party 
***    defected from Labour party 
Richard Livsey & Ronnie Fearne both  lost their seat in 1992 but regained it in 1997 
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Appendix E - Policy-making in the Lib Dems 
 
Rejected 
policies & 
resolutions 
Federal Conference 
Committee 
Federal Conference 
Election 
manifesto 
Passed 
Defeate 
State 
parties 
SAOs 
Conference 
members 
Local 
parties 
Regional 
parties 
Federal Policy 
Committee 
Policy Working 
Groups 
Parliamentary 
Liberal Democrats 
Submits policy documents 
or resolutions to 
Path of policies after 
conference 
Appoints 
Consults on 
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Appendix F – The 2010 Liberal Democrat Ministers, by constituency,  
majority and which party came 2
nd
 
 
Name    Constituency  Party  majority  % maj 
 
 
Clegg Nick   Sheffield Hallam  Con 15,284  29.9  
Deputy PM 
 
Cable Vince   Twickenham  Con 12140 20.3 
Business Secretary 
 
Laws David   Yeovil   Con 13036 22.8 
 
Moore Michael   Berwickshire,  Con 5675 11.6 
Secy of State for Scotland   Roxborough & Selkirk 
 
Huhne, Chris   Eastleigh   Con 3864 7.2 
Energy & Climate Secretary 
 
Alexander, Danny   Inverness, Nairn  Lab 8765 18.6 
Chief Sec to the Treasury  Bedenoch & Strathspey 
 
Browne, Jeremy   Taunton Deane  Con 3998 6.9 
FCO Minister 
 
Harvey, Nick   North Devon  Con 5821 11.3 
MoD Minister 
 
Webb Steve   Thornbury & Yate  Con 7116 14.8 
Business Innovation & Skills  
 
Burstow Paul   Sutton & Cheam  Con 1608 3.3  
Dept of Health Minister 
  
Teather, Sarah   Brent Central  Lab 1345 3 
Dept of Education Minister 
 
Carmichael, Alistair   Orkney & Shetland  Lab 9928 51.3 
Deputy Chief Whip 
 
Heath David   Somerset & Frome  Con 1817 3 
Deputy Leader of the Commons 
 
Lamb Norman   North Norfolk  Con 11626 23.4 
Asst Govt Whip 
 
Hunter Mark   Cheadle   Con 3272 6.2 
Asst Govt Whip 
 
Davey, Ed    Kingston & Surbiton  Con 7560 13.2 
Under Secy for Employment  
relations, consumer & postal affairs 
 
Stunell Andrew   Hazel Grove  Con 6371 15.2 
Under Sec for Community  
cohension 
 
Baker Norman   Lewes   Con 7647 15.3 
Under Sec for Regional & Local  
Transport 
 
Featherstone, Lynne   Hornsey & Wood   Lab 7875 12.5 
Under Sec for Equalities  Green 
 
Lords Wallace   PEER 
Advocate for Scotland  
 
Lord McNally    PEER 
Justice Minister 
 
Lord Shutt    PEER 
Deputy Govt Whip in Lords 
 
Baroness Northover   PEER  
Whip in Lords 
 
Lord Saltire    PEER 
Whip in Lords 
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Lib Dems won 57 seats in total 
 
They have 19 government posts 
Of these 15 were against the Conservatives   (79%) 
4 were against Labour    (21%) 
 
The remainder of the parliamentary party, out of 38 MPs  (66.6%) 
 
24 were against Conservatives    (63%) 
13 were against Labour     (34%) 
1 was against the SNP    (2.6%) 
 
Overall the LDs were challenging  
  
Tories  39 seats     68.42% 
Labour 17 seats     29.8% 
SNP in 1 seat     1.7% 
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Appendix G – Party Structure Nov 2009 
                
 
President Chair of Federal Conference 
Committee 
Party Leader & Chair of 
Federal Policy Committee 
Federal Executive 
Chair of Federal Finance & 
Administration Committee 
Chief Whip & Chair of POLD 
Chair of Campaigns & 
Communications Committee 
Chair of Training Task 
Group 
Chair of International 
Relations Committee 
Secretary to the 
Parliamentary Party 
Dep Sec to the 
Parliamentary Party 
Chief Whip, Lords 
Head of Office 
Parliamentary 
Legislative Advisors 
x3 
Research Assistant 
Communications 
Officer 
Chief Executive 
Political Assistant 
to Chief Executive Director of 
Finance 
Finance Officers 
x2 
HQ Director 
Office Manager & 
Committee 
Administrator 
Administrator & PA 
(& Info Account) 
Receptionist 
Director of 
Campaigns 
Head of Innovations 
Innovations Officer 
National Campaigns 
Officer 
National Campaigns 
Assistant 
Director of 
Marketing, 
Fundraising & 
Member‟s Services 
Membership 
Services Manager 
Membership 
Officers x2 
Membership 
Customer 
Services Officer 
Fundraising 
Managers x2 
Fundraising Officer (to 
be appointed) 
Lib Dem Calling 
Editor of Lib 
Dem News 
Lib Dem News 
Production 
Assistant 
Head of Compliance 
& Constitutional 
Support 
English Candidates 
Officer 
Candidates 
Assistant 
English Party 
Administrator 
London Region 
Administrator 
Conference & 
Events Manager 
Conference 
Registration 
Manager 
Assistant 
Conference 
Organiser 
Sales Executive, 
Conference Office 
Director of Policy & 
Communication 
Head of International 
Office 
P/T Temporary Assistant 
Africa Network Officer 
Head of Policy & 
Research 
Dep Head of Policy 
& Research 
Press Secretary to the 
Leader & Director of 
Media 
Senior Policy 
Officer 
Policy Officer 
x2 
Political 
Intelligence & 
Communications 
IT Support 
Consultant 
Intelligence & 
Communication
s Officers x2 
Leader’s Press 
Officer 
Head of Media 
Dep Head of 
Media & News 
Manager 
Print Media 
Officers x4 
Senior Broadcast 
Officer 
Broadcast 
Officer 
Regional & 
Specialist Media 
Manager 
Press Office 
Co-ordinator 
Overnight 
Media Analyst Communities & 
Transport 
Economy & 
Treasury 
Justice & 
Home Affairs 
Education & 
Families 
Health 
Business 
Enterprise and 
Regulatory 
Reform 
Environment 
& Rural 
Affairs 
International 
Affairs & 
Defence 
Cultural 
Affairs 
Work & 
Pensions 
Diversity Officer 
International Office 
Assistant 
Liberal Youth 
Training Task Group 
Co-ordinator (Lorna 
S) 
Women Lib Dems 
Head of Office 
Campaign for 
Gender Balance 
Organiser 
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Appendix H - Party Structure Oct 2010 
 
 
CHIEF EXEC 
Dir of         POLICY 
& COMMS 
Media Team  
 
Policy unit  
 
Leader‟s 
Correspondence 
Dir of FINANCE 
Finance 
Treasury 
Controller 
Dir of CAMPAIGNS & 
ELECTIONS 
Training 
Campaigns 
Dir of MARKETING, 
FUNDRAISING & 
MEMBERS’ SERVICES 
Membership 
LDC 
Marketing 
Digital/Data 
Lib Dem News 
Membership 
development 
Eng Party liaison 
Fundraising 
Dir of OPERATIONS 
 
HR 
Compliance 
Legal  
Diversity unit  
Conference Office 
International Office  
 
IT Services 
 
Candidates  
 
Trustees, Pensions, 
Trusts etc 
PARTY 
GOVERNANCE & 
BUILDING 
Cttee Admin & 
President support 
HR Support 
Building 
Liaison with 
ODPM 
Research and 
Analysis 
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Appendix I – Becoming a Lib Dem Candidate 
 
Becoming a Liberal Democrat Candidate 
 
Welcome to the Liberal Democrat approvals process. As a party, we are 
always delighted to welcome new candidates.  
 
Becoming a parliamentary candidate and fighting an election as a 
representative of the Party, can be a fantastic and often life-changing 
experience. As a candidate you will have the chance to make a real difference 
to your local area and to stand up for local people. The role is one of variety - 
one day you may be dealing with a local resident‟s problem, the next giving 
your opinion on national Party policy.  
 
The Party‟s approvals process is designed to ensure clarity and transparency. 
The process is based upon a Competency Framework. This clearly expresses 
the Party‟s view as to the abilities and qualities that a parliamentary candidate 
should possess. The six competencies that have been identified are: 
 Communication Skills 
 Leadership 
 Strategic Thinking and Judgement 
 Representing People 
 Resilience 
 Values in Action 
The competency framework is available to members of the Party to study prior 
to assessment and is included in the application pack. It includes details of the 
behaviour through which a person can show whether or not they have the 
necessary skills. 
 
We recommend that you also contact the relevant Candidates‟ Chair - please 
see the attached list – for further guidance. In England this will be the 
Regional Candidates‟ Chair for your area; in Wales and Scotland you should 
contact your State Candidates‟ Chair. 
 
A wide range of training sessions can be found at the Party‟s national and 
regional conferences. For further information, go to the main website 
www.libdems.org.uk and click on the Conferences section.  
 
We hope that this pack will provide you with helpful information on how the 
approvals process works. If you have any questions or if we can be of any 
assistance at all, please do not hesitate to contact us. 
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How to become a parliamentary candidate 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Request an application pack from the Candidates’ 
Office: candidates@libdems.org.uk 
Your form and references will be checked and if everything is in order you 
will be invited to attend an Assessment Centre once a place becomes 
available 
Read Competency Framework and undertake 
self-assessment 
Check Lib Dem News or 
www.libdems4parliament.org.uk for selection adverts 
For constituency selections, apply and go through the Local 
Party Selection Process  
If the Local Party selects you then you will be the candidate 
there at the next election 
If you feel ready to apply complete and return the 
application pack and also undertake any training you 
feel will help you 
If you do not feel ready to apply undertake 
all relevant available training. Contact 
candidates@libdems.org.uk for more 
information 
If you pass the Assessment Centre your name will be added to the list of 
approved candidates 
If you do not pass the Assessment Centre you will be given 
constructive feedback and advice about training and areas of 
improvement. In most cases you will be invited to attend another 
Assessment Centre after 12 months 
For elections that use regional or top-up lists, apply and go 
through the list Selection Process 
If you are selected onto the list you will be part of the 
Party‟s campaign team for the next election  
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The Liberal Democrat Approvals Process in Detail 
 
 
We are absolutely committed to making the approvals process 
accessible to all applicants. Please let us know of any access 
requirements as soon as possible so we can make reasonable 
adjustments. 
 
We would strongly recommend that you complete the self-assessment 
questionnaire below. This will allow you to judge how ready you are to go 
through the approvals process.  
 
If after reading this information pack and undertaking the questionnaire you 
decide that you would like to start the approvals process then contact us at 
candidates@libdems.org.uk to request an application pack.  
 
The application forms are very straightforward. We just ask you for contact 
details, some basic background information and for the contact details of 
three referees, one of which must be from a Party member. The application 
form does not form part of the assessment nor is seen by the assessors. It is 
used to ensure that you are who you say you are and that you are eligible to 
stand for Parliament.  
 
Once you have returned the completed application form you will be 
automatically added to the list of people waiting for an assessment day. As 
long as you have been a party member for 12 consecutive months in 
England and Wales and 9 consecutive months in Scotland and as long as 
there are no problems with your references, we will invite you to attend an 
assessment centre as soon as there is a space available. Assessment 
centres take place across the country on a regular basis. Our target is that all 
eligible applicants will be offered a place at an assessment centre within six 
months of handing in their forms.  
 
The assessment centre is based on the competency framework. This sets out 
the things we would expect a parliamentary candidate to do, and those things 
that a good candidate would probably not do. The assessment team does 
not see the information on your application form; they will base their 
assessment purely upon your performance during the assessment 
centre. 
 
At the assessment centre, you will take part in a variety of exercises. These 
have been designed to allow you to show the assessors how you would 
perform as a parliamentary candidate. Information about these exercises will 
be sent to you once you have returned your application forms to give you time 
to prepare. The exercises are designed so that there is no “right” or “wrong” 
way to complete them. Several different assessors will mark you throughout 
the assessment centre. They will be required to show evidence of things that 
you have said and done on the day to support the grade that you are given at 
the end of the day. 
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Depending on whether you are applying to become approved to run in 
England, Scotland or Wales, or for Europe, you will be given relevant Policy 
questions on the assessment day to reflect this.   
 
If you successfully pass the assessment you will be approved immediately as 
a candidate. If you are not successfully approved on the assessment day you 
will be able to reapply in either 1 or 5 years, depending on your final mark. 
 
Once you are an approved candidate and your name has been added to the 
Approved List, you are then free to put yourself forward for selection in any 
seat that advertises for a parliamentary candidate. These adverts appear in 
Lib Dem News and on www.libdems4parliament.org.uk.  
 
To apply for an advertised seat you will need to contact the Returning Officer 
whose details will be in the advert. The Returning Officer will send you an 
application form, which has to be returned by the given deadline. The Local 
Party Selection Committee will then shortlist the applications (you may be 
asked to attend a short-listing interview). If you are successfully short-listed, 
then you will have three weeks to campaign among the Local Party members 
to put forward your case. At the end of the campaign, there will be a hustings 
meeting at which the Local Party members will vote for who they want to 
represent them at the next General Election. If the Local Party selects you, 
then you will fight the next General Election for that seat. 
 
Scottish Parliamentary elections are split between constituency based first 
past the post seats and regional seats (based on the boundaries of multiple 
constituency seats) that are elected using the d‟Hondt, or closed party list, 
method.  Constituency seats are selected as for a General Election with the 
regional seats as for a European Election.  There are 129 seats in the 
Scottish Parliament of which 73 are constituency seats. To stand in Scotland, 
candidates must have completed an assessment centre and also have 
successfully completed the Scottish policy assessment. 
 
Elections to the National Assembly for Wales are split between constituency 
based first past the post seats, and regional seats that are elected using the 
d'Hondt, or closed party list, method.  There are 40 constituency seats, 
selection for which is carried out on a constituency basis.  There are five 
regions, with four members being elected form each region. List candidates 
are selected by a one-member one-vote system across each region. In order 
to be a candidate in Wales at either Assembly or Westminster elections, 
candidates must have completed an assessment centre and also have 
successfully completed the Welsh policy assessment.  
 
European elections operate on the d‟Hondt system of voting, which requires 
each party to have Euro-Regional list of candidates, ranked in order of 
preference. You can apply for selection in as many regions as you want but 
may only be included on one final list. To qualify for inclusion on the Lib Dem 
list, candidates must complete the relevant sections of the exercises on the 
assessment day. 
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Who’s who in approval and selection 
 
The approval and selection of Parliamentary Candidates is the constitutional 
responsibility of each of the three Federal State Parties of England, Scotland 
and Wales. Each State has an elected Candidates Committee, which takes 
the decisions and sets the policies that govern the processes of the approval, 
selection and review of their Parliamentary Candidates. In England, this is 
undertaken by the English Candidates Committee (ECC); in Scotland, the 
Scottish Campaigns and Candidates Committee (SC&C); and in Wales, the 
Welsh Candidates & Campaigns Committee (WCC).  
 
Each of these State Candidate Committees has an elected Chair who 
represents the Committee on a variety of bodies including the Joint States 
Candidates Committee (JSCC). 
 
In England, each English region also has a Regional Candidates‟ Chair 
(RCC), who is responsible for organising assessment centres, appointing 
Returning Officers, and providing advice and support to members going 
through the approvals and selection processes. 
 
The Candidates’ Office 
 
The staff in the Candidates‟ Office, based at the Lib Dem headquarters in 
Cowley Street, is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the 
approvals process for the English, Scottish and Welsh Parties. They act as 
the first port of call for any general enquiry about standing as a Parliamentary 
Candidate, and can provide advice on the best person to speak with at a 
regional or state level if you have a more specific query. 
 
Their responsibilities include sending out application forms, processing 
returned applications (including sending information about new applicants to 
Candidates‟ Chairs) and providing support and advice to members going 
through the approvals and selection processes. They are also responsible for 
providing support and advice to the elected committees and Chairs. 
 
Other organisations that may be able to offer help, advice or training 
are: 
 
PCA – Parliamentary Candidates‟ Association    
www.parliamentary.org.uk 
 
CGB – Campaign for Gender Balance     
www.genderbalance.org.uk  
 
LDDA – Liberal Democrat Disability Association   
www.disabilitylibdems.org.uk 
 
EMLD – Ethnic Minority Liberal Democrats    
www.ethnic-minority.libdems.org 
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DELGA - Liberal Democrats for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
Equality 
www.delga.org.uk 
Jargon Buster 
 
Here are some common terms and acronyms that you may hear people using 
about approval and selection: 
 
PPC - Prospective Parliamentary Candidate - the person who will fight the 
seat for the Party at the next General Election 
 
PSPC – Prospective Scottish Parliamentary Candidate 
 
PAC – Prospective Assembly Candidate (Welsh Assembly) 
 
PEPC - Prospective European Parliamentary Candidate 
 
RO – Returning Officer - the person appointed by the region of state to make 
sure a selection is run fairly and according to the rules 
 
ECC - English Candidates‟ Committee; oversees the approval and selection 
of Candidates in England 
 
SCC or C&C – Scottish Campaigns and Candidates‟ Committee; oversees 
the approval and selection of Candidates in Scotland 
 
WCC or CCC – Welsh Candidates‟ and Campaigns Committee; oversees the 
approval and selection of Candidates in Wales 
 
JSCC – Joint States‟ Candidates‟ Committee; co-ordinates the maintenance 
of standards in the approval and selection across all 3 States. 
 
RCC - Regional Candidates‟ Chair, a member of the Regional Executive who 
has responsibility for approval and selection in that region. They also provide 
support and help to candidates throughout the approval and selection 
processes 
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Self-assessment questionnaire 
 
This short questionnaire is designed to help you decide whether you are 
ready to submit an application for assessment. As the assessment centre is 
pass/fail, it is important that you make sure you are fully prepared and are 
applying at the right time for you. Read this questionnaire to help you decide 
whether you would benefit from further training or development before 
attending the assessment centre, particularly if you have been a member for 
less than 12 months in England and Wales or 9 months in Scotland and so 
are not yet eligible to be assessed. 
 
Policy and Values 
 Do you feel you are in broad agreement with current party 
policy? 
Y / N 
 Can you communicate Lib Dem policy clearly and 
persuasively? 
Y / N 
 Can you show how your Lib Dem values and beliefs affect the 
way you live your life? 
Y / N 
 
Building skills in this area 
The Policy area of the Party website contains briefings covering key policy 
areas. In addition, a pocket guide to policy is available from Lib Dem Image. 
You can learn more about how policy is formed and keep up to date with new 
developments by attending regional and federal conference.  
  
Communication skills 
 Are you able to use different styles of communication for 
different audiences and occasions?  
Y / N 
 Do you enjoy talking to people and addressing their 
concerns? 
Y / N 
 Do you look for opportunities to tell people about what the 
Lib Dems are doing for them? 
Y / N 
 
Building skills in this area 
There is Party training available in this area – please contact us for details of 
what is coming up in the near future. Many people are nervous about things 
like public speaking, and training can be of great benefit in building skills and 
confidence. 
 
Media 
 Do you feel able to communicate appropriately with 
journalists? 
Y / N 
 Are you able to think on your feet and respond quickly and 
appropriately to questions on topical matters? 
Y / N 
 Do you make the most of media opportunities in order to 
maximise Party profile? 
Y / N 
 
Building skills in this area 
There is Party training available in this area – please contact us for details of 
what is coming up in the near future. In addition, watching or listening to 
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politicians being interviewed can be very helpful – both to pick up tips and to 
see what to avoid!  
 
Inter-personal skills 
 Do you take the time to understand other people’s views and 
needs?  
Y / N 
 Are you able to deal effectively with conflict and opposition?   Y / N 
 Do you make an effort to be friendly and approachable when 
meeting new people? 
Y / N 
 
Building skills in this area 
There is Party training available in this area – please contact us for details of 
what is coming up in the near future.  
 
Campaigning 
 Do you have recent experience of participating in an election 
campaign? 
Y / N 
 Do you have the ability to see how national issues can be 
linked with areas of local concern? 
Y / N 
 Can you show that you are organised and able to plan ahead? Y / N 
 
Building skills in this area 
The Campaigns department run training at regional and federal conferences 
to help you keep up to date with new techniques and advice. Council by-
elections are a great was to get some campaigning experience all year round 
– you can find out what‟s happening near you on the Flock Together website. 
 
Leadership 
 Do you have experience of leading a group of people? Y / N 
 Are you able to inspire and motivate people to keep going, 
even when things are getting difficult? 
Y / N 
 Are you able to listen to and take account of a diverse range of 
views and opinions? 
Y / N 
 
 
Building skills in this area 
Look out for areas where you can gain experience of leading a group of 
people both in your professional and personal life.  
 
This questionnaire is designed as an aid to deciding when to apply for 
approval, and there is no recommended number of questions to which you 
should answer, “Yes”. If, however, you find that you have answered “No” to 
more than one question in any category, we would strongly advise you to 
undertake further development in that area becoming to assessment.  
 
You can contact your Candidates‟ Chair (please see the sheet of contact 
details above) for details of help available in your region or state, and the 
Candidates‟ Office, on candidates@libdems.org.uk, for details of training at 
conference and across the country. 
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A news item in The Argus of
November 13th concluded “The
council will now consider a range of
options on how best to manage the
site (The Tye) including selling it on.”
Liz Lee and Simon Doyle worked hard
over the ensuing months to ensure
that the Tye was not sold.  Ultimately,
prior to the East Saltdean town
council by-election in October 2010
the Conservatives were forced to
confirm that they had abandoned plans
to consider selling the Tye.
Simon Doyle said, “Local people feel a
real sense of ownership and had not
appreciated that the Tye could be sold
without their say so.”
The Liberal Democrats have always
maintained that the town council should
retain ownership of the Tye on behalf of
local people.  Liz Lee said, “We will
continue to work to ensure that the Tye
can never be sold without full
consultation with local residents.”
Simon Doyle and Liz Lee will continue
to press the town council to ensure the
long term future of the Tye rests with
local residents.
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In a hard fought town council by-election in
October 2010 Lib Dem candidate Simon Doyle
narrowly missed out on being elected by just 4
votes.
This represents a massive swing in support
from the Conservatives to the Liberal Democrats.
Many local residents lent their support to Simon
in recognition of the hard work on behalf of local
people that he and the Lib Dem team have
carried out over many years.
The Town and District council elections in May
will be a straight fight between the Lib Dems and
Conservatives.
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Displaying a poster at election time !
Contributing some money to cover campaign costs:
£10 ! £20 ! £50 !  £100 ! Other .....................
(Cheques payable to ‘Lewes Liberal Democrats’)
Donations of £10 or more entitle you to membership of the Lib Dems. Tick here if you
wish to join. !
Name: ..............................................................................................................................
Address: ...........................................................................................................................
Tel: ........................... E-mail:............................................................................................
East Saltdean Lib Dems, FREEPOST, 23 East Street, Lewes, BN7 2LJ.
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In the 6 months since the Coalition
was formed and the Lib Dems
entered Government much has been
achieved. The Lib Dems in
Government have achieved amongst
other things.
" Putting money back in your
pocket by raising the level at
which money is taxed.
" Restoring the link between
pensions and earnings.
" A step towards electoral
reform with the fairer votes
referendum.
" Getting tough on banks by
taxing bankers more and
making them curb bonuses.
" The introduction of the new
pupil premium which will give
more money to schools with
poorer pupils to spend on what they
need.
" The scrapping of ID cards
The Lib Dems have been playing an
important role in the Government dur-
ing these tough financial times.  The
Labour Government left our country in
an economic mess with the national
debt rising by £427 million a day.
Tough decisions have had to be
made and we have not been able to
introduce all our policies.
Your local Lib Dem team is still
working hard for you all year round.  If
there is anything we can help with
please get in touch using the form
below
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Get in touch with
the local  team
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Many local people have contacted us
regarding the poor state of repair of our roads
in Telscombe and East Saltdean.  This has
been made worse by the recent sub zero
temperatures.
Liberal Democrats have contacted East
Sussex County Council on behalf of local
residents highlighting the problems and
petitioning for improvements.
Let Simon and Liz know which roads locally
are causing you problems.
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In May 2007, you elected three
Conservative District Councillors to represent
you at Lewes District Council.  Local people
have been appalled to learn of the attendance
records of these councillors at Full Council
meetings.  Councillor James Page has
attended just 25% and Councillor Ron
Maskell just 50% of Full Council meetings this
financial year so far.  How can these
councillors represent your interests when they
do not even attend meetings?
Last year their attendance records for Full
Council meetings were 40% and 60%
respectively.  They were both paid their full
councillor’s allowance.  How can they justify
this?
Liz Lee said, “Residents deserve councillors
who are prepared to work hard on their behalf
and actively represent their interests at Lewes
District.”  Simon Doyle added, “It is shameful
that they take their duties and responsibilities
so lightly.”
01273 305964
lizwlee@
hotmail.com
01273 307295
Simondoyle.ld@
hotmail.co.uk
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Appendix K – List of Liberal Democrat Ministers291 
 
 
 
Portfolio 
Nick Clegg 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Lord President of the Council 
Leader of the Liberal Democrats 
Vincent Cable 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
President of the Board of Trade 
Chris Huhne Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
Danny Alexander Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
Michael Moore Secretary of State for Scotland 
Lord McNally 
Minister of State for Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
Deputy Leader of the House of Lords 
Nick Harvey Minister of State for the Armed Forces 
Steve Webb Minister of State for Pensions 
Sarah Teather Minister of State for Children and Families 
Jeremy Browne Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Paul Burstow Minister of State for Care Services 
Alistair Carmichael 
Deputy Chief Whip of the House of Commons 
Liberal Democrat Chief Whip in the Commons 
David Heath Deputy Leader of the House of Commons 
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Norman Lamb 
Assistant Government Whip in the House of Commons 
Chief Parliamentary and Political Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister 
Mark Hunter Assistant Government Whip in the House of Commons 
Lord Shutt Deputy Chief Whip in the House of Lords 
Baroness 
Northover 
Whip in the House of Lords 
Lord Wallace Whip in the House of Lords 
Edward Davey 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment Relations, Consumer and Postal 
Affairs 
Andrew Stunell Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Community Cohesion 
Norman Baker Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Regional and Local Transport 
Lynne 
Featherstone 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Equalities 
Lord Wallace Advocate General for Scotland 
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Appendix L - Chairmanship of Party Committees 1988-2010 
 
Chair Federal Policy Committee (Leader) 
 
Paddy Ashdown  1988-1998 
Charles Kennedy  1998-2005 
Ming Campbell   2005-2006* 
Nick Clegg   2007+ ** 
 
*Between January 06 and Campbell's election there was no Chair, while Cable was interim Leader, but Webb, 
Brinton & Hargreaves as Vice-Chairs undertook Chair duties. 
 
**in the run up to the general election of 2010 this role was performed by Danny Alexander and since then by 
Norman Lamb. 
 
Chair Federal Executive (President) 
 
Ian Wrigglesworth  1988-1990 
Charles Kennedy  1991-1994 
Robert Maclennan  1995-1998 
Diana Maddock   1999-2000 
Navnit Dholakia   2001-2004 
Simon Hughes   2005-2008 
Ros Scott   2009-2010 
Tim Farron   2010+ 
 
Chair Federal Conference Committee 
 
Willie Goodhart   1988-1992 
Alan Sherwell   1992-1997 
Liz Barker   1998-2003 
Duncan Brack   2003-2009 
Andrew Wiseman  2010+ 
 
Chair Federal Finance and Accounts Committee* 
 
Tim Clement-Jones  1988-1998 
Denis Robertson-Sullivan 1999-2000 
Robin Teverson   2000-2001 
David Griffiths   2002-2005 
Duncan Greenland  2006+ 
 
* since February 2001 this post holder has been the Party‟s registered treasurer with the Electoral Commission. 
Although there is a separate elected post of Treasurer. 
 
